CSS 



CAUSATION. 



CAUSE. 



table, that is, if the course of nature does not change, but continues to 

 proceed in its established order ; for then, as the universe exhibits an 

 uniformity of sequence in successive phenomena, or, in other words, 

 consists of a series of uniform causes and effects, or antecedents and 

 consequents, for the difference of name ia quite unimportant, man tnust, 

 in the nature of things, assuredly be the creature of circumstances, and 

 mint act as he is acted on. 



The work of Dr. Thos. Brown, entitled 'An Enquiry into the 

 Relation of Cause and Effect," is well known as a specimen of superior 

 metaphysical analysis. The main points of the theory it contains are 

 given more concisely in one o Dr. B.'s Lectures, vol. i. p. 135, and a 

 particular account of the work, with a notice of some objections to its 

 doctrine, is given by the Rev. David Welsh in his ' Life of Dr. Brown ' 

 (p. 98 et seq., and notes I and N in Appendix). 



As this ' Enquiry ' was originally designed expressly to vindicate 

 and explain the theory of Mr. Hume, it cannot be expected to contain 

 anything essentially or importantly different ; and that it does not is 

 evident on a comparison of the leading propositions. Dr. B. perfectly 

 coincides with Hume in maintaining that the relation of cause and 

 effect is not known a priori, but from experience ; and that after expe- 

 rience it is not discoverable by reason, but is merely an object of 

 belief a notion arising from " an instinctive principle of faith." 

 Hume's assertion, that the sentiment of this relation is derived from 

 experience only of the customary conjunction of objects, and arises 

 merely from the mental act of transition from one object to the other, 

 is contradicted by Dr. Brown ; but Hume in his paradoxical humour 

 has often incidentally done this for himself. The proposition of Hume 

 that, an to our knoicledi/e, there is " nothing but one event or object 

 >tff another," is that which Dr. B. reiterates throughout the 600 

 pages of his treatise, in showing that, " in a sequence of causes and 

 effects, whether as to the phenomena of mind or of matter, there is 

 absolutely nothing more than the antecedents and consequents them- 

 selves ;" that the idea of power, when acutely analysed, is simply the 

 idea of A itself, as that which invariably, and without the intervention 

 of anything whatever, is followed by B : the relation of things as to 

 being, in fact, their relation as to time : and the question about 

 cause and effect, a question solely about the uniform priority and poste- 

 riority of events ill time. The idea of action, force, and energy is also 

 resolved into that of simple antecedent and consequent : so that all is 

 reduced, as Hume has it, to one thing, not by but after another. This 

 identification of the idea of power with that of an antecedent having 

 an invariable relation to a consequent, only as to time, has been 

 regarded by many as virtually a denial of the reality of what is named 

 casual power ; but Dr. B., no less than other philosophers, appears to 

 have the same vague conception of an indefinable something which, 

 known only by its operations, constitutes at once a latent portion of 

 the whole qualities of an object, and forms its efficiency to create a 

 certain uniform change in another. He says that power is the relation 

 of a particular antecedent to the uniform change that follows, and that 

 he feels this relation to be a fitness or aptitude in the former to 

 produce the latter. He says thaf'God formed objects with powers to 

 >>e antecedents of changes;" that matter, like mind, is capable of 

 beginning changes ; and that we believe in the relation of cause and 

 effect, " not because we can demonstrate it to ourselves or to others, 

 but because it is impossible for us to disbelieve it ; the belief being in 

 every instance intuitive." But if proof be wanted that Dr. B. enter- 

 tained an orthodox notion of power as a productive principle, it is 

 given in the positive assertion of his personal friend and biographer, 

 the Rev. Mr. Welsh (p. 131), who says, that were his theory of causa- 

 tion really deficient in this particular, instead of commending he 

 should reject it as " a monstrous heresy." If this be so, it is amusing 

 to see Dr. Brown reprimanding Dr. Reid for dealing in " a tissue of 

 distinctions merely verbal," about " a mysterious unintelligible sonic 

 thing." The truth is, that power is merely a name for human ignorance : 

 the mind feels uneasy and dissatisfied in contemplating the unaccount- 

 able gap between au antecedent and consequent, and readily adopts 

 any hypothesis that will put a bridge over it ; hence the power of 

 gravitation, the poicer of volition, fte. Dr. Brown's definition of cause 

 as that which immediately as well as invariably precedes a chani 

 involves an obvious petitio pincifrii : for the question is whether 

 really is immediate to A, as known to us ? whether there exists a third 

 co-efficient to causation ? but this question can never be answered. 



Of the numerous strictures which have appeared on the theory of 

 Dr. Brown, we may notice the two following : ' An Essay upon the 

 Relation of Cause and Effect, controverting the doctrine of Hume, 

 Brown, and Lawrence,' 8vo, 1824. The author contends that ante- 

 cedency and subsequency are not essential to the proper definition oi 

 cause and effect ; because, although an object, in order to net as a 

 cause, must exist antecedently to such action, yet that when it does 

 act as a cause, its effects are synchronous with that action, and are 

 included in it ; that it is not mere sentiment, but reason (the faculty 

 of perceiving the ratios of things), which produces the conviction that 

 rverything which begins to exist must have a cause ; and which forces 

 the mind to perceive that similar causes must necessarily have similar 

 effect*, that nature cannot, without a contradiction of terms, be con- 

 ceived to alter her course, and therefore that no other change could 

 ensue than that which, in any given instance, does ensue; and that we 

 derive, from the observation of changes, and from the operation ol 



reason, the notion of that producing principle which we denominate 

 >mcer. In the translation, by Mr. Henry, of the ' Elements of Psycho- 

 gy>' by Victor Cousin, 1834, the theory of Hume and Brown is con- 

 sidered as asserting an unconnected succession of phenomena, without 

 he admission of any idea of causative efficiency : some elaborate 

 remarks of the translator, in accordance with the doctrine of the 

 author, are therefore given to exhibit its " falsehood and fallacy." It 

 a said that Dr. Brown confuses and mistakes the two distinctly 

 different conceptions of uniform antecedence and causation ; that he 

 akes the former which is only a condition of the idea of causation, for 

 the idea of causation itself, which includes something more and dif- 

 ferent, as proved by the consciousness of the relation of muscular 

 motion to the act of volition, and by the usages of all languages, &c., 

 that the idea of cause is that of a doer, actor, producer, changer, 

 mover ; and that the degree of motion produced is correspondent to 

 the degree of causative power exerted. An exposition of the doctrine 

 of causation adopted in the transcendental theory of Kant may be 

 found in the article on philosophy by Thomas Wirgman, vol. xx. ' En- 

 cyclop. Londiuensis ' (see ' Causation ' in Index, p. 252). By the 

 Kantians the conception of the relation of cause and effect is con- 

 sidered as a synthetical judgment a priori a postulate of pure reason. 

 It is a remarkable fact in the history of metaphysical science, that the 

 speculations of Hume on the idea of causation suggested to Kant the 

 first notion of his system of transcendental ideas, that is, ideas which 

 possess the character of universality and necessity. By Dr. Aber- 

 crombie, in his work on the ' Intellectual Powers,' 1832, the subject of 

 causation is considered as belonging to those " first truths," any 

 demonstration of which it is absurdity to attempt (pp. 187-208-214). 

 The following citation is from a learned metaphysical work (Harpur 

 ' On Philosophical Criticism,' 4to, 1810) : "All relation of necessity 

 exists in some quality, property, or attribute which is common to the 

 things related ; if things be related as cause and effect, such relation 

 must belong to the predicaments of action and passion : all action 

 implies motion either of body or mind ; it is motion therefore which, 

 being communicated, is common to the two objects, and is that which 

 constitutes the relation of cause and effect." It would be endless to 

 enumerate works in which the subject of causation is discussed. The 

 treatise of M. Maine de Biran on the relation of cause and effect is 

 highly commended by Cousin. Many works on natural theology and 

 free-will contain more or less on the subject Hobbes, Clarke, Leibnitz, 

 Collins, Hume, Butler, Cudworth, Edwards, Coplestone, &c. 



CAUSE (in Natural Philosophy). We have here only to explain 

 the manner in which this word is used, and not to enter into any 

 speculation upon the connexion of cause and effect. In common 

 language we say that A is the cause of B, when we have observed that 

 B never appears without A having preceded, so that A is always 

 followed by B. And, generally speaking, we are in the habit of 

 assuming the phenomenon which comes first to be the cause, and that 

 which comes afterwards, the effect. In natural philosophy, the word 

 cause is used in two senses, which may be distinguished into trite and 

 hypothetical ; and it is found convenient for distinction to latinise the 

 former term into tera causa. 1. By a rera causa, or true cause, is 

 meant that which is actually concerned in producing the effect. Thus 

 the rotation of the earth is a vera causa in the production of day and 

 night ; and similarly, what we call attraction is a vera causa in the 

 production of the celestial motions. 



2. There are two different ways in which the word cause is used in 

 the sense which we distinguish by the word hypothetical. (I.) The first 

 is when we are able to prove that phenomena take place exactly in the 

 manner and to the extent which would necessarily happen if a certain 

 supposition were true ; so that we cannot be led into error as to results, 

 if we assume that supposition to be true. Thus the supposition of 

 the stars being all fixed in an immense crystal sphere, which sphere is 

 turned round from east to west, is one from which the apparent 

 motions of the stars, such as they are, would necessarily follow, aud, 

 being frequently applied to the explanation of the details of the 

 heavenly motions, is then assumed as an hypothetical cause. And 

 when it is found that the motions of all the planets are precisely such 

 as would take place if the sun attracted them all, and they each other, 

 as implied in the word gravitation, then the attraction which is suffi- 

 cient to produce the effects in question is assumed as au hypothetical 

 cause. Thus in the old disputes about the motion of the earth, each 

 side admitted that the other produced an unobjectionable hypothetical 

 cause, and the point in question was, which had the vera causa. And 

 formerly it was discussed whether gravitation was a primary quality of 

 matter, or whether the intermediation of other matter was necessary. 

 The second supposition involved the attempt to explain gravitation, by 

 introducing some other quality of matter as the rera causa, in place of 

 the hypothetical attraction. And the doctrine of immaterialism 

 [BERKELEY, Bioo. Div.] is an attack upon the notion of matter as a rera 

 causa for the phenomena of the external world, though as an hypo- 

 thetical cause it is admitted as an unobjectionable mode of speaking. 



(II.) A phenomenon is cited as the hypothetical cause of another, 

 when the two are always found together, and the nature and quantity 

 of the second are connected by an invariable law with the nature and 

 quantity of the first. In this sense we have seen, in the article 

 CAPILLARY ATTRACTION, that because convexity and depression always 

 go together, and also concavity and elevation, the depression in 



