rusiYivio. 



Ml 



The attributes of the Kuuuui .Ycpdum ur .VqrfMUMu, are Marly tho 

 m* M tiwae of the (Irak Poaeidon. Poeeidon wu the <n .if 

 Kruno* and Hhea, and Die brother of Zeus and Hem, and appears to 

 hare been one of the ancient divinities of Greece ; although, accord- 

 ing to Hmdotiu (ii. 50), he wa* pot originally a Greek deity, but 

 was introduced from Libra. I'oeeidon waa the god of the water in 

 general, of the sea, the men, and the fountains ; but he was more 

 particularly regarded tu the god of the ago, which he acquired as his 

 ahare in the division uf the dominion* of hia father Kronue. Hia 

 nil.- wa* Am phi trite, and their ton Triton. 



Poseidon is aaid to hare produced the horse in his contest with 

 Athene for the right of naming the city of Athena. It U difficult 

 to give a reaeon for the connection of Neptune with the hone ; but it 

 i evident from several passages in the Greek writer* that he waa 

 regarded at a kind of equestrian deity, as well as the god of the sea. 

 (Aruttiph.. ' Knights,' 1. 44D.) Poeeidon had a magnificent palace 

 beneath the am at Mgu (' IL,' xiii. 20). The animals offered to him 

 in sacrifice were usually black bulls, rams, and boar pig*. 



Poaeidon was not originally a god of the Doric race. He was 

 principally worshipped by the lonians, who were in most places a 

 maritime people. In those Dorian cities, however, which had acquired 

 a love fur foreign commerce, we find that the worship of Poseidon pro- 

 Tailed extensively ; as, for instance, at Trcnarum, whence it waa carried 

 to Taix-ntutn, at Cyrene, in ,/Egina, and more particularly on the 

 Curintliiau isthmus, and at Traaen, from which place the worship of 

 this god was transmitted to Posidonia in Italy. (Mailer's ' Dorians,' 

 voL L, p. 417, 418, tr.) 



The etymology of the names Poseidon and Neptunus is doubtful. 

 Poaeidon a written in Doric Greek, Poteidon (noreiJov), of which we 

 have another example in the name of Potidica, written Poteidain 

 inoTtihiai in the inscription, now in the British Museum, on those 

 Athenians who fell before |this city. The name, according to some 

 writen, contains the same root, in the first syllable, as we find in mtt 

 and woraftit. Neptunus is derived by Cicero from nandn ('Nat. Deor.,' 

 ii. 26); and by Varro from nufitu, because this god covers (oAnn6i/) 

 the earth with the sea (' De Ling. Lat.,' iv. 10) ; but neither of these 

 derivations has the least show of probablity. We may compare the 

 form of the won! Nept-unus or -umnus, with Port-umuus, Vert- 

 iimnus, and the word al-umnus ; but the meaning or origin of the 

 root AVf'< or Nep RCCUIS uncurtain. It may perhaps be connected with 

 the same root as is contained in the Greek vlr-ru. 



The statues of Poseidon resembled in many respect* those of Zeus ; 

 but the figure of the former was more angular, and there was less of 

 repose and thought! illness in the countenance. The Greek sculptors 

 gave a certain degree of roughness to the statues of Poseidon, which 

 ap|>ears to hare been regarded as appropriate to the god of the ocean. 

 ir was usually somewhat in disorder, and the whole of his figure 

 was represented as exceedingly powerful and muscular. Hence the 

 " chest of Poseidon " (aripray TtoatMaiyos, ' 11.,' v. 471') is the poetic 

 expression for this characteristic of the deity, which is illustrated by 

 the noble fragment from the pediment of the Parthenon in the 

 British Museum. He waa usually fully draped. His right hand held 

 the trident; and he was frequently represented accompanied by 

 Amphitrite, or surrounded by Nereids, Tritons, dolphins, and other 

 marine personages and objects. (Miiller, ' Archaologie dcr Kunst,' 

 81 854-66 ; ' Denkmoler der Alton Kunst.') 



POSITIVE. [Nuii.vTivr. Qi AXTITIES.] 



POSSE COM1TATUS (literally, the "power of a county) comprise 

 all able-bodied males within the county between the ages of 15 and 70 

 yean. All such persona, without any exception, are bound to aid the 

 sheriff in all matters that relate to his office ; and he is fmcable if he 

 neglect to arU himself of their aid. In case of any invasion, rebellion, 

 riot, Ac., or breach of the peace within the county, all such persons, on 

 pain of fine or imprisonment, are bound to attend him on being charged 

 by him to do so, and to assist in opposing and suppressing them. 

 They may oome armed, and are justified in killing a person in case of 

 resistance. The power of the county may also be raised when necessary 

 for the purpose of apprehending traitors, felons, Ac., and that oven 

 within particular franchises. It is lawful for any peace-officer, (and 

 perhaps even for a private person,) to raise a competent number of 

 people for the purpose of opposing and suppressing enemies, rebels, 

 rioters, Ac. within the county ; but such persons are punialuthlu if they 

 use tinneoMary violence. It is also the duty of the sheriff or any 

 minister of the king having the execution of the king's writs, or 

 process even in a civil nature, who meet* with actual resistance in his 

 attempt to execute them, to raise a |>owcr sufficient to quell the 

 resistance. (2 Inst., 188, 194 ; 3 Inst., 181 ; 1 Hawk., P.O., 102, 156.) 



P088E8S10 KKATHKS. [DncrNT.] 



PO88K.SSION. In endeavouring to explain the legal moaning of 

 thisUrm, we shall commence with the following extract* from Savigny's 

 work on the Right of Possession (' Das Kecht des Besitzes,' Giessen, 



. , 



" All the definition* of possession are founded on one common 



the notion of possession of a thing we understand that 



n by virtue of which not only are we ourselves physically 



capable of operating upon it, but every other person is incapable. This 



(.minion, which is called detention, and which lies at the foundation 



of ercry notion of possession, is no juristical notion, but it has an 



i'>X. 



iiiiint Ji.iii- it-Lit ion to a juristical notion, by virtue of which it becomes 

 a subject of legislation. As ownership is the legal capacity to operate 

 on a thing at our pleasure, and to exclude all other person 

 it; so is detention the exercise of ownership, and it is tin- natural 



.. , [fg^ . 



If this jli 



r.-1-iii..n of poa***ioii were the only one, cvcrylliing concerning it th.ii 

 i-mild juridically be determined, would be omprehfiidrd in tho 

 following position*,: the owner has the right to posse**; tlir KIIIIC 

 right belongs to him to whom the owner gives the posajnsjiun ; n.. nth. r 

 person has thu right. 



I Jut the Roman law, in the cose of possession, as well as of pr. 

 determines the mode in which it is acquired and lost ; consequently it 

 treats possession not only as a consequence of a right, but as a con- 

 dition of rights. Accordingly, in a juristical theory of possession, it i 

 only the right of possession (jui iKwiMnsionix) that we have to coiwidi -i -, 

 and not the right to possess (called by modern jurists jus possideudi), 

 which belongs to the theory of proju-rty. 



" We now pass from the notion of mere detention to that of juristical 

 possession, which is the subject of thin treatise. The object of the 

 first part, which is the foundation of the whole investigation, i t.. 

 determine this notion formally and materially. Formally, by explaining 

 those rights which presuppose possession as a condition, ami conse- 

 quently determining the signification which the non-juristical notion 

 of detention obtains in jurisprudence, in order to its being considered 

 as something juristical, that is, Possession ; materially, l.y i-num 

 the conditions which the Roman law requires for the existence of 

 possession, and consequently the positive modifications under which 

 detention can be viewed as possession. 



" The formal determination of the notion by force of which alone 

 possession can become a subject of jurisprudence, is divided into tin . . 

 parts ; first we must determine the place which possession, as a legal 

 relation, occupies in the system of Roman law. We must then enume- 

 rate the righU which the Roman law recognises as a consequence of 

 possession, and we must also examine the righto which are improperly 

 considered rights of possession. It will then be easy to answer the 

 questions whether possession is to be considered as a right, and whether 

 as a jus in re. The first and simplest mode in which possession appears 

 in a system of jurisprudence consists in- the owirer having the 

 right to possess ; but we are here considering possession independent 

 of ownership, and as the source of peculiar rights ; the former of these 

 two questions therefore may bo expressed thus in what sense has 

 possession been distinguished from ownership ? a mode of expression 

 which has been used by many writers. 



" In the second placo we must determine how the different senses in 

 ulik-h jKissession occurs in the Roman law are distinguished from one 

 another by the mode of expression; and particularly what wen- the 

 significations of posscsisio generally, and possessio naturolis, and possessio 

 civilis, among the Roman jurists. 



" In the whole system of Roman law there are only two consequences 

 which can be ascribed to possession of itself, as distinct from all owner- 

 ship, and those are usucapiou and interdicts. 



" The foundation of usucapion is Uie rule of the Twelve Table*, that 

 he who possesses a thing one or two years becomes the owner. In this 

 case bare possession, independent of all right, is the foundation of 

 property, which possession must indeed have originated in a particular 

 way, in order to have such effect ; but still it is a bare fact, without 

 any other right than what such effect gives to it. Accordingly it is 

 possession itself, distinct from every other legal relation, on which 

 usucapion, and consequently the acquisition of ownership, depends. 



" 1'ossessorial Intel-dicta are the second effect of possession, and their 

 relation to possession is this : possession of itself being n< > 

 relation, the disturbance of possession is no violation of a legal right, 

 and it con only become so by the circumstance of its being at the same 

 time a violation of a legal right. But if the disturbance of possession 

 is effected by force, such force is a violation of right, since 

 forcible act is illegal, and such illegal act is the very thing which it. is 

 the object of on interdict to remedy. All possessorial interdicts thin 

 agree in this : they presuppose an act which in it* form is illegal.* 



" Now since possessorial interdicts are founded on such acts as in 

 their form are illegal, it is clear why puwuwion. indi.]-ndi'iit of all 

 regard to iU own rightfulness, may be the foundation of rights. Wln-n 

 the owner claims a thing as his property (vindicatio), it is a mat' 

 perfect indifference in what way the other party has obtained possession 

 of it, since the owner has the right to exclude every other person from 

 the possession of it The case is the same with respect to the inter- 

 dict, by which the ' inissio in posscssioucm ' is protected : this interdict 

 i not a poascssorial interdict, for the ' munio ' itself gives .n- 

 session, but it gives a right to detention, and this right is made 

 effective in the same way as in the case of property, (in th. 

 hand, he who has the bore possession of a thing lias not on that account 

 any right to the detention, but he ha* a right to require from all th<. 

 world that no force shall be used against him. If however force ia 

 used and directed against thu possession, the possessor protects h. 

 by means of the interdicts. Possession is the condition of these im.-r- 

 dicts, and in this case, as in the case of usucapiou, it is the condition of 

 right* generally, 



Interdict* were not limited to cae of violence ; they compre- 

 hended the three rilia founrionit. (Terence, ' Eunuch.,' ii. 8 ; T. S7.) 



