149 



ORCANON. 



ORGANON. 



150 



in which they are considered and handled. So far as logical forms, 

 considered as determinate notions, are disjointed from one another, 

 and not bound together in organic unity, they are dead forms, and 

 have not in them the spirit which is their living concrete unity. Thus 

 viewed, they have no solid subject-matter (inhalt) no matter which 

 of itself would be a real substance (gehalt). The subject-matter 

 which is looked for in logical forms is nothing else than a firm founda- 

 tion and concretion of these abstract determinations ; and such a 

 substantial essence is usually sought for beyond the bounds of the 

 science. But the logical reason is itself the Substantial or Real 

 matter, which unites in itself all abstract determinations, and is their 

 solid absolute concrete unity. There was no need then to look far for 

 a subject-matter, as it is usually called ; it is not the fault of logic if it 

 appears empty, but it is the fault of the way of considering it." 



" In forming judgments and conclusions, when the operations are 

 especially referred to and grounded on the quantity of the notions, 

 everything rests in an external difference, in a mere comparison, and 

 i es a pure analytical process and calculation void of all ideas. 

 The deduction of the so-called rules and laws of conclusions in par- 

 ticular, is not much better than a handling of sticks of different lengths 

 in order to sort them out and tie them up according to their magnitude 

 nothing else than the child's game of selecting and putting together 

 the pieces of a picture which is composed of parts. This exercise of 

 thought Ins accordingly not unaptly been compared with arithmetic, 

 and arithmetic has been compared with it. In arithmetic, numbers are 

 considered independent of any notions, as something which, in- 

 dependent of their equality or inequality, that is, independent of their 

 absolute external relation, have no signification, as something which 

 neither in themselves nor in their relations express a thought. When 

 it is mechanically ascertained that | multiplied by jj make J, this 

 operation 'contains just; as much' and just as little thought as the 

 ascertainment whether in a given figure this or that conclusion can be 

 made." 



Hegel remarks, that with respect to the formation of an individual 

 mini!, logic may be compared with grammar. Both logic and grammar 

 are something different for him who first approaches them and science 

 in general, and for him who comes back from the sciences to them. 

 He who begins to learn grammatical forms and rules, sees in them 

 nothing but themselves : he who has mastered a language, and com- 

 pares it with other languages, is in a capacity to understand the full 

 force of these rules and forms. Through the grammar he can reach 

 the expression of the mind, the logic. The case is the same with a 

 man's first introduction to logic : its signification is limited to itself. 

 Lo;nc must be first learned as something which a man comprehends 

 and understands, but in which extent, depth, and further meaning are 

 not discovered. It is not till we have a deeper acquaintance with the 

 other sciences that the logical becomes for the mind, subjectively, not 

 abstract universal, but a universal which comprehends within 

 it the abundance of the particular : just as the same moral maxim in 

 tin- mouth of a youth, even if he understands it correctly, has not the 

 signification and the comprehensive meaning which it has in the mind 

 of a mnn of long experience, to whom the words convey the full force 

 of tlif expression. Thus the logical cannot be fully estimated until it 

 is made the result of experience in the sciences : it then presents itself 

 to the mind as the universal truth, not as a particular knowledge co- 

 :it with other matter and realities, but as the essence of all other 

 knowledge. 



" l."gic has been defined (by Hegel) as the science of the pure 

 lit, which has for its principium (f)-im'ij t ) the pure knowledge 

 (iruiKn) not an abstract, but a concrete living unity ; and concrete in 

 ;iy, that in it there are undeniably opposed to one another the 

 consciousness of a subjective self-existence, and a second such existence, 

 an objective ; and that existence is known as a pure Notion in itself, 

 and the pure Notion is known as the real existence. These then are 

 the two momenta which are contained in the logical. But they are 

 only known as existing inseparably, and not each in the consciousness 

 'as exi.-rting by itself; but it is only by virtue of their being also known 

 as different ( yet not self -existing) that their unity is not abstract, empty, 

 and inactive, but concrete. 



" This unity constitutes the logical principium (j>r!nr!/i) as its 

 it, so that the development of this difference, which is always in 

 it, takes place within this element. Thus the entire notion is to be 

 considered in the one case as existing Notion, in the other as Notion 

 simply : in the former case it is notion by itself of reality or existence ; 

 in the latter it is notion as such, self-existing notion. 



"Logic will therefore be divided into the logic of the notion as 

 existence, and of the notion as notion ; or, to make use of the common 

 u very indefinite and ambiguous expressions, into the objective 

 and subjective logic. 



" Consistently with the fundamental element of the unity of the 



notion in itself, and the connected inseparability of its momenta, these 



momenta must be viewed also in their mutual relations, so far as they 



aro different, and so far as the notion is considered with respect to a 



nee. Hence arises a sphere of Mediation (vermittluny), or of the 



. as a system of reflective determinations, that is, of the existence 



passing into the internal existence of the notion, which, in this way, is 



n such by itself, but is affected by the immediate existence 



as by a thing properly external to itself." This is the doctrine of the 



essence (wesen), which stands between the doctrine of existence and of 

 the notion ; but in the general division of Hegel's work it is placed 

 under the objective logic, inasmuch as, though the essence is certainly 

 the Internal, yet the character of the subject is expressly appropriated 

 to the Notion. 



Hegel's division, therefore, is into the objective and subjective, or, 

 more distinctly, into : 



1. The Logic of Existence (Die Logik des Seyns). 



2. The Logic of Essence (Die Logik des Weseui). 



3. The Logic of the Notion (Die Logilc des Begriffs). 

 (' Wissenschaft der Logik,' erster band, 1832.) 



It may be useful to show in a general way what the Organon of 

 Aristotle, as we now have it, contains. The name Organon, or Instru- 

 ment, was not given by Aristotle, but is of a date posterior to him. 



The following synopsis is given by Giulio Paci, in his edition of the 

 Organon : 



( , ._ T, ... I With reference to pri- 



The CATEGORIES. 



. On INTERPRETATION. 

 . The PRIOR ANALYTIC*. 



. The POSTERIOR 

 ANALTTICA. 



. The TOPICA. 



. On SOPHISTIC 

 EI.EXCIH. 



With this tabular view, the following general description of the 

 contents of the Organon of Aristotle, by an able writer, will be intel- 

 ligible. " The incorrect notions which have prevailed, and still con- 

 tinue to prevail, in regard to the ' nature and province of logic,' are, 

 without detraction from his merits, mainly to be attributed to the 

 example and authority of the philosopher himself. The books of 

 I'iet, as containing an objective classification of real things, is 

 metaphysical, not logical. The two books of Posterior Analytics, as 

 solely conversant about demonstrative or necessary matter, transcend 

 the limits of the formal science ; and the same is tme of the eight 

 books of Topia, as wholly occupied with probable matter, its accidents 

 and applications. Even the two books of the Prior Analytics, in which 

 the pure syllogism is considered, are swelled with extralogical dis- 

 cussions. Such for example, is the whole doctrine of modality of 

 syllogisms, as founded on the distinction of pure, necessary, and con- 

 tingent matter ; the consideration of the real truth or falsehood of 

 propositions, and the power so irrelevantly attributed to the syllogism 

 of inferring a true conclusion from false premises ; the distinction of 

 the enthymeme through the extra formal character of its premises, as 

 a reasoning from signs and probabilities ; the physiognomic syllogism, 

 &c. &c. The same is true of the book on Interpretation (**pl 'Ep/niPtfa;) ; 

 and matters are even worse with that on Fallaciet (Sophistic Elcnchi). 

 If Aristotle, therefore, did more than any other philosopher for the 

 progress of the science, he also did more than any other to overlay it 

 with extraneous lumber, and to impede its development under a precise 

 and elegant form. Many of his successors had the correctest views of 

 the object and scope of logic ; and even among the schoolmen there 

 were minds who could have purified the science from its adventitious 

 sediment, had they not been prevented from applying their principles 

 to details by the implicit deference then exacted to the precept and 

 practice of Aristotle." (' Edinburgh Review,' April, 1833.) 



It may indeed be strongly suspected that the various treatises which 

 compose the Organon contain interpolations. Further, what we now 

 have are only a part of the logical works of Aristotle ; and even this 

 part does not exhibit simply a logical system, properly so called, but 

 rather a system of argumentative discourse. 



Wi> may remark of the Categories that attempts have been made to 

 found a philosophical system upon them, as explained by Aristotle. 

 They contain, us is observed by Dr. Whately, the explicit statement 

 that though a primary substance signifies a particular thing, as " a 

 particular man," " a particular horse," the general term " man " or 

 " horse " (which he calls a secondary substance) only appears to denote 

 a particular thing, but in fact does not ; for the thing is not one, as in 

 the case of a " particular man," but is said of many (v. 16, ed. Pac.). 

 This is a clear statement that general terms do not indicate realities, 

 but are only the expression of the mode in which the mind is 

 affected. 



In the Prior Analytics it lias been stated that the pure syllogism is 

 considered : the introductory chapter of the First Book states in a 

 general way the objects of the science as conceived by Aristotle, and is 

 expressed with his characteristic clearness. 



" It is proper," says Aristotle, " first to state about what the inquiry 

 is, and to what the inquiry belongs, namely, demonstration and demon- 

 strative science. Then we must define Proposition (irp<JTo<ris), Term 

 (tipos), and Syllogism (avKKayurphs) ; and what is a perfect and what an 

 imperfect syllogism. Next, what is meant by one thing being or not 

 being in the whole of another, and what we mean by a 'thing being 

 predicated of all or none. A proposition then is a sentence (A^os) 

 which affirms or denies something of another thing; and this either 

 universally, or particularly, or indefinitely. By universally, I mean 



