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WAR, SCIENCE OF. 



WAR, SCIENCE OF. 



marches of armies, and the general movements on a field of battle ami 

 in a retreat. 



Military positions are the sites occupied by armies either for the 

 purpose of covering and defending certain tracts of country, or pre- 

 paratory to the commencement of offensive operations against au 

 enemy. 



A position is considered as advantageously chosen when it is on 

 elevated ground ; when it is not commanded by eminences within the 

 range of artillery : and when, from the existence of natural obstacles, 

 as rivers or marshes, on the wings, it is incapable of being turned, that 

 is, the enemy cannot, without making an extensive movement, get to 

 the rear of the army by which the position is occupied. In the event 

 of such points of support being wanting, the position, whether it be a 

 plain or an eminence, should have its flanks protected by villages, or 

 by redoubts raised for the purpose ; for the flanks being the weakest 

 points of the line, since the troops there are only defended by their 

 own fire, they particularly require to be strengthened by the impedi- 

 ments of the ground, or by fortifications, iu order that the enemy, in 

 any attempt to turn the position, may be retarded till reinforcements 

 can be brought up to oppose him. 



The advantages possessed by an army on commanding ground consist 

 in the troops being able to see the manoeuvres of the enemy while their 

 own are concealed ; the fire, also, being directed downwards, is more 

 effective than that of the enemy, which is made upwards from a lower 

 level. The existence of woods or hollow ways in front of a position is 

 considered as an unfavourable circumstance, since an enemy might 

 there place divisions or parties for the purpose of attacking the line by 

 surprise ; but, on the other hand, a wood in the rear, if it should not 

 be such as to create an impediment to the passage of the troops 

 through it, might become advantageous in the event of a retreat, as it 

 would afford a temporary cover for the retiring columns. A village or 

 even a single building on the ground occupied by the army may become 

 the key of the position ; and, as frequently on the preservation of this 

 point depends the possession of the field of battle, such point should 

 be well supported by troops and artillery. At the battle of Corunna, in 

 1809, the village of Elvina was twice contested by the opposing armies ; 

 and on the field of Waterloo, the Chateau d" Hougoumont was the object 

 about which the action raged with the greatest violence. The highest 

 point of ground, particularly if near the lines of operation (the roads 

 leading to the magazines), may also constitute the key, and it is usually 

 strengthened by one or more redoubts. It would evidently be advan- 

 tageous if such key were near the centre of the line, because, on any 

 change in the disposition of the latter, the key might still be retained, 

 and if the wings are separated from each other, it might prevent either 

 of them from being cut off by the enemy ; whereas, if situated at one 

 extremity, it might, on a wheel of the army taking place, become so 

 remote as to be incapable of being supported. 



The elevated ground which constitutes the position should be able 

 to contain all the troops who are to occupy it ; but it should not much 

 exceed the extent necessary for this purpose, lest, not being able to 

 defend the whole, the army should be deprived of the advantages 

 arising from a superiority of command, in consequence of the enemy 

 gaining some part of the height. 



However favourable a position may be with respect to the elevation 

 of the ground, that circumstance will be of small value if the troops 

 and artillery cannot be conveniently placed on it. It is indispensable 

 that the ground afford ample room for the manoeuvres of that species 

 of troops in which the strength of the army chiefly lies ; and at the 

 same time it may be observed that, in making choice of a position, the 

 ground in front should be as much as possible disadvantageous in that 

 respect for the enemy. The Spanish general, Cuesta, is blamed for 

 having, previously to the battle of Rio Seco, in 1808, placed his army 

 in such a situation that the ground before it was in the highest degree 

 favourable for the action of the French cavalry, which was particularly 

 numerous. Artillery should always be placed where it can act with 

 most effect ; and when the ground occupied by an army presents alter- 

 nately salient and retired points along the front of the line, the bat- 

 teries should be placed at all such points. At the former, in order 

 that the lines of fire may effectually command the approaches by which 

 the enemy's columns may advance ; and at the latter, that they may 

 defend the descending ground immediately in front of the others. 

 Infantry may occupy any kind of ground, but should, if possible, 

 always form a close line. It is usually placed between the batteries ; 

 and, if exposed to a distant cannonade, the troops may be drawn up in 

 a trench, the earth from which will serve to cover them, without pre- 

 venting them from marching out iu line to meet the enemy. Cavalry 

 must be posted on a level plain, over which it may advance with regu- 

 larity when a charge is to be made ; if compelled to act on broken 

 ground, it is formed in small detachments behind the infantry, through 

 whose intervals it may pass at proper opportunities. It may be observed, 

 that every disposition of an army for defence should correspond to that 

 of the works which constitute a fortified place. The batteries at the 

 advanced points of the line serve a purpose similar to that of the guns 

 in the flanks of bastions ; and the intermediate line of troops forms a 

 sort of curtain. 



In the choice of positions for offensive operations, such should be 

 taken as have no rivers or broken ground in front since these would 

 impede the contemplated movements towards the enemy : small 



inequalities, behind which infantry or cavalry may be concealed, are, 

 however, advantageous, as they afford the means of occasionally making 

 attacks by surprise. On the other hand, when an army is on the 

 defensive, the front as well as the wings should be protected by every 

 obstacle to the progress of the enemy which nature may present or art 

 can devise ; among those afforded by the latter may be mentioned the 

 blocking up of roads by abatis or traverses ; preparing countermines 

 by which, on the enemy's advance, the roads may be destroyed; 

 rendering fords impassable and even forming inundations by construct- 

 ing dams across the streams. It should be observed, however, that 

 when a defensive position is covered by a river, the line of troops 

 should be at 800 or 1000 yards in rear of the latter, in order that 

 sufficient space may be afforded for the troops to act against the enemy 

 in the event of his forcing a passage across ; and, in all cases, every 

 obstacle in the way of a free communication within the position ought 

 to be removed, that the troops may easily succour each other when 

 attacked. Whatever be the nature of the obstacles opposed to the 

 enemy, they should be within the range of the artillery of the line ; 

 and then the position may be considered as impregnable, since an 

 enemy would find it scarcely possible either to form or deploy his 

 columns of attack on broken ground and under a destructive cannonade. 

 Good roads, on the other hand, should exist, or should be formed, in 

 the rear, both to facilitate the arrival of supplies from the magazines 

 or depots, and to favour a retreat, should the latter step become neces- 

 sary. An army always retires in disorder under the fire of the enemy, 

 and its danger is greatly increased when the retrograde movement is 

 embarrassed by walls, ravines, streams, or other impediments; the 

 divisions then become separated from each other, ancf some of them 

 are generally cut off by the enemy before they can be supported. It 

 would be advantageous that the ground in rear should command that 

 of the position itself ; for then the army, in retreating, would obtain 

 a superiority of elevation over the pursuing enemy ; and it might even 

 have an opportunity of renewing the action with a prospect of success. 



A knowledge of the art of choosing military positions is an import- 

 ant qualification in the staff officers of an army; and these oflicers 

 should continually exercise themselves in forming correct judgments 

 concerning the fitness of ground for such positions. They should be 

 able to ascertain at once, by the eye, its extent and the stations it 

 may afford for troops of the different arms, so that those of all kinds 

 may act with the greatest effect and duly support each other ; and, 

 consequently, they should be able to determine the order of battle 

 which is the most advantageous for the ground to be occupied. They 

 are also to judge of the facilities which the roads may present for au 

 advance or a retreat, or for the conveyance of supplies from the 

 magazines ; and, finally, of the obstacles which the ground in front 

 may oppose to the movements of the enemy. The power of readily 

 appreciating the character of ground in all these respects is what is 

 called, by foreign writers, the military coup-d'ocil ; and this cau only 

 be acquired by a profound knowledge of the tactics of war, joined to 

 much experience in the practice of executing military surveys, and of 

 contemplating the appearance of ground from all possible points of 

 view. These points being the supposed stations of the enemy, the 

 staff-officer should accustom himself to observe from thence how the 

 latter might make his attack ; for then only can he judge in what 

 manner an attack ought to be opposed ; that is, what disposition of 

 troops and artillery would be the most favourable for resisting it 

 when made. 



The main principles which have been laid down at the commence- 

 ment of this article as the guides to the conduct of strategical opera- 

 tions, are equally the principles in tactical combinations ; the following 

 observations, then, are simply with a view of showing how these may 

 be earned out. 



Marches comprehend all the movements by which an army trans- 

 ports itself from one place to another : when they are made at the 

 opening of a campaign, and at a considerable distance from the enemy, 

 they are called routes ; and on such an occasion the object generally is 

 to invade a country, to seek subsistence, to surprise the enemy or force 

 him to make counter-movements, in executing which he may be advan- 

 tageously attacked. During a campaign, and in the enemy's sight, 

 marches are made in order to attack some important position which he 

 may occupy, or succour some post which he may threaten, or in order 

 to fall back on the magazines of the army. At the end of a campaign 

 an army marches to the quarters which it is to take up for the winter. 



When au army already encamped in order of battle is to advance 

 towards the ground directly before it, the march is said to be to the 

 front ; and if it is to proceed to ground on the right or left of the 

 line, the movement is called a flank march. In the former case it 

 would be advantageous if there were several roads nearly parallel to 

 one another, and all tending to the position which is to be occupied ; 

 and it would even be proper, should there not already exist a suffi- 

 cient number, to make such, by cutting through woods or walls, form- 

 ing causeways over marshes, or bridges over streams. The army 

 might then be divided into several short columns, so as to be able with 

 facility, if suddenly attacked, to deploy into line at any moment either 

 during the march or on arriving in the new position : the intervals 

 between the lines of route should therefore be, as nearly as possible, 

 equal to the extent which the columns moving in those lines would 

 occupy wheu formed in order of battle. The advanced guard, con- 



