MIKAJUL 



DREAMS. 



00 1 



Uule utura UMO mechanic!, and which *Und* in about the nine 

 rabUotuhip to drawing, in iU more elevated character, M an ordinary 

 lotu r doe* to a liuuhed literary composition. Lake the *ketcher, the 

 drafuaun only copiea the object* before him, and thoee generally 

 inanimate one* j but with thi* difference, that hi. drawing* are ex- 

 pected to exhibit perfect fidelity, and admit of being worked up to a 

 high degree of finuh and beauty. 

 Than are various manipulation* or modee of drawing, dint inguuhed 



according to the material* or implement* made use of, auch as chalk, 

 black lead pencil, aepia, or other tinted drawing* ; which lait-mentioned 

 da** are eometinMi called waahed drawing*, in which *ome indication 

 of colouring i* occasionally introduced. But what U termed water- 

 colour drawing, a* now practised, i* altogether a *pecie* of painting, 

 although the proem* i* totally different from that of oil colour*, or 

 cren dutomper. Pen and iuk drawing* in the style of etching*, either 

 with or without the addition of w*ah of shadow, are capable of pro- 

 ducing considerable effect. Still more effective are drawing* either in 

 black-lead pencil, chalk, or sepia, made on paper of a neutral tint, the 

 bright light* bring put on with white. 



Painters' drawiug* or studies, auch as those of the old master*, are 

 highly valuable because they often exhibit their first conception* in 

 nil their energy, and admit us to immediate intercourse, as it were, 

 with their idea* a* they arose in their minds. Collection* of auch 

 drawiug* are found in most national and royal, and in many private, 

 museums. The British Museum contains a very choice though not 

 very extensive collection of drawings by the old masters. Perhaps 

 the finest ever formed by a private individual was that of Sir Thomas 

 Lawrence, P.R.A. ; but it was dispersed after his death. The bulk of 

 the Michel Angelo and Raf&elle drawings were purchased for Oxford 

 University, and are kept in the University galleries. Of late, photo- 

 graphy ha* been applied to the production of fac-similes of the 

 drawing* of painters, especially thoee of the old masters; and, the 

 application ranks among the most interesting and valuable of that 

 beautiful art. The art branch of the Department of Science and Art 

 have therefore conferred a great boon on students of art by making 

 photographic fac-similes of the exquisite drawings by Raffaelle in the 

 British Museum, the Louvre, and especially the unrivalled collection 

 belonging to the University of Oxford, and issuing them at almost 

 nominal price*. 



DllEAMS may be best described, in a few words, as trains of ideas 

 presenting themselves to the mind during sleep. The person to whose 

 mind idea* present themselves in trains during sleep, is said la ilrcam, 

 and the word dreaming designates either the state of the mind in 

 dreams, or else the susceptibility or potentiality of having dreams. 

 We use the word in the former sense, when we speak of " the state of 

 dreaming ; " in the latter, when we say that " dreaming is a part of 

 man's nature." 



It is the principal design of this article to present the reader with 

 the ptychuluyical theory of dream* : to explain, first, the psychological 

 law by which dreams, as being trains of ideas, are regulated, and to 

 exemplify the operation of this law ; and, secondly, by means of this 

 law and of certain psychological circumstances peculiar to the state of 

 sleep, to explain the differences existing between dreams, as being 

 trains of ideas which occur in the state of sleep, and trains of ideas 

 a* they generally occur in the waking state. When dreams, as psy- 

 chological phenomena, shall have been thus explained (in the scho- 

 lastic phrase) pcrgmut et differentium, the reader will be in possession 

 of the whole psychological theory of dreams. 



But dreams may give rise, as they frequently have given rise, to an 

 inquiry other than the psychological inquiry which we have indicated, 

 namely, one which in common npeech is called a ji/iytical, but which 

 would be better called, by coining a word analogous to psychological, 

 tomatol"jical inquiry. Besides observing the mental phenomena of 

 dreams, and referring these phenomena to a mental or (as we have 

 before termed it) psychological law, together with certain psychological 

 circumstances peculiar to the state of sleep, men may speculate on the 

 manner in which the state of the body in sleep affects the mind how 

 the body when asleep is affected, and how again the body thus affected 

 operate* to the production of the phenomena of dreams. Of this 

 physical or somatological inquiry, the greater and more important part, 

 that which relate* to the state of the body, belongs properly to the 

 subject of sleep ; while, as) regards the manner in which the state of 

 UM body operate* to the production of the phenomena of dreams, to 

 determine which observation gives very small assist. ill state, 



in a second division of this article, the little that can be relied on. 



In the third part of the article we shall give a few well-attested 

 inrtani-fi of dreams, accompanied by circumstances which, as they are 

 related, do not seem to admit of explanation. And this will lead us 

 naturally to *ay a few word* concerning the lupernatural character 

 which, at different times and in liilrrnit countries, has been attributed 

 to dream*. 



I. We hare laid that dream* are trains of idea* presenting them- 

 selves to the mind during sleep. Occasionally, and under peculiar 

 and definable circumstances, teiiHttiont are felt during sleep ; some of 

 u Inch commonly do not awake the dreamer, while others, which awake 

 him, are yet ahown to have been felt during sleep by the circumstance 

 that a train of idea* called up by them passe* before the mind, invested 

 with the attributes of dreams, in an interval between the 



ami the waking. These sensation*, however, are, from the nature of 

 the case, comparatively *o few, and, even when they are felt, *o unim- 

 portant in compariiwn with tlio idea* which they call up, that they may 

 very well be excluded from notice in a general description of dream*. 



Bearing in mind then the existence of these few and unimportant 

 exception*, we shall henceforward speak of dream* as consisting only 

 of idea*. And that the feeling* composing dreams, which are at the 

 time believed to be seiuations, are not sensation*, but only ideas, 

 that we do not *ee, hear, smell, ta*te, and touch what we believe at the 

 time that we respectively we, hear, smell, taste, and touch, but that 

 we only have the ideas of these respective *en*ation, cannot need proof. 

 At any rate, the only proof which the nature of the case admits i* one 

 to be furnished by each individual for himself. Knowing the circum- 



which, when he is awake, are concomitant with the having the 

 feelings called tauatioiu, and the circumstances which are concomitant 

 with the state of sleep and of dreaming, knowing further that these 

 two sets of circumstances are incompatible with one another ; while, 

 on the other hand, the circumstance* concomitant, when he is awake, 

 with the having the feelings called idea*, are such that he may very 

 well have them likewise when he is asleep; he cannot butconclu 

 himself (and if he do not, other means of proving it U> him there are 

 none) that the feelings of which he is conscious during sleep are not, 

 as at the time he believe* them to be, sensations, but ideas. He knows 

 that when he is asleep and dream*, he is so situated that he cannot 

 have the sensations which at the time he believe* that he has. He 

 knows that he may, in his then situation, have ideas ; and, if he has 

 any feelings at all, mutt have ideas. He must conclude then that what 

 at the time he believes to be sensations are in reality only idea*, and 

 must consider the appearance of these ideas as sensations, as a matter 

 to be explained by means of psychological circumstances peculiar to 

 the state of sleep. 



Dreams, then, being thus assumed to be trains of ideas, we proceed 

 to investigate the law by which they are regulated, and to exemplify 

 the operation of the law. 



On observing, or (to use the phrase which, when mental phenomena 

 are spoken of, is more common) reflecting upon, our waking train of 

 ideas, we find that when two sensations, or two ideas, or a sensation 

 and an idea have occurred in proximate succession, the sensation that 

 occurred first, or its idea, or the idea that occurred first, is after 

 followed by the idea of the sensation that occurred second, or (as the 

 case may be) by the idea that occurred second, and that this happens 

 the more surely in proportion as such proximate succession of the two 

 sensations, or two ideas, or sensation and idea, has been more recent, 

 and in proportion as it has been more frequent. Such is a brief state- 

 ment of what is called the law of association, and of its laws. [ASSO- 

 CIATION.] 



" When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever," says Hobbes, " his 

 next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. 

 every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. But as we 

 have no imagination li'iea), whereof we have not formerly had sense in 

 whole or in part* ; so we have no transition from one imagination to 

 another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses." (' Levia- 

 than,' i. 3.) Hobbes has here enunciated the principle of previous 

 proximate succession, or contiguity (whatever it may be called), and 

 has spoken of it as the sole primary principle of association ; the only 

 defect in the manner in which he has enunciated it being the omission 

 of the instances of two ideas, and of a sensation and idea occurring in 

 proximate succession. Most subsequent writers on the subject have 

 added other primary principles, more or less, to this one enunciated by 

 Hobbes ; and hi so doing are, we think, chargeable with an im; 

 analysis. Mr. Hume enumerated three principles, contiguity in time 

 and place, causation, and resemblance ; a fourth, contrast, which he 

 named, he looked upon as a secondary principle resolvable into causa- 

 tion and resemblance. ('Essays,' vol. ii.. p. '21.) Dr. Brown, tinding 

 great fault with Mr. Hume's enumeration, and observing that all 

 suggestion (the phrase employed by him in the place of assoc. 

 depends on prior co-existence (by which he means the same as we by 

 proximate succession), nevertheless does not seem to have p. 

 the processes by which resemblance and contrast may be resolved into 

 this principle, and furthermore treats the topic under the tin 

 division of resemblance, contrast, and contiguity in place or t.i 

 which he inconsistently calls primary principles. (' Lect,' 84 foil.) 

 Mr. Mill has two principles, subdivisions (and i>erhaps unnecessary 

 subdivisions) of the one principle, as it is represented by Hume and 

 Brown, contiguity; he calls them the " synchronous order," which, 

 he says, answers to contiguity in place, and the " successive order," 

 which, he says, answers to contiguity in time. ('Analysis of tlie 

 Human Mind,' vol. i. p. 53.) He observes rightly, that tin- 1 1 li 

 of causation, resemblance, and contrast, may be resolved into pre- 

 vious proximate succession ; though he does not go through the 

 analyses, and indeed the few hints which he gives of what he iln -ms Un- 

 necessary processes seem to show that he did not understand tin -m. 



The mode* of resolving causation in obvious; causation indeed is lint 

 a name for previous proximate succession, under particular circum- 

 stances. Let us briefly explain (Mr. Mill not having done it) the 

 modes of resolving resemblance and contrast into the name principle ; 

 taking, which is the most convenient method ill such cases, a par- 

 ticular instance of 



