181 



ORICHALCUM. 



ORION". 



U2 



eiples (apx0> which] \ve must assume (inro6iaBa.i) both to be, and 

 we must assume what they are, or in some other way make clear, 

 which the arithmetician does ; for both what unity is and that it is 

 he assumes. But as to those things which have a middle (pfaoo), and 

 of which something else is the cause of the essence, we can, as we have 

 said, show by demonstration. (' Analyt. Post.,' ii. 9.) 



(66.) And of proposition (putting, placing, 0'<m) that which takes 

 for granted either of the parts of the enunciation, for example, that a 

 thing is, or is not, is Hypothesis (inrMeau) : but the proposition with- 

 out this is Definition ; for the definition is proposition (9f<rts) ; for the 

 arithmetician laya down (puts, places, riSerou) that the unit is indi- 

 visible, as far as quantity is concerned : but it is not hypothesis ; for 

 what a unit is and that there is a unit is not the same thing. ('Analyt. 

 Post ,' i. 2.) 



(67.) All demonstrative science is about three things, two of which 

 are assumed to be ; and these two are genus, the affections (Tafl^/iara) 

 of which by themselves it contemplates, and what are called common 

 axioms (ifio/ioTa) from which first principles science demonstrates; 

 and thirdly, the affections (fAirt) of which what each means it takes 

 for granted. (' Analyt. Post.' i. 10.) 



(68.) It is clear that it is not possible to demonstrate the peculiar 

 first principles of each thing : for those first principles will be the first 

 principles of all things, and knowledge of those is that which is supreme 

 over all. For he knows more who knows from the higher causes : for 

 he knows from the prior when he knows from causes which depend 

 not on other causes. So that if he knows more and most, that science 

 also will be both more and most. (' Analyt. Post.' i. 9.) 



(69.) Accordingly that it is impossible to have science from demon- 

 stration, if a man does not know the first principles which admit of no 

 middle (fyxaf 01 Utaaai), has been said before. But as to the know- 

 ledge of things which want a middle, a man may be in doubt. All 

 animals have an innate discerning faculty, which men call perception 

 (afofh)<ris). And as they have perception, in some animals there is a 

 permanence (pu>rl\) of the thing perceived (<u<rth)/ia) ; and in others 

 there is not. In those animals, then, in which it is not, there is either 

 wholly, or with respect to things of which there is no permanence in 

 them, no knowledge except of what they perceive : but in those ani- 

 mals in which there is, there is the faculty of having the perception 

 in the mind, though they do not then perceive. And many animals 

 being such, there results a difference among them, so that some have 

 reason owing to the permanence of such things, and some have not. 

 Accordingly from perception comes memory ()iyfinii), as we call it, and 

 from the frequent remembrance of the same thing comes experience 

 (lnvupiai) : for many remembrances in number are one experience. 

 And from experience, or from a whole thing remaining tranquil in the 

 mind as one thing apart from the many, whatever thing in all these 

 things is as one and the same thing, is the beginning of art and of 

 science; if about production (yirtau), of art; if about that which is 

 or being (TO ty), of science. Neither indeed do the faculties (<?{<) 

 exist in the mind separate, nor do they proceed from other faculties 

 which are more intelligent, but they proceed from perception ; as in 

 battle when a flight has taken place, when one stops, another stops, 

 and then another, until order is' restored : and the mind exists in such 

 a manner as to have the faculty of being so affected. For when one 

 thing of things which are not different stands, it first of all is in the 

 mind as universal (for the mind perceives the individual, but the per- 

 ception belongs to the universal, for example, it belongs to mankind, 

 but not to a man (' Callias ') ) : and again it abides in these until the 

 undivided and the universal have abided : for example, such or such 

 an animal abides, until animal generally abides ; and in this in like 

 manner. It if manifest then that it is necessary for us to know the 

 first things by induction : for perception also in this manner produces 

 the universal in the mind. 



And since of the faculties that concern the understanding (Sidvoia), 

 by which we learn the truth, some are always true, and some admit of 

 falsehood, as opinion and reasoning (\6yiafu>i) ; and since science and 

 intellect (i-wimiinT] KCU xoCs) are always true, and there is no other kind 

 of science more exact than intellect, and since the first principles are 

 clearer than the demonstrations, and since all science is together with 

 reason (\4yoi),* there can be no science of the first principles : and 

 since nothing can be truer than science except intellect, intellect must 

 be intellect of first principles : and this appears both from considering 

 these things, and that the beginning of demonstration is not demon- 

 stration, so that neither is science the beginning of science. If then 

 we have no kind of truth which exists independent of science, intellect 

 (roiit) must be the beginning of science. (' Analyt. Post.' ii. 19.) 



ORICHALCUM or AKICHALCUM. [BBASS.] 



OKIEL. The origin of this term is uncertain; its use is, however, 

 thoroughly established, and the meaning now affixed to it is sufficiently 

 clear and precise. It is applied to that particular kind of bay-window 

 which is made to project from the upper story of a building. The 

 distinction therefore between a bay and an oriel is this : by a Bay is 

 understood a projecting window, or rather a projection pierced with 



* The word *>- i rendered ' ratio ' by the Latin translation. Trendelcn- 

 burg translates the passage thiu : " jede wienichaft abcr mit elnem frrunde 

 rerknupft 1st." Perhaps *y<5 may be understood as in No. 2. Avy,r/ii t should 

 be related to * as IM (defining;, terming) Is to S; (flni, term). 



ABTS ASD SCI. DIV. VOL. VI. 



window openings in its entire width, and rising immediately from the 

 ground, whether it be confined to the lower part of the building or 

 carried up through one or more stories above the ground floor ; by an 

 Oriel, is understood a bay which does not descend to the ground, but 

 is suspended over the face of the wall beneath it. Oriel accordingly 

 corresponds with the German terms Erker-fenster and Chor-fenster, 

 which are almost the only ones of similar import in any foreign lan- 

 guage. This absence of a name for it is accounted for by the thing 

 itself being little known in the architecture of other coitntries, and in 

 our own it occurs only in our Domestic Tudor, such form of window 

 being very rare indeed in ecclesiastical structures. In our domestic, 

 which also comprises collegiate, architecture, it is a beautiful and 

 valuable feature, and one which admits of very great diversity of 

 design, and imparts much variety and liveliness of effect to a building, 

 more especially if there be ground-bays likewise, the two kinds of 

 projection both harmonising and contrasting with each other. The 

 colleges of Oxford and Cambridge afford numerous excellent examples 

 of both bays and oriels. 



Internally there is no distinction between bays and oriels, inasmuch 

 as both the one and the other form a recess whose sides are filled with 

 windows. But greater variety of plan occurs in oriels than in bays, 

 which are usually more spacious as to breadth, and of shallower 

 proportions as to depth ; they are also either rectangular in plan, or 

 form three sides of an octagon, whether a regular one or not ; whereas 

 curved forms are of frequent occurrence in the plans of oriels, and are 

 occasionally combined with straight ones. Yet as similar plans do 

 occur in bays, no real distinction can be founded upon such accidents 

 of design. Thornbury Castle, Gloucestershire, contains an example of 

 a bay of very unusual character, both in respect to plan and elevation, 

 its plan in the upper part being different from that of the lower, and 

 in some degree projecting over it, as is indicated in the annexed 

 figures, the first of which describes the plan of the lower, the other of 

 the upper floor. 



Bays generally terminate in either a plain or embattled parapet; 

 but oriels are for the most part made to show some sort of roof, either 

 rising behind or resting upon the mouldings which serve as their 

 cornice. Occasionally this roof or crown is rendered an ornamental 

 part of the design, and terminated by some kind of finish. Oriels may 

 therefore be described as consisting of three distinct parts, namely, the 

 supporting portion, consisting of a series of mouldings, splayed off so 

 as to come down to a point below, somewhat after the manner of a 

 corbel (for which member we would accordingly suggest corbel-stool or 

 corbel-base as a significant and very convenient term) ; 2ndly, the body 

 of the oriel, consisting of the windoic-ajn-on or window-parapet, and the 

 window-openings themselves, the former of which is almost invariably 

 panelled so as to correspond with the lights, whereby the whole is 

 made to consist of a series of panels, those in the lower range being 

 blank or solid, the others perforated and glazed ; Srdly, the crown or 

 roofing, occasionally including under that term the ornamental finish, 

 of whatever kind it may be, above the windows, when that happens to 

 form a conspicuous termination to the design, as is the case with the 

 semicircular oriel at Great Chalfield, where the parapet is formed by a 

 rich bandeau or crown of strawberry-leaf ornaments or Tudur-fluKcri 

 with open work between them. 



OUIFLAMME. [BANNKH.] 



ORILLON, is the term applied in fortification to the projecting 

 tower placed at the shoulder angle of the bastion. [See M in the 

 plate to BASTION.] This orillon covers the flank from view from the 

 front ; it is frequently found in old fortresses and also in Coehorn's 

 system of fortification. 



ORI'ON (Constellation). We have already noted the appearance 

 which the Greek astro-mythological system has of being an application 

 of existing fables to a subdivision of the stars derived from the East, 

 mixed perhaps with the Oriental allegories, imperfectly understood. 

 The trivial character of the myths by which the Great Bear and Orion, 

 perhaps the two most remarkable constellations in the heavens, are 

 accompanied, is enough of itself to upset any claim to high antiquity 

 for the syet^m above noted. We owe this brilliant cluster, according 

 to Hygiuus (of whose two or three very slight storits this is the most 

 striking), to the fraternal solicitude of Apollo that his sister Diana 

 should remain unmarried, or at least that she should not marry one 

 Orion, a son of Neptune according to some, or of a rather curious 

 parentage according to others. The deity above mentioned, when 

 persuasion had failed, hit upon a method of preventing his Bister's 

 match, as followa He asserted that she could not hit a black object 

 which appeared in the sea at a distance ; and she, being a good marks- 

 woman, showed him immediately that she could. This black object, 



