TACTICS, NAVAL. 



TACTICS, NAVAL. 



prolongation of the line thus formed. If, for example, the fleet consists 

 of ships sailing in three divisions close-hauled, and the line is to be 

 formed upon the centre division, as in the subjoined diagram ; then, 

 as soon as this squadron is brought to, the ships in the weather division 

 bear away and steer till they get ahead of the centre, when they haul 

 their wind ; the lee division tacks and sails on till it gets astern of the 

 centre, and when these ships have hauled their wind the line of battle 

 is formed. In this formation the weather division or column has been 

 made to constitute the van, and the lee column the rear of the line ; 

 but it is sometimes thought necessary to make the columns change 

 places, by causing that which is on the weather side of the fleet to 

 become the centre or rear column, or by making the centre or lee 

 column constitute the van of the line. A like interchange of the 

 places of the van, centre, and rear divisions is also, occasionally, made 

 when the fleet is in the order of sailing ; and various other evolutions 

 are performed by the ships of a fleet, both while sailing and in the line 

 of battle : the principal of these consist in the several ships tacking, 

 or veering, in succession, and in turning to windward ; and there are, 

 besides, the series of movements which are necessary in order to restore 

 the line of battle when disordered in consequence of a shifting of the 

 wind. But the detals of these evolutions can be studied with advan- 

 tage only in works which are expressly written on naval tactics. 



From the order of battle it is necessary to return to some one of 

 the orders of sailing ; and with respect to the three first of these, it 

 will be merely necessary for the ships in the line to tack, or bear away, 

 in the assigned directions, increasing or diminishing sail, so that they 

 may arrive in their proper positions nearly at the same time. In 

 returning to the fifth order of sailing, there are two cases, which con- 

 siat in performing the manoeuvres on the same and on the opposite 

 tack. In the first case, should it be required that the van may I ecome 

 the weather squadron, the van and centre tack together and stand on, 

 while the rear proceeds in its actual course; then, when the rear 

 comes successively abreast of the centre and van squadrons, these re- 

 tack, and thus three parallel columns are formed. In the second case, 

 the van being to form the weather squadron, the ships in van first 

 tack in succession, then the ships in the centre, and lastly those in the 

 rear. All then keep on, till the corresponding ships in the differ- 

 ent squadrons get abreast of each other, when the order is formed. 

 The evolutions differ, of course, from those just mentioned when 

 the van is to form the lee, and when it is to form the centre 

 squadron. 



In the order of retreat before the wind, the ships are drawn up in 

 two equal divisions, in lines making an angle of 135 with each other ; 

 the admiral's ship remaining to windward of the rest of the fleet, and 

 being at the angular point. 



If a fleet is much superior in force to that of the enemy, it will be 

 of little moment whether it comes to action on the windward or the 

 leeward side ;and each of these situations when taken, either by a fleet 

 or a single ship, baa both advantages and defect*. The advantages 

 of gaining the weather-gage, as it is called, are that in such a situa- 

 tion a fleet may approach that of the enemy, and it may commence 

 the engagement when it shall appear most convenient : ships may be 

 detached to the rear in order to turn the enemy's line and put it in 

 confusion, and a ship may board its opponent almost at will : in firing 

 also, the windward ships are but little incommoded by the smoke. On 

 the other hand, the disadvantages of being to windward are, the diffi- 

 culty of retreat without passing through the enemy's line ; disabled 

 ships cannot quit the line without disordering the rest of the fleet, and 

 in stormy weather the lower-deck ports can seldom be opened, When 

 a fleet is to leeward of that of the enemy, the ships which may be 

 dismasted can be readily drawn away, and the whole fleet may retire if 

 unable to contend against a superior force. 



If a fleet to leeward of the enemy's line should attempt to gain the 

 windward side, it should manoeuvre so as to delay the engagement for 

 a time in the hope that a change of wind in its favour may take place, 

 and it must then endeavour to take advantage of such change. In 

 thene circumstances the commander must however keep the enemy in 

 tight, or at least he must obtain a knowledge of his manoeuvres by 

 means of frigates detached for the purpose. If unable to succeed in 

 getting to windward, it should be drawn up on a line as short as 

 possible, in which case, that of the enemy being more extended, some 

 of the shipe in it must either take no part in the engagement, or, 

 leaving their line in order to bear down, they will lose the advantage 

 of the wind. On the other hand, a weather fleet should be manoeuvred 

 so as always to keep that which is to leeward quite abreast of it ; 

 since then, unless the wind should shift, it will continue to hold its 

 position. 



When it is desired to bring on an action against a fleet in line on 

 the leeward side, the general rule is that the weather fleet should 

 get abreast of the other, then bear down upon it till within the proper 

 distance, and form in order of battle. Should the leeward fleet bear 

 away at a certain angle with the wind in order to avoid the engage- 

 ment, the other may bear away at a still greater angle ; then, according 

 to the relation between the distance of the fleets from one another and 

 the extent of the weather line of nhipn, the latter will cut the other in 

 some particular part of its length, and thus compel it to fight in dis- 

 advantageous circumstances. Again, if being to leeward of the enemy, 

 it be necessary to avoid an engagement, the only resource is to bear 



away in order of retreat. If to windward, the fleet should, if possible, 

 in retreating, keep constantly on one tack, in order to avoid the loss of 

 time occupied in going about ; but if from want of room it be necessary 

 to change the course, the fleet may be kept on one tack during all the 

 time that the enemy is on the other : for thus the two fleets will be 

 constantly diverging from one another. 



It is observed by Mr. Clerk, in his ' Essay on Naval Tactics,' that 

 when an enemy's fleet is to leeward, and in that situation is to be 

 brought to action, both fleets being in line of battle, if the ships in the 

 weather-line bear directly down upon the others, those in the van are 

 liable to be disabled in their rigging ; and thus, their motion being 

 retarded, disorder must ensue in the dispositions of the ships which 

 follow them. Precisely the same disadvantages, he adds, attend the 

 method of coming with the whole fleet, in line of battle, obliquely 

 upon the line of the enemy ; and to these faulty modes of attack ho 

 ascribes the damages which have so frequently been sustained by 

 British fleets at the commencement of actions. The method proposed 

 by that writer for coming to an engagement against a fleet to leeward 

 is similar to that of an attack in oblique order on land, and consists in 

 detaching a squadron for the purpose of attacking some of the rear 

 ships in the enemy's line : the squadron should engage the ships broad- 

 side to broadside while the rest of the fleet is at a distance, prepared to 

 send support if necessary. Then, should the van and centre of the 

 enemy's fleet continue its course in order to avoid a general action, 

 those rear ships will be taken : if any of the van ships should tack 

 successively in order to support the rear, some other ships of their line 

 will be in danger of being taken by a second squadron detached from 

 the windward fleet ; and if the whole line should tack together, the 

 disorder thence arising might cause the loss of more ships, or might 

 bring on a general action at a disadvantage to the leeward fleet. Lastly, 

 if this fleet should veer, and bear away, the ships would become ex- 

 posed to a raking fire in then- retreat. 



The manwuvre of doubling an enemy's line of battle consists in 

 sending ships round by either of its extremities for the purpose of 

 placing some of those in that line between two fires. In order to 

 double a fleet, the ships should advance beyond its van, or fall in its 

 rear, when by tacking or veering according as they are to leeward or 

 windward of the line, they may get into the required position on its 

 opposite side. It is right to observe, however, that this manccuvre 

 ought to be attempted under favourable circumstances only, as the 

 doubling ships are liable to be separated so far from their own fleet as 

 to be prevented from rejoining it ; and it is, on the whole, considered 

 more advantageous to double a fleet by its rear than by its van, since 

 in the event of some of the enemy's ships being damaged, and unable 

 to keep up with the rest, such ships may be taken by those which are 

 performing the manoeuvre of doubling : should any of these last be 

 separated from their fleet, they can remain in the rear without risk, 

 till an opportunity is offered of rejoining it. At the battle of the Nile 

 (1798), Admiral Nelson doubled the van of the French line, and 

 attacked it on both sides, while the other ships of that line, th whole 

 fleet being at anchor, could afford no assistance. In order to avoid 

 being turned, the largest ships of a fleet ought to be in the van and 

 rear of its line when in order of battle ; and the rate of sailing for each 

 should be such that the rear ships may never be astern of the enemy. 

 Care should also be taken that the ships are as close together as 

 possible, that the enemy may not pass between any two of them, and 

 thus break the order of battle. 



It is well known, from the records of naval history, that the 

 manoeuvre of cutting through the line of an enemy's fleet during an 

 engagement has been several times performed by English commanders 

 since the middle of the 17th century. In an action with the Dutch, 

 in the year 1652, Sir George Ayscue is said to have charged from the 

 leeward through the fleet of the enemy; and in that between the; 

 English and Dutch fleets in 1665, the earl of Sandwich cut through 

 the centre of the Dutch line, and caused the disorder which ended in 

 its total defeat : again in May, 1672, Sir Joseph Jordan, of the Blue 

 squadron, having the advantage of the wind, pierced the Dutch fleet 

 and threw it into confusion. But the action which first gave notoriety 

 to the manoeuvre was that in which Admiral Rodney gained the im- 

 portant victory over the French fleet commanded by the Comte de 

 Grasse : this action was fought in 1782. The battle in which the 

 brilliant career of Lord Nelson terminated with a decisive victory 

 (1805) owed the success with which it was crowned to the employment 

 of a like mode of attack. 



The honour of having been the first to demonstrate fully the prin- 

 ciples on which the manoeuvres of an attack against fleets to windward 

 or to leeward depend, is generally ascribed to Mr. Clerk of Eldin, who 

 published the first edition of his ' Essay on Naval Tactics '. in 1782; 

 and it has been asserted (Playfair's ' Memoir of Mr. Clerk ') that Clerk 

 had, in conversation, communicated to Sir Charles Douglas (Rodney's 

 flag-captain) his whole system of tactics in the year preceding that in 

 which the battle with the Comte de Grasse was fought. The accuracy 

 of this assertion has been however disproved by Sir Howard Douglas, 

 in his ' Memoir on Naval Evolutions;' and from an account of the 

 circumstances under which the- manoeuvre of breaking the French line 

 was performed, as they have been given by Sir Charles Dashwoorl (one 

 of Admiral Rodney's aides-de-camp on the day of the action), it appears 

 that the idea of the manoeuvre was, at the moment, suggested to the 



