685 



WAGER. 



WAGES. 



086 



wager on the probabilities of the ship having arrived, when he know 

 that it actually has arrived, the wager is unfair. In all matters o 

 skill, indeed, the mere offer of the wager is an assertion of skill, an( 

 the acceptance of the wager is the denial of this assertion : this i 

 understood, so that there is no occasion for the party who offers th 

 wager to make any declaration of skill, other than is implied in th 

 wager itself. 



There is one case, and that a common one, in which the immoralit; 

 of the wager is not easy to expose, though it is, we think, sufficient!; 

 certain ; it is where a person, by offering different wagers to differen 

 people, secures himself a certainty of gain, let the event happen which 

 way it will. Thus one of three things must happen. A, B, C ; a person 

 bets 4 to 4 against A, 5 to 4 against B, 6 to 4 against C, with three 

 different persons ; he must win 8, for two of his opponents must lose 

 he cannot pay more than 6, for one only can win ; he is therefore, on 

 the most unfavourable supposition, a gainer of 2. As against each o 

 his opponents the wager may be fair : these may not be known to eacl 

 other, and each one may consider that he has the best of the wager 

 Whom then does he injure ? If it be admitted that a man has a righ 

 to lay any bet which he can get take)) provided the event betted on 

 be perfectly understood, he can then injure no one, and no exception 

 can be taken to the proceeding. But if it be not allowed that a man 

 ha* a right to lay any odds, except those which, to the best of his 

 knowledge and belief, represent the state of the chances, he must then 

 offer a bet which he believes to be unfair, to some one or other of th 

 preceding persons. By betting 4 to 4 against A, he declares his belie 

 that the chance of A's arrival is 4 : similarly by betting 5 to 4 against 

 B, he declares his belief that the chance of B's arrival is {. Conse 

 quently he implies a declaration that his belief of tha chance of C's 

 arrival is 



141 

 ~ 2~9 or 18' 



Consequently he ought to lay 1 7 to 1 against the arrival of C, whereas 

 he lays 8 to 2, or 6 to 4. He is then telling contradictory stories to 

 different people, and is saved from conviction only by the fact of each 

 party not knowing what he has stated to others. If there were a 

 possible mode of fighting in 'which the weapon of each op|K>nent should 

 be armour against those of the rest, we imagine it would not be con- 

 sidered either brave or honest that a man should provoke the combat 

 with several enemies, in such a manner that he should be sure to kill 

 and sure not to be killed ; and we suppose that if wagering be per- 

 mitted at all among men of honour, it is under the idea that he who 

 makes another risk his money also risks his own. 



This possibility of securing certain gain by betting against belief 

 (for against belief it must be) seems to us tobe enough, were there 

 no other reason, to show that a wager is not right, unless the odds 

 really represent the opinion of the better : for to maintain that such a 

 wager is a fair one, is also to maintain that it Is fair to make others 

 meet risk without sharing it. 



It may indeed be asserted that each better has his own book, which 

 he endeavours to make up in such a way as to win in every event : so 

 that the whole is an admitted trial of skill. But this excuse breaks 

 down when it is remembered that it is impossible a society of gamblers 

 can make a set of books which will give a balance of gain to all, with- 

 out Inking in a number of persons who do not belong to the society : 

 and the question is whether the words in italics have not two real 

 meanings. 



WAGER (in Law.) [GAMING.] 

 WAGER OF BATTLE. [APPEAL ; TRIAL.] 



WAGER OF LAW was a mode of trial where the defendant was 

 permitted, as it was said, " to make his law," that was, " to take an 

 oath (for example) that he oweth not the debt demanded of him upon 

 a simple contract, nor any penny thereof ; " " but he ought to bring 

 with him eleven persons of his neighbours that will avow upon their 

 oath that in their consciences he saith truth ; so that he himself must 

 be sworn tie fdelitate, and the eleven de credulilate." This form of 

 trial was not allowed save when the debt arose by word only, and 

 might have been satisfied in secret without witnesses. It was not per- 

 mitted as to any debt arising on specialty, or where a contempt, tres- 

 pass, deceit, or injury was supposed in the defendant ; but only in 

 some cases, in debt, detinue, or account ; and also in a real action where 

 the tenant alleged that he was not legally summoned. Neither was it 

 permitted to an infant, nor to a person outlawed or infamous, nor in a 

 suit on behalf of or for the benefit of the crown, nor to executors or 

 administrators in matters relating to the debts of their testator. Where 

 admitted, however, it was conclusive, and barred the party for ever. 

 This mode of trial seems to have existed at a very early period in the 

 history of nations. It was part of the law of Moses, that " If a man 

 deliver unto his neighbour an ass, or an ox, or a sheep, or any beast to 

 keep, and it die, or be hurt, or driven away, no man seeing it ; then 

 hall an oath of the Lord be between them both , that he hath not put 

 his hand unto his neighbour s goods, and the owner of it shall accept 

 thereof, and he shall not make it good." (Exod.. xx. 10 ) The prac- 

 tice of trying by the oaths of the parties to a suit prevailed in the civil 

 law, where either of the parties might refer the matter to the oath of 

 his adversary ; and if he did not accept it, or justify his refusal of it, 

 the judge decided against him. The whole proceeding is prescribed at 



length in ' Cod. Justin.,' iv. 1, 12. The clergy, also, in the earlier ages 

 were generally admitted to this mode of defence. It was also one of 

 the customs of London in the sheriffs' court. But in this country it 

 ultimately gave dissatisfaction. " Men's consciences," as Lord Coke 

 says, " grew so large," that the presumption of law that no man would 

 forswear himself ceased to be much relied on Other forms of actions 

 were brought, such as assumpsit and trover, in which the wager of law 

 could not be had ; and eventually, by 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 42, s. 83, the 

 whole proceeding was abolished. 



WAGER-POLICY is a name given to a policy of insurance made by 

 persons having no interest in the event about which they insure. Such 

 insurances, formerly common, were found to be " productive of many 

 pernicious practices," and therefore the statute 19 Geo. II., c. 37, was 

 passed, by which it was enacted that no assurances should be made on 

 any ship belonging to his Majesty or any of his subjects, or on any 

 goods, &c., laden on board, " interest or no interest, or without further 

 proc iof interest than the policy, or by way of gaming or wagering, or 

 without benefit of salvage to the assurer ; and that every such assur- 

 ance shall be null and void to all intents and purposes." 



WAGES are the price paid for labour. The labour of man, being an 

 object of purchase and sale, has, like other commodities, a natural or 

 cost price, and a market price. Its natural price is that which suffices 

 to maintain the labourer and his family, and to perpetuate the race of 

 labourers. The rate of wages cannot be permanently below this natu- 

 ral price, for if in any country labourers could not be maintained, they 

 must cease to exist : they must be exterminated by famine, or be 

 removed to some other country. If the price paid were only sufficient 

 to maintain the labourer himself, without any family, he would be 

 unable to marry, or his children would die of want. By these dis- 

 tressing causes the supply of labour would be reduced until the com- 

 petition of employers had raised the price of labour to its natural level. 

 But although the natural price would thus appear to be that which 

 only wards off starvation, there is, happily for mankind, a principle 

 which tends to raise it to a much higher standard. Every man desires 

 to improve his condition, to enjoy more of the comforts and luxuries 

 of life than have fallen to his lot, and to raise himself in the estimation 

 of others. If he has accomplished this, he acquires habits of living 

 which it is painful for him to forego. He endeavours to bring up his 

 children with the game views and habits as his own, and feels it a 

 degradation if they fall below the standard which he has himself 

 attained. The necessary consequence of this tendency to social 

 improvement is to cause prudence and forethought in marrying, and 

 undertaking the support and settlement of a family. A labourer cannot 

 well have too many wants. He should desire good food, good clothing, 

 a cleanly and comfortable home, and education for his children. If 

 the standard of wants could be universally raised, the natural price of 

 labour would rise in proportion ; for if each labourer were determined 

 not to render himself unable to gratify these wants, all could command 

 the wages that would supply them. The degree in which this prin- 

 ciple operate* determines the natural rate of wages and the condition 

 of the working classes. Where it has no influence, as in many parts of 

 Asia, the wages are only sufficient to support life upon the commonest 

 food, and to provide the most squalid clothing and habitations. In more 

 civilised countries, the wants and prudence of the middle classes extend 

 lower in the scale of society, and the labourers want more and enjoy 

 more of the comforts and decencies of life. 



The general market-rate of wages depends upon the ratio which 

 the capital applied to the employment of labour bears to the number 

 of labourers. If that ratio be great, the competition of capitalists 

 must raise wage* ; if small, the competition of labourers amongst each 

 other, for employment, must reduce them. Whenever the accumula- 

 tion of capital is proceeding more rapidly than the increase of popula- 

 tion, wages will be on the increase, and the condition of the working 

 olnn*f* will be continually improving, until some check has been given 

 the increase of capital, or until the growth of population (which is 

 naturally encouraged by high wages) has altered the relative proportion 

 of capital to labourers, and reduced the market-rate of wages to the 

 natural rate. While the general rate of wages is regulated by these 

 causes, there are various circumstances which, by increasing or de- 

 creasing competition for employment, tend to raise or depress the 

 wages paid to persons engaged in particular occupations. Some of the 

 principal of these are 



1. The agreeableness or dinagreeableness of the employments. 



2. The easiness or cheapness, or the difficulty and expense, of learning 

 .hem. 



3. Their constancy or inconstancy. 



4. The small or great trust that must be reposed in those who carry 

 hem on. 



5. The probability or improbability of succeeding in them. 



It is not uncommon to hear these circumstances stated as the direct 

 nd immediate causes of high or low wages in particular employments ; 

 a if in some cases employers voluntarily gave high wages, or the 

 abourer could command them merely on account of the natvire of the 

 mployment. But the relation of supply to demand will influence 

 pages in particular employments, as it does the price of labour gene- 

 ally, and of other commodities ; and the circumstances stated above 

 vill obviously tend to increase or diminish the number of competitors 

 or particular employments. More will naturally seek an agreeable 



