WAR, SCIENCE OP. 



WAR, SCIENCE OF. 



701 



ing their strength us much a* possible by passing through woods tad 

 hollow way*, if such them be, while the cavalry, supported by ome 

 infantry in village, a> at I, move toward) u a* before, in order to 

 deceive the enemy. The central column* r and x then move toward! 

 their left, and unite with the trooupa q to attack the wing A. Thus 

 the disposition of the army is completely changed : and if the change 

 fa effected with rapidity, the enemy might not have time to reinforce 

 the wing A before it would be turned. If the troops in the wing a 

 were to advance to attack the central columns at r and u, and these 

 were to retire, those troops would be unable to produce any effect, as it 

 would be necessary to recall them in a short time on account of the 

 danger then threatening the right wing. 



TnU is nearly what took place at the battle of Leuthen (17S7), when 

 the king of Prussia advancing against the Austrian army, made demon- 

 strations as if he would attack their right wing. Marshal Daun, though 

 for a time he suspected the feint, was at length deceived, and sent all 

 his reserves to strengthen that wing : the king observing this, pro- 

 ceeded immediately to execute an oblique attack ; for which purpose his 

 columns moved rapidly to the right and deployed on the left wing of 

 the Austrians ; this wing gave way, and the right wing wheeling up to 

 attack the Prussians' left, the two armies were brought into parallel 

 positions. These movements produced in the Austrian line disorder, 

 and openings by which the Prussian cavalry penetrated and took pos- 

 session of the village of Leuthen : the Austrians rallied twice after- 

 wards, but they were finally obliged to retreat. At the battle of 

 Albuera (1S11) the French general at first moved his columns as if he 

 intended to attack the left of the allies, but goon causing them to 

 change the direction of their march, he rapidly placed nearly two- 

 thirds of his army in order of battle perpendicular to the right of the 

 British line. By this movement the allies were obliged to change 

 their front, and, as this was done under a heavy fire, the enemy was 

 upon them before they had time to complete the new formation. 



When an army, in the position A B, is attacked on one wing, as n, by 

 the corps M, and is in danger of being turned, it may endeavour to 

 prevent the success of the manoeuvre by throwing back that wing in a 

 direction B c, parallel to that of the attacking corps, M : this is called 





forming the army en pntener ; the .ingle B is, however, weak, for the 

 troops in B c by falling back may become crowded and disordered ; A n 

 may become exposed to a raking fire from 11, and DC to a like fire from 

 troops at X. It is evident, however, that u cannot now turn the flank 

 B c without making a circuitous movement, by which it may become 

 separated from the rest of its line : and if the army A B is strong 

 enough, it may form a line parallel to the direction of c B. By such a 

 movement the parallel order would be restored, and the wing A might 

 even be made to turn the left, <J. of its opponent : this should of course 

 be attempted, as the return to a parallel order of battle leads to no 

 useful result. In order to effect it, the division nc should retire 

 gradually, while the brigades in A B wheel back, in order to keep in 

 connection with it; at the same time the brigades at A wheel to their 

 front so as to form the new line A'C.', in a direction oblique to that of 

 Q, r, x. 



An attack on an enemy's line is often made by a strong division 

 drawn up in one column for the purpose of forcing its way through the 

 line at some point where it appears to be weak, and thus compel- 

 ling the different corps to retire that they may not be separately over- 

 whelmed. This is the mode of attack which was practised with B 

 much success by Napoleon against the Continental armies, but which 

 failed when attempted against the British troops, both in Spain and at 

 Waterloo. 



It is adopted when an attack is to be made on an enemy behind 

 retrenchments, in which case the troops move as much as possible 

 toward* the salient angle* of the work in order to avoid the direct 

 fire; it it also necessary when the ground only permits the troojw 

 to advance on a narrow front, as in defiling through a ravine; in 

 fact, if an enemy's position have obstructions in its front, it must 

 necessarily be attacked in columns if at all. The columns should bo 

 connected with each other by bodies of light troops, and the attack 

 should be made with a view of separating a wing of the enemy from 

 his main body. 



The attack in column possesses some advantages over one made by 

 troops deployed in line while the men remain steady in the column ; for 

 the enemy is intimidated by the light of a vast body coming against 

 him, while *he assailant* feel confidence from their union. A rapid 

 uccetston of efforts directed against troop* in a slender line will also, 



in general, succeed in breaking their order ; but there are several cir- 

 cumstances which more than counterbalance these advantages : during 

 he advance over uneven ground the men lose their ranks and fall 

 nto confusion ; the flanking fire of the enemy's artillery makes great 

 woe among the crowded nmnr*. and the columns can only oppose 

 this fire by an irregular fire from its sides ; disorder then ensues, the 

 commands of the officer* are no longer regarded, and an attempt to 

 deploy for the purpose of making an attack in line only complete* the 

 disorganisation. An attack in column can indeed, scarcely succeed 

 unless it were preceded by a heavy fire of artillery : this will put the 

 enemy's line in disorder ; and in the event of forcing it, the column 

 may then be deployed in order to secure its advantage*. 



If a line, nearly equal in strength to that of the opponent, on being 

 Attacked in column, were to stand firmly, it is probable that the attack 

 would fail ; and even if the lino were penetrated, the troops, by form- 

 ng themselves in hollow squares, disposed chequer-wise, so that their 

 Ire* may cross on the ground in their front, have invariably been 

 found capable of restating the efforts of the assailants. This last ma- 

 noeuvre was recommended by General Jomini, and was for the first 

 :iine employed at the battle of Asperu, in 1809. In that action Napo- 

 "eon, perceiving the Austrian line to be weakened in the centre, ordered 

 t to be attacked by the whole corps of Marshal Lannes, which for this 

 inirpo.se was drawn up in one great column. The column, preceded by 

 artillery, advanced rapidly, and succeeded in penetrating the line. 

 The troops in that part gave ground, but forming themselves in squares, 

 they resisted all the efforts of the French cavalry to disperse them, 

 while the wings of the army closing upon the flanks of the column, 

 poured into it a destructive fire of artillery, which at length forced it 

 to retire in confusion between the two fortified villages which supported 

 its wings. The attack of the French at the battle of Wagram had, 

 however, complete success : the Austrians, being doubtful of the pre- 

 cise spot at which Napoleon would cross the Danube, hod very widely 

 dispersed their troops; the centre of their line was particularly weak, 

 and against this part the French emperor determined to direct a dense 

 column. This was composed of the reserve of the army, and the charge 

 was preceded by a heavy cannonade, which still further dispersed the 

 Austrian troops. The army, being thus broken, was compelled to 

 retreat. At the battle of Talavera (1809), the French in strong columns 

 attacked, at the same time, the centre and both wings of the British 

 line. The Utter was drawn up three deep, and its fire of musketry 

 and artillery, directed against the heads and flanks of the columns, 

 aided by charges of cavalry, drove the enemy bock with great slaughter. 

 An indiscreet pursuit made by the Guards was the cause of much dis- 

 order in the centre ; and the enemy returning to the charge, that part 

 of the line was completely broken ; but fresh troops being ordered up 

 to the spot, their fire kept the enemy in check till the disordered 

 troops rallied, and the artillery continuing to play on the flanks of the 

 enemy's columns, the latter at length gave way. 



The success of an action is often promoted by sending out a detach- 

 ment with directions to fall on the Banks or rear of the enemy during 

 the engagement. The sudden appearance of a body of troops in surh a 

 situation cannot fail to produce embarrassment in the army which U 

 attacked, and to diminish the energy of its operations towards the 

 front. On the other hand, there is some danger in sending out large 

 detachments from an army, as it is seldom possible to afford them d'ie 

 support ; and therefore they may be cut off by the enemy. The dis- 

 tance which the detachment has to march, together with the state of 

 the roads on which it must move, should be ascertained with precision, 

 in order that it may be at the appointed post at a seasonable moment ; 

 and such determinations ore very uncertain, particularly if the corps 

 has to make a great circuit. It almost always happens that tin- de- 

 tachment arrives too late for the accomplishment of the object ; and 

 this was the case with a detachment sent by the king of Prussia during 

 the action at Torgau (17oO), with a view of turning the left of the 

 A ustrians, end cutting off their retreat 



Detachments are however constantly sent out to protect the parties 

 reconnoitring a country, to guard a convoy, or to support a foraging 

 party. In these cases its object is less to fight than to cover a retreat ; 

 therefore the troops advance with circumspection, and retire when the 

 enemy appears in superior force. During the war in Spain (IMS), 

 Colonel (Sir Frederick) Adam having been detached to occupy a post 

 atOrdal, ten miles in advance of the army under Lord William !',< n- 

 tinck, in Catalonia, was suddenly attacked by the French army, and 

 his troops dispersed. This misfortune is ascribed to neglect in nut 

 having placed outposts, by which warning might be obtained of the 

 enemy's approach. 



An army which gains an advantage over its adversary is always more 

 or less deranged by the action, and it is necessary that it tihonld cndc.-i- 

 vour to recover its order preparatory to receiving the second line of 

 the enemy, should the latter advance to renew the combat. On the 

 c n. my retiring, the first line of the victorious army advances, and then 

 the second line follows it in order to support it, sending, if necessary, 

 battalions or squadrons to replace such as have been molt disordered 

 during the action. In the event of the second line, or reserve, of tlio 

 enemy being defeated, since then there is no apprehension that tin- 

 action will be continued, companies of troops may be detached in pur- 

 suit of the retreating army ; but every precaution should be tab n to 

 keep them within the support of the main body, and particularly to 



