WAR, SCIENCE OF. 



WAR, SCIENCE OF. 



from the country in which it U acting, and therefore it doe* not 

 wholly depend upon iU magazine* (or it* mean* of subsistence ; jet 

 ren in tbia part of the world the auppliea of proviaion and forage 



tarred. Such a diaaater ia atill more likely to overtake an army in 

 the East, if unprovided with the meaua of support in iUelf, since there 

 the military force of the enemy consists largely in swarms of liflit 

 cavalry, who, avoiding regular engagement*, hang continually npon the 

 flanka and rear of the army, both preventing supplies from arriving and 

 cutting off all partiea who may be beyond the protection of the main 

 body. In fact, an army ia in all cases dependent on it* communi- 

 cations with its depot* and base of operations for receiving iU supplies. 

 not only of provisions, but also of ammunition and reinforcement*, and 

 alao in getting rid of it* sick and wounded. And, further, such ia the 

 moral or psychical effect on an armyof its communications being inter- 

 rupted, that it ha* always been held by the greatest generals, not only 

 of our own time, but of antiquity, that such an event ia the sure pre- 

 lude to disorganisation and defeat. Now a base of operation* may be 

 a single fortress or sea-port town ; but, a* a general rule, it is a long 

 strip of country, and in this latter case a slight consideration of it* 

 object and of the general principles which should guide all military 

 combinations indicate what is the best form for a base of operations, 

 namely, that it should form two 'side* of an angle approaching more or 

 leas to a right angle, so situated with respect to the theatre of war that 

 one side is parallel and the other perpendicular to the enemy'* base of 

 operations. For it is evident that, supposing the enemy to hare 

 advanced into the theatre of war, a great power of acting on his com- 

 munications is afforded by employing the end of the most advanced 

 portion of the rectangular base for entering the theatre of war ; for it 

 place* the army on the enemy's communications in his rear without 

 at the same time exposing it* own. It is not necessary that the base 

 should be right-angled to give this advantage ; for, in fact, a base of 

 any other form is good when, by projecting into the theatre of war, it 

 give* the power more or lees of acting from on advanced point on the 

 communication* of the enemy. Napoleon's theatre of war at the com- 

 mencement of the Austerlitz campaign was bounded on the north by 

 the Mayn and northern boundary of the Austrian dominions, on the 

 west by the Rhine and western boundary of Piedmont, on the south 

 by the Gulf of Genoa, Romania, and the Adriatic and Illyrio. The 

 base formed by the Rhine and the Mayn, supposing the country north 

 of the Mayn to be in possession of the French, is a base of the best 

 kind. The Rhine is parallel and the Mayn at right angles to the 

 Austrian base. Supposing, then, an Austrian army to advance into 

 the theatre of war west of Bamberg, the French, advancing from Bam- 

 berg and Bareith, would cut off their communications, that is, their 

 supplies of all descriptions, and in case of defeat, which is therefore 

 probable, their line* of retreat, and, driving them into the angle 

 between the Mayn and Rhine, utterly destroy them, while at the same 

 time the communications of the French would be secure, and they 

 could receive supplies and reinforcements, and, if defeated, which, 

 with these advantage* in their favour, would not be probable, they 

 might with ease retreat into some fortified portion of their base of 

 operation*. 



Again, the campaign of Moreau, in 1800, is a good example of a base 

 of this kind, the base being formed by the High Rhine and the Lake of 

 Constance and the line of the Lower Rhine, the French being in 

 possession of Switzerland. Napoleon wished Moreau to pass the Rhine 

 at Schauffbausen with his whole army, and thus to cut Kray off. As 

 he bad a itlt-de-pont at Bole, however, he was content with making 

 certain of a lesser success, and, ordering Lecourbe to pas* at Scbautt"- 

 hausen, he himself, with half the army, crossed at Bale, effected a 

 junction at Kughen, and occupied Stockhack, which was a vny 

 important point on the Austrian line of retreat. Kray, finding himself 

 cut off in the angle of the high and low Rhine, with 60,000 men, 

 endeavoured to retreat, but was met by Moreau and defeated at 

 Knuhen. 



If we consider Spain roughly a* a rectangle, three of the sides of 

 which ore formed by the sea and in possession of the English, w hilut 

 the fourth is in possession of the French, it will be seen what immense 

 advantage the maritime base of Torre* Vedras, at the extremity of one 

 of the sides, conferred. 



Lines of operation*, a* has been before stated, should at all times be 

 interior [STRATEGY], so that the portions of an army moving on t IK-MI 

 may at any time be massed in superior numbers to the enemy at any 

 point where a collision may occur ; but at the same time a single road 

 or strategic line, or indeed a single line of operation*, may often be 

 unfavourable, a* it doe* not give so great security against the enter- 

 prise* of the enemy, and in the presence of the enemy U extremely bad, 

 as it neceoiUtc* tlic column being of great length on the line of march, 

 rendering it unwieldy and liable to be overwhelmed by an attack in 

 front, or cut in half at the same time. Lines at a distance from one 

 another are objectionable, in *o far as they may become exterior, and 

 the troops on them be attacked in drtn.il anil overwhelmed before they 

 can support each other. When it is said that a commander should 

 slwaya endeavour to operate on interior, and make the enemy operate 

 on exterior, lines of operations, it must be understood that mere dis- 



tance apart on the map U not the only criterion of lines being exterior 

 or interior. Lines which appear exterior from their distance apart on 

 the map may be really interior from their advantage of cross roads, Ac., 

 and more especially from the superiority in the rate of marching of the 

 army moving on them. There is always an immense advantage in 

 maintaining * Urge a strategical front as possible, for by no doing the 

 euemy is kept in doubt and suspense as to the point on which it is 

 intended to strike a decisive blow ; but the length of this strategical 

 point must of course be limited by the necessity of tiffaitltiltg 

 inU-rior lines. Superiority in the rate of marching is then of immense 

 importance. The divisions of an army which can march twice as fast 

 as another are on interior lines, when 80 or 90 mile* apart, to their 

 enemy, when his divisions ore 60 miles apart. 



Napoleon said that if two armies are equal in all things except num- 

 bers and the rate of marching, the relative values of the two armies 

 will not be found by comparing their numbers, but by comparing the 

 product* of their numbers and rates. 



These considerations will show the immense superiority some rapid 

 means of transit along the strategic front may give ; for instance, a rail- 

 way. It was by availing himself of a railway in this manner, tliat the 

 Emperor Louis Napoleon mode that splendid movement at the com- 

 mencement of the late Italian war, when, by suddenly concentrating 

 his forces, which had been extended along the whole line of the Ticino, 

 on his extreme left, he crossed, and attacking the Austrian army before 

 it could concentrate, won the battle of Magenta. 



With respect to converging and diverging lines of operations. Di- 

 verging, or, as they are sometimes called, excentric Unes, proceeding 

 from any one point or more in a base, may perhaps occasionally be 

 found advantageous for offensive operations, since by them bodies of 

 troops may be rapidly moved up at once to different points in an 

 enemy's hue, and, if compelled to retreat from such points, they will 

 gradually approach each other, and be able to unite at some point in 

 their rear ; but they are only admissible when the marches have been 

 so ordered that interior strategical Unes are observed, so that the divi- 

 sions, by falling back or repassing the central point, may be in superior 

 force at the point of collision. It is evident, therefore, that such lines 

 should not have a great degree of divergence, especially when there are 

 few or no cross roads of communication, since then the columns in 

 their advance may become so far separated a* to be in danger of being 

 cut off in detail. 



Diverging or excentric lines of retreat are eminently wrong. A* 

 an instance may be given Wumiscr's retreat before Bonaparte. Bona- 

 parte having directed his whole force on one division, overthrew 

 it at Trent ; then getting in rear, and on the communications of the 

 other division, destroyed it at Bassano and Mantua; he, Bonaparte 

 himself, having by a concentric retreat just previously been enabled to 

 beat Wurmser. 



The retreat of the Russian armies in 1S12, under Barclay de Tolli 

 and Prince Bagration, before Napoleon, is an example of the grea 

 advantages of concentric retreats. Though Napoleon made repeated 

 attempts to intercept them, he was unable to prevent their retiring on, 

 and joining at, Suioleneko, whence they retired on Moscow ; and 

 though they were beaten at Moskwa, the battle was not very decisive ; 

 and their armies, by keeping together, were enabled to menace Napo- 

 leon's communications. This, according to Jomini, was the commence- 

 ment *t Napoleon's disasters. 



Concentric lines of retreat require care in using them, that the divi- 

 sions joining do not get intermingled, which may lead to inextricable 

 confusion and disaster, as was the case with the Prussians after Jena, 

 by which they suffered a severe augmentation of their disasters. 

 Lastly, when an army employs converging or concentric lines of opera- 

 tions, it is necessary to organise the marches so that the divisions may 

 arrive at their place of assemblement before the enemy can reach it, so 

 as to intercept and defeat the divisions separately. 



In the campaign of 1809, the British and Spanish armies were com- 

 pelled to act on what are called double excentric lines of operations ; 

 for Lord Wellington was on the line of the Tagus, having Lisbon for a 

 base, while Vcnegas with a Spanish army was employed in La Mancha; 

 and there were besides the forces in (jallicia and Leon. The armies, 

 being thus separated from each other, were quite unable to co-operate 

 for one object, even hod the Spanish generals and armies been capable 

 of executing any combined operations. 



1 hiving thus far slightly considered the main principles of strategy, 

 which since only permit* us to touch on, we must for a further eluci- 

 dation of them refer our readers to the various works, such as .Folium's, 

 on this subject ; and we cannot recommend a better work than the 

 ' Elementary Treatise on Strategy,' by Edward Yates, B.A., os on intro- 

 duction to the works mentioned at the end of the article, and to general 

 military history, by the close study of which alone can a clear know- 

 ledge of the principles of war be obtained in the cabinet, the full 

 knowledge nnd power of applying which must be obtained by expe- 

 rience in the field. Yates'* ' Elementary Treatise on Tactic* ' cannot 

 be too strongly recommended as an introductory work to the study of 

 the other branch of the science of war. 



The manner of reconnoitring ground and performing the details of 



military manoeuvres, has been described under RwomuIUVOB, and 



IONS, MiUTAHY. Wo will now proceed to a consideration of 



military positions and the principle* of tactics with relation to the 



