305 



PARLIAMENT, IMPERIAL. 



PARLIAMENT, IMPERIAL. 



soo 



of their acts. But although the king may determine the period for 

 calling parliaments, his prerogative is restrained within certain limits ; 

 as he is bound by statute to issue writs within three years after the 

 determination of any parliament ; while the practice of providing 

 money for the public service by annual enactments renders it com- 

 pulsory upon him to meet parliament every year. 



There is one contingency upon which the parliament may meet 

 without summons, under the authority of an Act of parliament. It 

 was provided by the 6 Anne, c. 7, that " in case there should be no 

 parliament in being at the time of the demise of the crown, then the 

 last preceding parliament should immediate convene and sit at West- 

 minster, as if the said parliament had never been dissolved." By the 

 37 Geo. III., c. 127, a parliament so revived would only continue in 

 existence for six months, if not sooner dissolved. 



As the king appoints the time and place of meeting, BO also at the 

 commencement of every session he declares to both houses the cause 

 of summons by a speech delivered to them in the House of Lords by 

 himself in person, or by commissioners appointed by him. Until he 

 baa done this, neither house can proceed with any business. 



The causes of summons declared do not make it necessary for 

 parliament to consider them only, or to proceed at once to the con- 

 sideration of any of them. After the speech, any business may be 

 commenced ; and the commons, in order to prove their right to act 

 without reference to any authority but their own, invariably read a 

 bill a first time proformd before they take the speech into considera- 

 tion. Other business is also done very frequently at the same time. 

 New writs are issued for places which have become vacant during the 

 recess, returns are ordered, and even addresses are presented on 

 matters unconnected with the speech. 



Prorogation and Adjournment. Parliament, it has been seen, can 

 only commence its deliberations at the time appointed by the king ; 

 neither can it continue them any longer than he pleases. He may 

 prorogue parliament by having his command signified in his presence 

 by the lord-chancellor or speaker of the House of Lords to both houses, 

 or by writ under the great seal, or by commission. The effect of a 

 prorogation is at once to suspend all business until parliament may be 

 summoned again. Not only are the sittings of parliament 'at an end, 

 but all proceedings pending at the time, except impeachments by the 

 commons, are quashed. A bill must be renewed after a prorogation, 

 as if it had never been introduced, though the prorogation be for no 

 more than a day. William III. prorogued parliament from the 21st 

 October, 1689, to the 23rd, in order to renew the Bill of Rights, con- 

 cerning which a difference had arisen between the two houses that wag 

 fatal to it. It being a rule that a bill cannot be passed in either 

 house twice in the same session, a prorogation has been resorted to in 

 other cases to enable a second bill to be brought in. 

 Adjournment is solely in the power of each house respectively. It 

 has not been uncommon indeed for the king's pleasure to be signified, 

 by message or proclamation, that both houses should adjourn. Either 

 of them however may decline complying with what can be considered 

 as no more than a request. Business has frequently been transacted 

 after the king's desire ha* been made known, and the question for 

 adjournment put in the ordinary manner. 



LtimJuti'jn. The king may also put an end to the existence of 

 parliament by a dissolution. He is not however entirely free to define 

 the duration of a parliament, for after seven years it ceases to exist 

 under the statute of George I., commonly known as the Septennial 

 Act. Before the Triennial Act, 6 Win. &, Mary, there was no limit to 

 the continuance of parliament, except the will of the king. Parlia- 

 ment is dissolved by proclamation, after having been prorogued to a 

 certain day. This practice, according to Hateell, " which has now 

 been uniform for above a century, has probably arisen from those 

 motives that are suggested by Charles I., in his speech in 1628, ' that 

 it should be a general maxim with kings themselves only to execute 

 pleating things, and to avoid appearing personally in matters that may 

 teem harsh and disagreeable.' " 



In addition to these several powers of calling a parliament, appoint- 

 ing iU meeting, directing the commencement of its proceedings, deter- 

 mining them for an indefinite time by prorogation, and finally of 

 dissolving it altogether, the crown has the creation of one entire 

 branch of the legislature ; together with other parliamentary powers, 

 which will hereafter be noticed in treating of the functions of the two 



The judicial functions of the lords and their right to pass bills 

 affecting the peerage which the commons may not amend, are the only 

 properties peculiar to them, apart from their personal rights and 

 privileges. 



Taxation. The chief powers vested in the House of Commons are 

 those of imposing taxes and voting money for the public service. 

 Bilk for these purposes can only originate in that house, and the Lords 

 may not make any alterations in them, except for the correction of 

 clerical errors. On the opening of parliament, the king directs estimates 

 to be laid before the house, but the amount may be varied by the 

 common* at pleasure. Grants distinct from those proposed in the 

 estimate* cannot be made without the king's recommendation being 

 signified. The commons will not allow the right of the lord* to 

 insert in a bill any pecuniary penalties or to alter the amount or 

 application of any penalty imposed by themselves ; but the rigid asser- 



ARTS iSD . DIV. VOL. VI. 



tion of this rule was found to be attended with much inconvenience, 

 and a standing order was made in 1831, directing the Speaker in each 

 case to report whether the object of the lords appears to be "to 

 impose, vary, or take away any pecuniary charge or burthen on the 

 subject," or " only to relate to the punishment of offences, and the 

 house shall determine whether it may be expedient in such particular 

 case to insist upon the exercise of their privilege." 



On May 21, 1860, the bill for the repeal of the paper duty was 

 thrown out by the House of Lords, after having been passed by the 

 commons. This excited much attention, as it was contended that the 

 power of refusing to repeal a tax was in fact equal to that of imposing 

 one. It was, however, generally agreed that the lords had the power 

 of refusing to pass any bill of which they disapproved. On July 5, the 

 House of Commons, on the motion of Lord Palmerston, unanimously 

 resolved, " 1. That the right of granting aids and supplies to the crown 

 is in the commons alone, as an essential part of their constitution ; and 

 the limitation of all such grants, as to the matter, manner, measure, 

 and time, is only in them. 2. That although the lords have exercised 

 the power of rejecting bills of several descriptions relating to taxation, 

 by negativing the whole, yet the exercise of that power by them has 

 not been frequent, and is justly regarded by this house with peculiar 

 jealousy, as affecting the rights of the commons to grant the supplies 

 and to provide the ways and means for the service of the year. 3. That 

 to guard for the future against an undue exercise of that power by the 

 Lords, and to secure to the commons their rightful control over tax- 

 ation and supply, this house has in its own hands the power so to impose 

 and remit taxes, and to frame bills of supply, that the right of the 

 commons as to the matter, manner, measure, and time, may be 

 maintained inviolate." 



Riijkt of determining flections. Another important power peculiar 

 to the commons is that of determining all matters touching the 

 election of their own members, and involving therein the rights of 

 the electors. Upon the latter portion of this right a memorable contest 

 arose between the Lords and Commons in 1704. Ashby, a burgess of 

 Aylesbury, brought an action at common law against the returning- 

 omcers of that town for having refused to permit him to give his vote 

 at an election. A verdict was obtained by him, but a judgment was 

 given against him in the Queen's Bench, which was reversed by the 

 House of Lords upon a writ of error. The commons declared that 

 " the determination of the right of election of members to serve in 

 parliament is the proper business of the House of Commons, which 

 they would always be very jealous of, and this jurisdiction of theirs is 

 uncontested ; that they exercise a great power in that matter, for they 

 oblige the officer to alter his return according to their judgment ; and 

 that they cannot judge of the right of election without determining 

 the right of the electors, and if electors were at liberty to prosecute 

 suits touching their right of giving voices in other courts, there might 

 be different voices in other courts, which would make confusion, and be 

 dishonourable to the House of Commons ; and therefore such an action 

 was a breach of privilege." In addition to the ordinary exercise of 

 their jurisdiction as regarded the right of elections, the commons 

 relied upon an Act of the 7 Will. 111., c. 7, by which it had been 

 declared, that " the last determination of the House of Commons con- 

 cerning the right of elections is to be pursued." On the other hand, 

 it wa objected that ' there is a great difference between the right of 

 the electors and the right of the elected : the one is a temporary right 

 to a place in parliament pro hdc vice ; the other is a freehold or fran- 

 chise. Who has a right to sit in the House of Commons, may be 

 properly cognizable there ; but who has a right to choose, is a matter 

 originally established, even before there is a parliament. A man has a 

 right to his freehold by the common law, and the law having annexed 

 his right of voting to his freehold, it is of the nature of his freehold, 

 and must depend upon it. The same law that gives him his right 

 must defend it for him, and any other power that will pretend to take 

 away his right of voting, may as well pretend to takeaway the freehold 

 upon which it depends." These extracts from the Report of a Lords' 

 Committee, 27th March, 1704, upon the conferences and other pro- 

 ceedings in the case of Ashby and White, give an epitome of the main 

 arguments upon which each party in the contest relied. The whole of 

 this Report, together with another of the 13th March, may be read 

 with great interest. 



Encouraged by the decision of the House of Lords, five other 

 burgesses of Aylesbury, now familiarly known as " the Aylesbury 

 men," commenced actions against the constables of their town, and 

 were committed to Newgate by the House of Commons for a contempt 

 of their jurisdiction. They endeavoured to obtain their discharge on 

 writ* of habecu corput, but did not succeed. The commons declared 

 their counsel, agents, and solicitors guilty of a breach of privilege, and 

 committed them also. Resolutions condemning these proceedings 

 were passed by the lords ; conferences were held, and addresses pre- 

 sented to the queen. At length the queen came down and prorogued 

 parliament, and thus put an end to the contest and to the imprison- 

 ment of the Aylesbury men and then- counsel. 



The question which was agitated at that time has never since arisen. 

 The commons have continued to exercise the sole right of determining 

 whether electors have had the right to vote while inquiring into the 

 conflicting claims of candidates for seats in parliament, and specific 

 modes for trying the right of election by the house have been pre- 



