7 WAGES. 



trade, easily learned, than one of a disagreeable character and difficult 

 to lrn. All description* of (killed labour bear a higher price than 

 unskilled labour. The expense of acquiring the knowledge of any art 

 or trade would not be incurred at all, unless the person who had 

 incurred it were better remunerated than other* who hare nothing to 

 offer except their natural strength and intelligence, which is common 

 to all men ; but many cannot incur the expense of learning a trade if 

 they would ; others are too indolent, too careless, or too awkward ; and 

 thus skilled workmen are not open to the same unlimited competition 

 as other rlss**s of labourers, and are in a condition to command higher 

 wages. Wherever uncommon skill, talent, or other advantage* are 

 required, the number of persons actually practising and living by an 

 employment must be comparatively limited. Mont persons are deterred 

 from attempting to learn it by the fear of failure, and many who 

 attempt it do not succeed in gaining their livelihood by it. The few 

 who are really successful can then command an extraordinary reward 

 for the exercise of their peculiar talents or acquirements. The world 

 will enjoy the advantage of them at any price, not being satisfied with 

 any less degree of excellence. Even if an unusual influx of .-killed 

 labourers into any employment should lower the rate of wai: 

 lower rate is not likely to continue very long, as the superfluous num- 

 ber would seek other employments which offered a higher reward. 

 This remit is facilitated by the fact, that the ordinarily high price of 

 skilled labour cause* a much more expensive mode of living, and thus 

 nisei the natural rate of wages of skilled labourers; or, in other 

 words, induces them to regard as necessaries a variety of comforts 

 which are beyond the reach of common workmen. 



Wages are usually calculated in money, and are called high or low 

 according to the money price actually paid ; but the condition of the 

 labourer is obviously affected by the price of commodities as well as by 

 the amount of his wages. If the necessaries of life be cheap, low 

 money wages will maintain him in comfort ; if they become dearer, 

 higher wages will not improve his condition, but will leave him as he 

 was. Hence it becomes a most important object to inquire whether 

 the price of provisions affects the rate of wages. The disputes which 

 have arisen upon this question would seem to be chiefly caused by 

 attempts to apply a universal law to countries and employments under 

 totally different circumstances. Some contend that as wages are regu- 

 lated by supply and demand, the price of provisions cannot affect them; 

 while others maintain that the average prices of labour and of food 

 must always, for long periods of years, conform one with the other. 

 It is evident, at the outset, that the former are speaking of the market 

 rate of wages, and the latter of the natural rate ; and if this distinction 

 be borne in mind, the two propositions may easily be reconciled. If 

 the market rate of wages be high, it is because the demand for labour 

 is greater than the immediate supply. A fall in the price of provisions 

 could not then lower the rate of wages, because the supply of labour 

 would still be the same ; but if the fall were permanent, the condition 

 of the labourer would become BO easy,, that population would increase, 

 and the supply of labour would be more abundant. The market rate 

 would thus be brought down to the natural rate, unless capital should 

 be increasing in the same proportion as the supply of labour ; and any 

 increase in the price of food must then check the growth of population, 

 limit the supply of labour, and ultimately raise wages. There is the 

 same tendency in the market price of labour to conform to the natural 

 price as there is in the market price of commodities to conform to 

 their real value. Both labour and commodities are equally capable of 

 increase and diminution, and the varying causes which encourage or 

 check production adjust the proportion between the natural or cost 

 price and the market price. But in some countries the market rate of 

 wages may be very much above the natural rate, and in others nearly 

 the same. In one country capital may be increasing more rapidly than 

 imputation, and in another not so fast. It is clear that a rise or fall in 

 the price of food cannot influence the rate of wages alike in all these 

 countries. Where the wages are high, and capital is rapidly accumu- 

 lated, any reduction in the price of food and other commodities is a 

 clear gain to the labourer, and can have only a very remote, if any, 

 effect in lowering wages ; but where wages are already reduced to the 

 natural rate, and capital is not increasing faster than population, wages 

 will undoubtedly rise and fall with any permanent increase or diminution 

 in the cost of mibsistence. 



The question is further affected by the differences which exist in 

 the natural rate of wages in various countries. Where the natural rate 

 is so low as only to afford the bare means of existence, the least rise in 

 the price of food must be fatal to numbers of the labouring population, 

 and, by thus limiting the supply of labour, must raise its price ; but 

 where the natural rate is high, the labourers suffer indeed from a rise 

 in the price of food, but their existence is not endangered, the supply 

 of labour is not diminished, and their wages consequently do not rise. 

 From these circumstances, it is evident that the precise condition of a 

 country in respect to capital, population, and wages must be ascertained 

 before it can be determined whether the price of f<x>d will aftY. t the 

 money rate of wages. It may, however, be generally affirmed, that in 

 proportion as the market rate approaches to the natural rate, and the 

 litter to the mere cost of the commonest subsistence, will the price of 

 the necessaries of life affect the rate of wage*. 



When the causes which regulate the price of labour are understood, 

 the folly and injustice of nny legislation to fix the rate of wages are 



WAHHABIS. m 



obvious. The seller of an article will always endeavour to obtain a 

 high price for it, which the purchaser will only give if he be unal<!<- t<> 

 obtain it for less. Labour is the most important object that man has 

 to buy or to sell. Each will make the best bargain he can, and in this 

 no law ought to restrain him. Laws may purpose to affect wage* 

 either directly or indirectly. Direct interference with the rate of 

 wages has been frequently resorted to. By several acts of parliament 

 a legal rate of wages in particular employments was ordered to be 

 settled, from which any deviations either on the part of the etm 

 or labourer were punishable. (See 2.1 Kdw III., stat. 1 ; 34 Edw. III., 

 c. 11; IS Kich. II., c. 8; 11 Urn. VII., c. 22; SEIix.c. 4; Uames I., 

 c. 6.) Unless all the cause* of high or low wages already explained be 

 visionary, it is plain that no law can overrule them and establish a legal 

 rate different from that which natural causes would have produced. 

 It may embarrass the operations of trade, and mischievously disturb 

 the freedom of the labour market ; but it cannot attain its immediate 

 end a compulsory rate of wages. The experience of this fact ha* 

 long since put an end to any such legislation in this country. The 

 most pernicious interference with wages ever effected by the indirect 

 operation of a law resulted from the mode of administering the laws 

 for the relief of the poor. Before these laws were altered in 1.-:; I. it 

 was the practice in most parishes, especially in the south f I ' 

 to give relief from the poor-rate to labourers in proportion to the num- 

 ber of their children. The natural rate of wages was continually 

 undergoing depression, because, marriages being encouraged without 

 reference to the sufficiency of wages to support a family, ppulation 

 was extraordinarily promoted. At the same time, the property destined 

 to support it was suffering diminution, by being taxed heavily for the 

 payment of comparatively unproductive labour. 



The only sound mode of raising wages and improving the condition 

 of a people is to promote and encourage the increase of the K 

 wealth of a country [Wi:.\mi], by every means which legislative 

 science points out as best suited to that end, and at the same time to 

 remove obstructions, and give facilities to the moral and intellectual 

 improvement of the working classes. By these means capital will I.e 

 increasing with the natural growth of population ; while the labourers, 

 with better habits, will be less prone to reckless inn>: OM.I, r 

 consequently not so likely to outrun the increase of capital. 



It is not unusual for persons in particular amploymmtl to desire 

 higher wages, and to enter into combinations against their masters in 

 order to obtain them. Such combinations were formerly prohibited 

 both by the common and statute law of this country ; but since the 

 5th Geo. IV., c. 95, if unattended with violence or intimidation, they 

 are not unlawful Unless he has bound himself by a contract, every 

 man has a right to give or withhold his own labour as he pleases ; but 

 he has no right to pre\f nt others from disposing of their labour. But 

 the only mode of rendering a combination effectual is to exclude fresh 

 workmen, which frequently can only be done by molestation and 

 threats, which are subversive of the freedom and peace of x 

 Strikes, temperately conducted, cannot in principle be condemned, 

 being often a necessary protection to the working classes, When 

 masters are not dealing fairly with their workmen, the fear of a strike 

 may often control them, especially as, when acting unjustly, they 

 would find a difficulty in obtaining new hands. But where the canoe 

 of a strike or combination is not an occasional dispute concerning 

 wages, but an attempt to limit the number of workmen by compulxory 

 regulations and bye-laws, and to dictate to their employers, it is 

 injurious to trade, and ultimately to the parties themselves. To the 

 labouring classes at large such combinations cannot be ben. 

 Whenever they are successful it is by excluding many competitors, 

 who are, of course, injured by the exclusion. The labour i 

 muirt become clogged by a mass of exclusive trades, which render it 

 difficult to find employment. The injury suffered by trade in conse- 

 quence of the artificial limits to the supply of labour and the unnatu- 

 rally high wages must also have the effect of diminishing capital, and 

 consequently the means of employing labour. 



(Adam Smith's Wealth of Nation i ; Kicardo's Political Kconmn 

 Taxation; Malthus, Etuay on Population ; Mill, J., Element* of Political 

 / : Mill, J. S., Prinrifiltg of Political Economy.) 



WAHHABIS or WAIIABEES, is the name of the adherents of a 

 Mohammedan sect in Arabia. The origin of this sect U intimately 

 connected with the following circumstances. When Sultan s 

 had conquered Egypt and deposed the last khalif of Cairo. A! 

 wakki-1 in A. H. UJ2 (A.D. HIT), he was acknowledged as successor of 

 the khalifs by Berckiat, the grand sherif of Mecca, who prc.-. nt I him 

 with the keys of the Ka'bah. From this time the sultans of the 

 Osmanlis were the protectors of the Mohammedan faith, though only 

 recognised as such by the Sunnites; they were the guardian.* of the 

 holy cities, Mecca and Medina ; and they had the privilege and the 

 duty of protecting the numerous caravans of hdjls, or pilgrims, wl.ieh 

 annually travel to Mecca. A Turkish pasha resided at Jidda, and 

 sometime* also at Mocha, and while the fertile provinces of 1 1 ]:>/ and 

 Yemen in Western Arabia scorned to obey the Sultan, the pa 

 Baghdad and Basrah made frequent attempts to establish the Turkish 

 authority in the province of El-Hassain Eastern Arabia. The M 

 medan religion had generally departed from its primitive pur, i 

 was particularly corrupted among the Turks. The Mohammedans had 

 introduced novelties into their religion, which were rather calculated 



