801 



PROPERTY. 



PROPIONYL. 



mistake. In the first passage ('Dig.' 41, tit. 1, s. 52), to which he 

 refers in support of his statement, it is clear that a corporeal definite 

 thing is spoken of, which the commentator could hardly have doubted 

 about, if he had given in his note the whole of the passage instead of a 

 part of it. The passage is this : " a thing is a man's in bonis, whenever 

 he can defend his possession of it by a plea (e.rceptio), or recover it 

 when lost by an actio." This aciio would be in rem : the declara- 



the things in bonii ; but the things in action so spoken of are things 

 which a man has not, as contrasted with things which a man has, in 

 his possession, and these are things corporeal, things determinate. 

 Besides, even if we should admit that the Roman law treated a debt 

 as a thing in bonii, it did not treat it as property, for a thing in bonii 

 was not property in the sense in which Blackstone is here using 

 property. Further, when a Roman claimed a debt, his declaration was 

 that something ought to be given to him or done for his benefit by 

 the defendant; and this "giving" always meant giving something 

 which did not belong to the plaintiff, for it was a principle of Roman 

 law that you could not give to a man what already belonged to him. 

 But the Roman law had a precision in these matters of which the 

 commentator had not the slightest idea. 



From these remarks it will appear, first, that there is a difficulty in 

 classifying the things that are objects of personal property ; second, 

 that things, as choses in action, are not property, and yet they can be 

 transferred (in equity) as if they were property. Accordingly it 

 happens that it is sometimes difficult to say whether a particular thing 

 is an assignable thing or not, whether in its nature it is capable of any 

 transfer. 



Property in chattels may, like property in things real, vary as to 

 quantity and quality of interest, though things personal are not 

 capable of such extended and various modifications, analogous to 

 estates, as things real are. As to quantity, that is, duration, a man 

 may have the use of a personal thing for life, and another may have 

 the absolute property in it after his death. As to quality, persons may 

 own a thing personal as joint tenants and as tenants in common. 

 There is an equitable 'property in chattels as well as in things real 

 Money, for instance, is often paid to a trustee, in order that he may 

 give the interest of it to one person for life, and after his death 

 pay the money to another. The trustee, so long as he holds the 

 money, has the legal property in the money, and in the thing in 

 which the money is invested. A legatee ha only an equitable 

 interest, even in a specific legacy, after his testator's will is proved, 

 until the executor gives the thing to him, or in some clear way admits 

 his right to it. 



The modes of acquiring and losing personal property are reduced by 

 Blackstone to the following principal modes : Occupancy ; preroga- 

 tive, whereby a right accrues to the crown or the crown's grantee; 

 forfeiture, which is a punishment for a crime or misdemeanour; 

 custom, as heriots, Ac. ; succession, by which term Blackstone under- 

 stands the capacity of a corporation aggregate to take what their 

 predecessors had ; marriage, by which the husband acquires the 

 chattel* of the wife, and the right of suing for her choses in action, and 

 a peculiar kind of interest in her chattels real ; judgment ; gift or 

 grant; contract; bankruptcy and insolvency, so far as relates to 

 chattels ; testament ; administration. The enumeration taken from 

 Blackstone is not here offered as one that is complete or altogether 

 unexceptionable. Under contract Blackstone includes sale, as to 

 which it may be observed that the formalities required by the law for 

 the transfer of ownership in things personal are few ; but the difficult 

 questions which arise as to the transfer of property in personal things 

 are .probably much more numerous than in the case of estates in 

 things real 



Under contract he also comprehends bailment, by which " a special 

 qualified property is transferred from the bailor to the bailee together 

 with the possession." This qualified property, as it is called, gives the 

 bailee a right of action against all persons who injure or take away the 

 chattels ; and Blackstone, as usual, finds a reason for this right of 

 action. This right of action is however really founded on the right of 

 possession, and it is just the same right of action that a man has who 

 finds a thing, against any person, except the owner, who injures or 

 takes away the thing. This right, when understood, is in all respects 

 consistent with sound principles ; and there is no objection to calling 

 it a right founded on a qualified property, when the term qualified 

 property is rightly understood. Under contract, he also includes 

 hiring and borrowing, and these also are contracts which, he says, 'may 

 transfer a qualified property to the hirer or borrower. The same 

 remarks apply to this kind of property as to that acquired by bailment.' 

 There is, however, a case in which a man must acquire an absolute 

 property by borrowing, as in the case of the Roman mutuum, when 

 the thing borrowed is a thing which consists " pmdere, numcro, or 

 mcnrurd," as, for instance, so many pounds of butter. The distinc- 

 tions of the Roman law between hiring, " locatio et conductio," lending, 

 " mutuum," " commodatum," and " depoitum," are founded on 

 unchangeable principles, and are expounded in that system with a 

 clearness which, in this respect, ours perhaps does not admit. 



The incapacities of persons as to acquiring personal property are 

 ARTS AXD SCI. DIV. VOL. VI. 



fewer than those as to real property ; and the incapacities to transfer 

 and lose are also fewer. But a complete enumeration of the classes 

 of persons who labour under either of these incapacities, and the 

 particular incapacities of each of such classes, would probably be more 

 difficult than a like enumeration as to estates in real property 



PROPERTY-TAX. [TAXAMOX.] 



PROPHECY (irpoij.7)Tio, a foretelling, or the power of foretelling) 

 in its popular acceptation is a foretelling, or a thing foretold. In 

 classical Greek, prophetes (7rpo</>Trnjs) corresponds with the Latin vates, 

 which indeed may be regarded as the same word without the pre- 

 position. In the Old Testament, the Hebrew nevvah (to bubble forth) 

 implies something of inspiration ; but in Numbers xii. 6, there is a 

 difference made between Moses, with whom God spake "mouth 

 to mouth," and other prophets, with whom he spoke " in a 

 dream." In Exodus vii. 1, Aaron is directed to be the " prophet" of 

 Moses, or, as is explained in Exodus iv. 16, his interpreter, or to " be 

 to him as a mouth." St. Paul uses propheles (Tit. i. 12), which is 

 rendered " prophet " in the authorised version, but " poet " by Tyndale ; 

 and probably Epimeuides is meant. S. Chrysostom (' Horn, in 1 Cor.') 

 says that propketes is the same as hermeneutes (ipintwrfc), an inter- 

 preter; and Festus says that the chief priests of the temples and 

 interpreters of the oracles were by the ancients called prophets. 



Under ORACLE it is observed that there were current in ancient 

 Greece numerous so-called prophecies, but they were dark and 

 ambiguous. This is not the case with the prophecies recorded in the 

 Bible. Some of these were extant in books written long before the 

 events took place to which they refer, such as the prophecy concerning 

 Abraham's posterity, their extraordinary increase, their sufferings in 

 Egypt four hundred years, their sojourning in the wilderness, and their 

 possessing at length the land of Canaan. The numerous prophecies in 

 the Old Testament pertaining to the Messiah, with their accomplish- 

 ment recorded in the New Testament, and the prophecies of Jesus and 

 his Apostles, are so familiar to the minds of all, that they need not be 

 specified. The prophecies of the Old and New Testament, which have 

 been long fulfilled, afford altogether an amount of evidence which, if 

 really understood, it seems impossible to resist, in proof of the Bible 

 being a revelation from God. 



The prophecies of the Old and New Testament are understood by 

 all believers in scriptural prophecy to be predictions of future events 

 pronounced by persons who, on the occasion of delivering such pre- 

 dictions, were directed and governed by the Deity. The first thing to 

 establish in the examination of these prophecies is the genuineness of 

 the books in which they are contained. The question is, whether the 

 prophecies in the form in which we have them, were delivered before 

 the events to which it is alleged that they refer. This is purely a 

 matter of historical criticism, and in no respect differs in the manner 

 of carrying on the investigation, from an inquiry of a like kind as to 

 any other book. The next inquiry is to compare the alleged prophecy 

 with the events of which it is alleged that it was a prediction. This, 

 though apparently the easier part of the inquiry, is one wherein much 

 difference of opinion may exist. Some of the prophecies are clear and 

 precise in their terms ; and when the former part of the inquiry has 

 had a satisfactory result, no unprejudiced person can doubt that the 

 prophecies do refer to certain definite events. Some of the prophecies 

 are in their terms vague and general ; and others refer to events which, 

 it is admitted, have not yet been accomplished. So far as it is admitted 

 that any prophecy has not been accomplished, so far it must be 

 admitted that prophecy fails in being substantiated by the only evidence 

 that can establish its truth. It is then on those events which all 

 believers allege to be events accomplished, in conformity to genuine 

 predictions, that the proof of prophecy depends. The method of 

 investigation is that which has been already mentioned, and every man 

 should come to it with an unprejudiced mind. 



PROPION AMIDE. [PROPIONYL.] 



PROPIONE. [PEOPIO.VTL.] 



PROPIONIC ACID. [PKOPIONTL.] 



PROPIONIC ALDEHYDE. [PROPIONYL.] 



PROPION1TRYL. [ETHYL, cyanide of.] ' 



PROPIONYL (CaHjO.,). The radical assumed to exist in a nuniboi 

 of organic compounds collectively known as the propionic group, 

 and of which the chief member is propionic acid. The name is 

 derived from irpuros, first, and Triuv,fat, because propionic acid is 

 the first in the series of fatty acids, which separates as an oily layer 

 when liberated in aqueous solutions of its salts. 



Hydride of propionyl (CjHuOj, H). Metacetic or propionic aldehyde. 

 This is one of the products ofithe oxidation of albumen, fibrin, or casein, 

 by a mixture of sulphuric acid with either binoxide of manganese, or 

 bichromate of potash. It is isolated from other matters that are 

 obtained at the same time, by fractional distillation. 



Hydride of propionyl is a limpid liquid, of agreeable ethereal odour, 

 sp. gr. 079 ; boiling point between 130 and 150 Fahr., and vapour 

 density 2'111. It slowly acidifies when exposed to the air. 



Hydride ofpentachloropropionyl (CuCljO.,, H), or propionic chloral, is 

 one of the products of the action of hydrochloric acid and binoxide of 

 manganese upon starch. It is an oily liquid, crystallising in rhombic 

 tables on exposing to a temperature of 32 Fahr. 



Propionc (C,,,H 10 0,), or the elhylide ofpropinnyl (C,,H 5 0,y C.Hj). 

 The product of the destructive distillation of propionate of baryta. It 



3 r 



