WAR, SCIENCE Of. 



WAR, SCIENCE OF. 



iting both of infantry and cavalry, may march before the bnd :' the 

 centre column at th distance of about a mile ; and theae troop* abould 

 be accni|*uied by the pontoons and the sappers who are to remove 

 the obstacles, or form the bridge*. \\ lu n the French army advanced 

 Into Russia in 1812, it marched in three great columns nearly abreast 

 of etch other : the centre column proceeded along the main road ; and 

 the country being one vast plain, the others with their artillery moved 

 over the ground on both sides. 



On a flank march along nearly parallel muds, since the heads and 

 rears of the columns are where the extremities of the wings of the 

 army would be if in order of battle, the several lines of route should 

 be as near together as possible, that the troop* may readily mm c into 

 their proper {daces in re-forming the line ; and it is obvious that, in 

 such marches, the divisions in each column should lie well clotted 

 together; for should they become separated by rivers, marshes, or any 

 other obstacles, the enemy might seize the oppoi tunity to attack a 

 division before it could be supported by the others. 



The difficulty of returning rapidly to the 6rder of battle when 

 attacked, is the reason that flank marches in the presence of an 

 enemy are dangerous, particularly when the ground offers no impedi- 

 ment to bis approach : they however become necessary when a posi- 

 tion is to be taken up on either extremity of on enemy's line ; and 

 in order that they may be executed with safety, the columns should 

 be protected in flank by a corps appointed for the purpose. In 

 general an effort is made, by false demonstrations, to deceive the 

 enemy, for a time at least, respecting such movements : these consist 

 in opening roads in different directions through woods or enclosures, 

 in laying bridges over streams, iu sending provisions and stores, and 

 even bodies of troops, to various points ; and, while the enemy is in 

 a state of uncertainty concerning the object of the demonstrations, 

 the columns secretly commence their march : care however is to be 

 taken that detachments, when sent out as feints, do not proceed so far 

 from the army as to be cut off, or compelled to retire with great loss. 



In the usual order of march the artillery should be formed in 

 divisions corresponding to those of the troops, in order that each 

 column may have a portion attached to it, and ready to act with it in 

 the event of being obliged suddenly to come to action independently 

 of the rest of the army. A few pieces of artillery generally accom- 

 pany the advanced-guard in order to protect the deployment and 

 commence the action ; and a division composed of the heaviest pieces 

 may move with the cavalry for its support. During the march, the 

 place of the artillery is in rear of the column to which it belongs, that 

 it may not impede the movement of the troops ; that of the reserve 

 artillery being behind the centre column, in order that it may readily 

 move up to the position iu which it is to be employed. If some point 

 of attack bos been previously decided on if, for example, it is intended 

 to commence an engagement by assailing a village or an intrencbmeiit 

 a considerable division of the artillery must accompany the columns 

 destined for that purpose ; and if the army while making a flank-march 

 in likely to be attacked on the road, Rome artillery proceeds at the 

 bead of each division of the troops. Should an attack in such cir- 

 ctimstances take place, the troops must form as quickly as possible, and 

 the artillery must be placed where it may serve to repel the assailants 

 by it* fire. 



If an extensive movement is to be made in order to arrive at the 

 position of the enemy, it is necessary to be careful that the latter may 

 not, by short routes, attack the army on the march. This manoeuvre 

 waa successfully performed by the Prussians at Liegnitz in 1760: the 

 king, being surrounded by the Austrian* and Russian*, and in <1 m ... r 

 of being overwhelmed, on learning that the corps of General London 

 was moving to turn his left and fall on his rear, while other troops 

 were to attack him in front, suddenly decamped, leaving troops and 

 artillery to occupy the attention of Marshal Douu in front, and 

 defeated Loudon on his march : by this action he opened a communi- 

 cation with Breclau, and caused the siege of Schweiduitz to be raised. 



In all marches the breadth of a column must depend upon that of 

 the road, and space should be afforded for the officers and orderlies to 

 poo* by the ride of the troops without inconvenience : care should be 

 taken when any change is made in the breadth of a column previously 

 to entering a defile, that the formation* be made without allowing the 

 troop* to fall into confusion. 



To force a defile which is occupied by an enemy possessing artillery, 

 and covered by epaulemeuts, in an undertaking which is likely to be 

 attended with some loss : but if it is necessary to attempt it, the trooiw 

 which guard it* entrance should be dispersed by a fire of artillery ; and 

 then the Infantry of the army may enter the defile protected by light 

 troop* and artillery placed on the slopes or summits of the height*, in 

 nutation* where their fire may act with effect against the enemy's posi- 

 tion, or against the port* which he may occupy. These detachment* 

 mutt be followed by reserve troop*, by whom they may be strengthened, 

 or on whom they may retire If repelled. The enemy is thus, if po- 

 nible.to be driven from every |>o*t by v. hi' h tin: defile, with it* parallel 

 or tnuxrerw p*.*a*, if inch there be, is flanked ; when the main body 

 of the army may diipote itmlf in the position which shall appear most 

 favourable for maintaining |x>**eMion of the ground while the enemy 

 remain-, in tliu neighbourhood : strong detachment* mutt also be placed 

 in situation* which may command every approach to the flank* of the 



In the i- .-lit,.!' having penetrated into the enemy'* country, *ome 

 -hoiild be secured, in order that they may serve to protect 

 the succeeding operation*. Fortified places are usually on in. r, or in 

 situation* from whence crossroads diverge into the country; and the 

 poweaion of even one *uch place would be advantageous, at u 

 lor artillery and store*, while the riven or roads would facilitate the 

 conveyance of supplie* to the army. 



i'u the other hand, in order to defend or cover a country, on army 

 should be posted *o that by short movement* it may reach the enemy ; 

 and it must be understood that, in acting on the defensive, the corps 

 of troops should not be stationed at great distance* from each utlu i , in 

 the expectation of being able to defend every point \vhi< h ; 

 menaced by the enemy. This error waa committed at tin- opening of 

 the campaign in 1809, on the advance of the Austrian* in great force 

 toward* the frontiers of France; when General Berthier so separated 

 the division* of the French army, that all of them might have been 

 separately defeated, hod the movements of the Archduke Charles been 

 more rapid than they were. 



When two armies are in the neighbourhood of each other, an engage- 

 ment, either general or partial, may take place : the hitter usually con- 

 sists in an attack on one wing, or on some advanced part of the enemy's 

 line, in order, by driving it back, to obtain a more advantageous 

 tion, or to secure some line of communication. A general actioi. 

 become necessary when an invasion of a comr -it, <!, 



when a besieged fortress is to be relieved, when the position oe, 

 is to be defended, or when that which is occupied by tin- enemy so for 

 obstructs the communications as to deprive the army of the means of 

 subsistence. A battle may also be hazarded if the position of the 

 enemy be disadvantageous, if the divisions of his army are ill sup] 

 or if his force is weakened, either from some part being badly co\ered, 

 or from considerable detachments having been mode. 



An army drawn up for parade is usually disposed in two lines, with 

 the infantry in the centre of each, and the cavalry on the wings ; but 

 this is far from being the case on service, since the nature of the 

 ground will frequently render a contrary disposition necessary : in 

 some parts of the field the troops may bo in a single line, iu other 

 parts in two, or even in three lines. 



The order of battle immediately previous to an engagement depend* 

 so much on the facility which the ground may allord for di.- 

 moving the troops, that it is scarcely possible to assign any rule fur 

 the formation ; yet it is usual among military writers to class all the 

 different dispositions of an army under two kinds, which 

 noted the parallel and the. oUiijue order. The first comprehend* all 

 dispositions iu which the troops of both armies may be engaged at 

 once along the whole of their fronts : it was very generally employed 

 by the Greeks and Romans, and during the middle ages : but it is now 

 seldom adopted, since the weaker army is in danger of being out- 

 llanked; and should any part of it be driven back, the rest <>] t],.- 

 troops would either be turned and thus cut oil', or be also compelled 

 tn retire. The battle would therefore be lost; and, being > 

 pursued, the defeated army incurs the risk of being entirely ruined. 

 At the battle of Talavera, July, 1808, the two armi< .-. n up 



in parallel order, and the attack was made by the French at the same 

 time on the centre and on both wings of the a' 



The oblique order of battle may be said to have been employed by 

 the ancients when it wan intended to break the enemy's line : on such 

 occasions the phalanx was drawn up in tin- form of a wedge, and it 

 advanced with on angle in front against the centre of the line, 

 battle of Arbela, the army of Alexander attacked only the right 

 of the Persians; and at the battle of Cynoscephalx, the consul I 

 nius, ordering one of his wings to remain on the ground which it tin n 

 occupied, advanced with the other against the army of 1'liilip. (1'olyb., 

 ex. 3, lib. 17.) But this order of battle was first employed on sound 

 military principles by Frederick III. of Prussia, 



It does not always consist in drawing up an army in a straight line, 

 which, if produced, would meet the line of the enemy ; for this, on 

 account of the inequalities and accidents of tliu ground, is seldom 

 possible : nor are the two wings of an anny always placed at unequal 

 listauccs from those of the enemy, though this is frequently the case. 

 The principle of the oblique order consists iu such a disposition of the 

 troop* as may enable a portion of the army to engage at some one point 

 in the enemy's line, while the rest, protected by the obstacles of the 

 ground, is stationed so us to be able to support the troop* engaged, or 

 irevent the enemy at other point* of his line from attacking 

 .hose troops in flank ; and a great commander will always mm 

 so that his army, even though inferior on the whole to that of the 

 enemy, may be superior in strength at the point of attack. 



The attack is generally directed against one of the enemy's wings in 

 the hope of being able to turn it, that is, to get beyond it* extremity, 

 or in its rear, and thus to cut oil' iu retreat or intercept its sup; 

 jut if the wing* are well protected by the ground, or by ini . 

 meuU, or by strong reserves being posted there, and if at the same 

 time the centre ho* been w< aki u< d by troops having been drawn away, 

 ir by those which form it being widely disseminated, the attack 

 be advantageously made against that part of the line. At the battle of 

 C'orunna, January, 1808, the British and French armies were in 

 oblique order, the right of the former being near the 1 i it tor ; 



while the opposite extremities were, by the nature of i , kept 



