153 



ORGANON. 



ORGANON. 



151 



references to the original places in Aristotle have also been retained. 

 The original terms of Aristotle are also given in brackets the first time 

 that each is mentioned. 



In the preface to another useful work (' Erlautemngen zu den 

 Elementen der Aristotelischen Logik,' Berlin, 1842, by the same 

 author), he has more fully explained his views in making these 

 extracts from Aristotle, and the following remarks are his : At the 

 time of the Reformation Luther saw clearly the advantage of logical 

 instruction in the higher schools, and he viewed it correctly as the 

 completion of the grammatical instruction. The circle of studies in 

 modern times has been wonderfully enlarged, and it has been found 

 necessary to extend the school instruction to meet the wants of the 

 present age. But the great variety of subjects with which our present 

 systems of education occupy us, only render it the more necessary to 

 discipline the mind in such a manner that it shall see a unity in all 

 that is presented to it, and not be bewildered by the variety of objects 

 whose connection escapes us, when they are contemplated separately. 

 Such a discipline is furnished by a good course of elementary instruc- 

 tion in logic. For this purpose the author has adopted the genuine 

 words of Aristotle, hi which the philosopher has laid down his 

 elementary logical principles. The logic of Aristotle is not antiquated, 

 though it is both misunderstood by some, and blamed by others who 

 do understand it. It is not the formal logic of Kant, which would 

 confine us to the forms of thought without any reference to the 

 object into which the thought penetrates. Such a limitation of the 

 subject is entirely at variance with the system of Aristotle, and 

 opposed to its real character. " We have," says Trendelenburg, 

 " attempted to restore this real character, and thus brought Aristotle 

 nearer to the objective demands of modern times." Those who view 

 logic OH purely formal, view it differently from Aristotle, and they may 

 consider their mode of viewing the subject to be better than his. 

 Those who way that Aristotle has, in some matters, erroneously 

 extended the province of logic to things beyond its limits, and has 

 not always kept close to the real subject, appear to have conceived 

 thnt he viewed it merely as formal, and sometimes '.transgressed the 

 boundaries of the science which he recognised. This is however an 

 erroneous view of Aristotle's system. 



The advantage of studying these elementary principles in the words 

 of Aristotle is, that in his writings the language of philosophy is 

 formed into a scientific terminology, which is the basis of that which 

 we now use. We cannot therefore lay a sure foundation for our logical 

 and philosophical studies on any other basis than a full comprehension 

 of the meaning of Aristotle's terms. 



The author remarks that a learner of logic there meets with those 

 fundamental notions (begriffc) in their simple nakedness, which lie 

 hidden in all our knowledge and govern it. As these notions arc hid 

 or concealed in our knowledge, they appear dry and lifeless when they 

 are produced in their naked form. It is therefore the business of 

 the teacher to show to the pupil their real significance, to make him 

 see their actual value hi their application. Now the instruction in the 

 German Gymnasia, as in the higher schools in Great Britain and 

 Ireland, IB in the learned languages and in mathematics ; and accord- 

 ingly the teachers in both these departments, if they are to make use 

 of such a work as Trcndelenburg's, must be able to apply logical princi- 

 ples to instruction in language and hi mathematics. To facilitate this 

 method of instruction is the object of the learned author in the 

 ' Illustrations (Erlautemngen) to the Elements of Aristotle," not, as ho 

 modestly observes, that this is precisely the form in which he supposes 

 that they ought to be presented to the pupil, but " merely to render 

 clear the fundamental notion of the logical relationship in the objects 

 of scienti6c observation." 



The mode in which the author suggests that his two works should 

 be used is probably the best ; but they cannot be used at all hi ordinary 

 instruction, except under the guidance of a competent teacher. They 

 will however be useful to those who have a competent knowledge of 

 reek and German languages, and possess some elementary notions 

 iu ; and those who cannot read Greek with facility will probably 

 find the following translation sufficiently exact to give them the mean- 

 ing of Aristotle. A translation of such extracts is not easy, and it is 

 possible that there may be some errors in it. A careful study of these 

 extracts however will convince a student how meagre and unsatis- 

 factory an exhibition of the elementary principles of logic even our 

 belt works on the subject contain. 



Oallinu of Logic. 



(1.) In things in which theris both falsehood and truth, there is a 

 composition of ideas as though they were one. (' De Anim.,' iii. 6.) 

 K' >r falsehood and truth are concerned with composition and separa- 

 tion. Accordingly nouns and verbs by themselves resemble the 

 without composition and separation, as " man" or " white," 

 when nothing is added : for there is so far neither falsehood nor 

 truth. (' De Interpret.') Consequently he thinks truly who considers 

 that which is separated to be separated, and that which is com- 



Cndetl to Ije compounded ; but he thinks falsely whose thoughts 

 e a different relation from that which the things have. (' Metaph.,' 

 ix. 10.) 



All speech (\&yot) is significative, but not all enunciative 

 j), but only that in which there is either truth or false 



hood. But it is not in all ; for example, prayer is speech, but neither 

 true nor false. The enunciative alone belongs to the present inquiry. 

 (' De Interpret.,' c.,4.) 



(3.) Of things said with no connection, each signifies either sub- 

 stance (oiiirta) or quantity, or quality, or relation, or where (space), or 

 when (time), or position, or possession, or acting, or being acted 

 on. And substance ( oiaria ) is, to give an example, such as man, 

 horse : and quantity is, such as two cubits, three cubits : and 

 quality, such as white, grammatical : and relation, such as double, half, 

 greater : and where, such as in the Lyceum, in the agora : and when, 

 such as yesterday, last year : position, such as he is lying, he is sitting : 

 and possession, such as he has shoes on, he is armed : and acting, such 

 as he cuts, he burns : and being acted on (vdffxf"), such as he is cut, 

 he is burnt. (' Categ.,' c. 4.) 



(4.) Simple enunciative speech is firstly an affirmation, secondly a 

 negation. And affirmation (Kcmfyratru) is an enunciation of something 

 towards another thing ; and negation (dir<!<J)oiris) is the enunciation of 

 something away from another thing. And the speech is true in like 

 manner as the things are true. (' De Interpret.' c. 5, 6, 9.) 



(5.) " Not-man" is not a noun ; for indeed there ia no name to call 

 it by ; for it is neither affirmative speech nor a negation. But let it 

 be called " name or noun indefinite," (idpurros) because it can be said 

 equally of anything, both of what is and what is not. 



Every affirmation and negation will consist either of a noun and a 

 verb or of an indefinite noun and a verb. But without a verb there is 

 neither affirmation nor negation. (' De Interpret.,' c. 2, 10.) 



(6.) Of things some are universal and some particular. I call that 

 universal (nofldAou) which can be said of more things (than one) ; and 

 I call that particular (no*' iitaarov) which cannot : thus, man belongs 

 to the universal, and Callias to the particular. (' De Interpret.,' c. 7.) 

 A Proposition (rfbraau) then is speech either affirming or denying 

 something about something. And this speech is either universal or 

 particular (cli pipci), or indefinite (oJiopio-roj). I call that universal 

 which belongs either to all or to none ; I call that particular which 

 belongs either to some one, or not to some one, or not to all ; and I 

 call that indefinite which either belongs or does not belong, without 

 the universal or particular, as, for instance, of opposite things 

 that there is the same science, or that pleasure ia not a good. 

 (' Analyt. Pr.,' i. 1.) 



It is very evident that the universal is more efficient, because, know- 

 ing the first of two propositions, we know in a manner the second also, 

 and have it potentially ; for example, if a man knows that the angles 

 of every triangle are together equal to two right angles, he knows in a 

 way that the angles of an isosceles triangle also are together equal to 

 two right angles potentially (Svntpci), even if he does not know that 

 the isosceles triangle is a triangle. But he who knows this proposition 

 (the second) by no means knows the universal, either potentially or in 

 reality (impydj). And the universal is an object of the intellect; 

 but the particular terminates in the sensuous perception. ('Analyt. 

 Post.,' i. 24.) 



(7.) Every proposition belongs either to what is, or to what must 

 be, or to what can be. (' Analyt. Pr.' i. 2.) 



(8.) Of all things indeed which exist there are some of such a kind 

 that they can be predicated with truth universally of nothing else, 

 such as Cleon, Callias, and a single thing, and what is an object of 

 sense ; but of these things others can be predicated (for each of these 

 persons is both man and animal) ; and some things are themselves 

 predicated of other things, but of them there is no further predication 

 by other things ; and some are both themselves predicated of others, 

 and others of them, for example, " man " is predicated of " Callias,' 

 and "animal" of "man." Accordingly that there are some things 

 which exist which cannot be predicated of anything is manifest. For 

 of sensuous objects nearly every one is such that it can be predicated 

 (Ktrrriyopi:<r8cu) of nothing. (' Anal. Pr.' i. 27.) 



The genera (yen)) are predicated of the species, but not the converse 

 the species (HSri) of the genera. (' Categ.' c. 5.) 



(9.) It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong 

 ( inrapx*"') and not to belong to the same thing and in the same manner. 

 This indeed of all principles is the most certain ; for it is impossible 

 for any one to conceive that the same thing is and is not. Wherefore 

 all who demonstrate, carry back (their demonstration) to this ultimate 

 notion. (' Metaphys." iv. 3.) 



Every thing which is true must agree with itself in every way : for 

 with truth all which is true is in harmony, but with falsehood the 

 truth is soon at variance. (' Eth. Nic.' i. 8.) 



(10.) And since it is possible for what belongs to be enunciated as 

 not belonging, and what does not as belonging, and what belongs aa 

 belonging, and what does not belong as not belonging, and with respect 

 to other times than the present in like manner, it is possible to deny 

 both all that a man has affirmed, and to affirm what he has denied. 

 So that it is manifest that to every affirmation a negation is opposed, 

 and to every negation an affirmation ; and let the contradiction 

 (lunlQcuru) be this, affirmations and negations opposed. 



And I call opposition (btrrutiiaBiu) the contradiction of the same 

 thing about the same thing, but not Itfuaviliuas. (Comp. ' Categ.,' c. 1 ; 

 ' De Interpret.,' o. 6.) _ * 



Contradiction is opposition (lunUens) in which there is no mean m 

 itself. And as parts of contradiction, there is on one side affirming 



