in 



OKGANON. 



OBOANOK. 



where it applies to all or none ; by particularly, where it applies to 

 put, or uot a |rt, or not t" .ill ; and !_>- indeliniU-ly, where it applies, 

 or doc* not apply, without anything being determined as to the whole 

 or jnrt. The demonstrative (avufeurruni) proposition differs from tlu> 

 io (8XfTue^). The demonstrative is an assumption of one ride 

 of the question, namely the contradiction ; for he MM demonstrate* 

 doe* not interrogate, but he assumes ; but the dialectic is an interro- 

 gation ai to the contradiction.* Thix, however, makes no difference 

 with respect to the syllogism in either case, for both he who d 

 ctrates and he who interrogates syllogise by assuming something to be 

 predicated or not to be predicated of another thing. Consequently a 

 syllogistic proposition will be simply an affirmation or denial of one 

 thing with respect to another, in the way already mentioned ; and a 

 proposition will be demonstrative if it is true, and obtained by means 

 of the original hypothesis. A dialectic proposition in, with respect to 

 the question, an interrogation about denial ; but to him who syllogises, 

 it is the assumption of that which u apparent and probable, as it is 

 shown in the Topic*. What then U a proposition, and ill what respect 

 a syllogistic, demonstrative, and dialectic proposition differ, will be 

 accurately stated in what follows (in the ' Analytics Fosteriora ') ; but 

 for the present purpose what hog been already said is sufficient. 



' I call Term that into which a proposition is resolved, as the pre- 

 dicate (TO Kanrxopov/uror), and that of which predication is made, with 

 the addition or not of ' being,' or ' not being.' A syllogism is discourse, 

 in which certain things being laid down, something different from these 

 things necessarily results by virtue of these premises (ru roCro 

 Tu). And I mean by the words ' by virtue of the premises,' that this 

 something results by reason of them (Jk ToOro) : and 'by reason of 

 them ' means that no other term U needed in order to this necessary 

 result. Now, I call that a perfect syllogism which requires nothing 

 else besides what is assumed or granted in order that the necessary 

 conclusion may appear. I call that an imperfect syllogism which 

 requires one or more things which are of necessity by virtue of the 

 given terms, but are not assumed in the propositions. For one thing 

 to be said to be in the whole of another, ami one thing to be predicated 

 of the whole of another, is the same thing ; and I mean by predication 

 of the whole of a thing, when one cannot conceive any part of the one 

 thing (the subject) of which the other cannot be predicated ; and the 

 like when the predication is of no part of a thing." 



It was apparently the object of Aristotle in his so-called logical 

 treatises, as we now have them, to make a perfect system of argu- 

 mentative discourse, and not merely a logical (properly BO called) 

 system. It is probable that if all his works of this class were extant 

 and arranged according to his own method, we should see still more 

 clearly that the whole was not considered a logical system (as the term 

 logic is strictly understood), but that a logical system (as the term is 

 strictly understood) was contained in it. Whether Aristotle or any 

 other person put the existing books of the Organon together, neither 

 the author who conceived them in connection with one another, nor 

 any one else, considered them as forming a pure logical or even a pure 

 dialectic treatise, but a treatise on argumentation. And this is clear 

 enough from an examination of the contents of the Organon, and the 

 remarks of Cicero (Topica) and his commentator Boethius, who was 

 himself a writer on logic. Boethius, who uses the term Loyk, informs 

 us that the Peripatetics understood this term as Cicero understood it, 

 and Cicero defines it to be " disserendi diligena ratio," or " an exact 

 method of argumentation." The Peripatetics, he adds, understood 

 logic to consist in invention and judgment ; but the Stoics, who neg- 

 lected invention, considered it to consist in judgment only, which they 

 distinguished by the name of dialectic. Thus the logic of the l'eri|u- 

 tctic.H was larger than the logic of the Stoics. The logic of the Peripatetics 

 consisted, first of topic or invention, which teaches the method of easily 

 discovering arguments ; and Boethius remarks that Aristotle in his 

 ' Topica ' treats of the " maxima) propositiones " (called loci), which are 

 universal propositions, of undoubted truth, which need no demon- 

 stration, or probable propositions, and lr< nu which we descend to the con- 

 clusions of the syllogism. Judgment is more particularly exercised in 

 making conclusions (in colligendi ratione), but inasmuch as all argu- 

 mentation and nylliigisiiig depend on and are constructed of propositions, 

 we have to consider both the matter of propositions and uieir con- 

 nection. As to the matt/r, we have to consider whether the propositions 

 are true, or necessary, or probable, or sophistical As to the connection, 

 we have to consider the union and the composition of the propositions, 

 which may be called the form of the arguments. Logic then consist* 

 of invention, and of the conclusions from invention, or the form of the 

 argumentation. The part which treats of invention supplies the 

 iiiHtruments or means for invention, and, as already observed, is called 

 Topice. The part which relates to judgment supplies certain rules for 

 discerning or separating (ditcrrnauli), and is called Analytice : so far 

 aa it treats of the connection or union of propositions, it is called 

 Analytice Prior ; so far as it treats of the inventions themselves, it is 

 called Analytice Posterior, when it is engaged about discerning neces- 

 sary argument* ; but when it is engaged about false and deceptive 

 arguments (eariUatoria) , that u, sophistical.it is called the Klenchi. 

 lioethius then conclude* that Aristotle treated of logic in a more 



TV 8iaArriiri> i-rurrfiiaiv olanv rot op6ii tia\(fiir$,n irtpi TWV iv 

 lf*rtiatt Kul lutoxplffti \6yuv. ( Ding . Laert., Zcno,' rli., c. S.) 



complete manner than the Stoic*, "since he treated of the two things 

 wide* which there U no third, namely, invention and judgment, while 

 the Stoic* neglected invention and only furnished us with the instru- 

 nents of judgment." 



This statement of what the logic of Aristotle was, may help to 

 remove certain long-rooted mistakes on the matter. Dr. Whately, who 

 confines logic to the pure syllogism in his theoretical view of the 

 - jbject, though not in his practical exposition of it, say* that " with 

 Jie exception of Aristotle, hardly a writer on logic can be mem 

 who has clearly perceived, and steadily kept in view throughout, ita 

 real nature and object." And he remarks that even Aristotle is not 

 ntifil;! exempt from the error of mistaking the nature of logic, and 

 extending it to subject* with which it has no proper connection. Now 

 ;he fact is that Aristotle's logic, being what we have here explained it 

 ;o be, is a very different thing from what it appear* to be con- 

 M be by many. To say that Aristotle is not entirely exempt from tho 

 error above mentioned is rather a singular expression, when three- 

 fourths of his Organon have nothing at all to do with the pure syllo- 

 {ism. In fact Aristotle's Organon, and his logic as explained by 

 Boethius, are much more like Watts's much-abused ' Right Use of 

 Reason ' than like what many modern writers take them to be. 



There is a short but not a satisfactory account of the contents of 

 Aristotle's Organon by Dr. Thomas Keid, Edinburgh, 1806. It may 

 however serve to give the reader some notion of the contents of the 

 work. The best account of it is said to be by Barthoiemy St. Hilaire, 

 ' La Logique d'Aristote,' 2 vols. 8vo. [Looic.] 



The controversial tone of this article, in a work of this description, 

 may require a word or two of apology. Until the limits of logic are 

 better defined, the subject niunt be controversial, for the qn 

 ' What is Logic < " must continually recur. The work with reference 

 to which these remarks are chiefly made has long had a great rirru- 

 lation, and has taken the place of former treatises, which is a sufficient 

 reason why the errors of that work, if such they be, should bo i>ointed 

 out. In various parts of his work, Dr. Whately has explained with 

 sufficient precision what he considers Logic to be : he has in fact defined 

 it as the pure syllogism, irrespective of all material considerations. 

 But in the execution of his plan he continually perplexes the reader 

 with considerations as to the matter of propositions and terms ; and he 

 transcends the narrow limits within which the science, as he under- 

 stands it, is confined. It cannot be supposed that a writer, however 

 able, can so far deviate from a scientific method without serious 

 prejudice to his work.* 



Two reviews of Dr. Whately's treatise have fallen under our notice, 

 one of which appeared in the ' Westminster Keview ' for January, 

 18-2S; the other in the 'Edinburgh Review' for April, 1833. Tho 

 former shows that Dr. Whately is not alone in some of those opinions 

 which we consider erroneous. The latter is from a master-hand [Sir 

 \V. Hamilton], who is well acquainted with both ancient and modern 

 writers on logic and philosophy. To this article we are much and 

 deeply indebted. 



Several treatises on logic have appeared in Germany, which profess 

 to exhibit the subject according to a strictly scientific method. Among 

 these may be mentioned Kiesewetter's ' Oruudriss ciner Allgemeinen 

 Logik nach Kontischen Grundsatzen," &c., Berlin, 1791. 



A complete catalogue of logical treatises would be very long ; and 

 the value of the catalogue would hardly compensate for its length. 

 Writers have formed their notions of the science with more or less 

 precision, but have seldom, if ever, kept within their own limits ; and 

 this is a difficulty which is inherent in the subject. If confined to the 

 bare affirmation or negation of propositions expressed by u or it not 

 (considered simply as determinations of quantity), and to the pure 

 syllogism, the theory of logic is soon exhausted, and as a science it is 

 comprised within very narrow limits. If we once transcend thoso 

 bounds, we enter into a wider sphere, in which this formal logic 

 becomes a mere point. To ascertain the full import of the words it 

 and is not in a proposition is the highest aim of philosophy. 



A student in logic, consulting only modern works, may be debarred 

 from even the slightest notion of an historical view of the suliject, 

 by the mixture which his books give him of the ideas of writers of all 

 times and countries. To disentangle the confusion of mini! 

 methods which even a good treatise presents, ki*lorically speaking, it 

 is above all things necessary that he should first get some knowledge 

 of what Aristotle is. And this the work of an erudite and acute 

 German writer enables us to give in a very useful way. 



The ' Kk'ineuta Logices Anstotelicae,' by Professor Trendulcnburg, 

 Berlin, 1842, -ml edition, consists of passage* selected from the works 

 of Aristotle, which passages may be considered as containing tho 

 element* of the science. These passages are so arranged as to present 

 a kind of outline of the whole logical system of Aristotle. They are 

 intended for the use of the higher classes in gymnasia, and as a pre- 

 paration for philosophical studies. 



The following article U simply a translation of these extracts, which 

 arc retained in the order given to them by Trendclenburg ; and the 



The edition of Dr. Whitcly's 'Logic,' referred to in thi article la the 

 fourth. The writer [1840] did not know that there was a sixth, which contains 

 some few alterations, till this article was ready for the press. The reader 

 should refer both to the fourth and to tho sixth editions. 



