685 



DREAMS. 



DREAMS. 



The sight of a man, A, calls up the idea of another man, B, who 

 resembles him. Some of the sensations and ideas which are elements 

 of the complex feeling called the sight of A , have been before present to 

 the mind as elements of the complex feeling called the sight of B ; and 

 these sensations and ideas call up the ideas' of the other sensations 

 and the other ideas which go to make up the complex feeling called the 

 sight of B, and which are not elements of the complex feeling called 

 the tight of A ; for with these other sensations and other ideas they 

 have before existed in proximate succession, or (as we may say for 

 shortness) have co-existed. These ideas, thus called up, co-exist (as 

 we may again say for shortness) with the ideas of the sensations, and 

 with the ideas, which, belonging both to the sight of A and the sight 

 of B, called them up ; and thus the idea of the sight of B, or the idea 

 of B, is present to the mind. 



Again, as regards contrast, the idea of a giant calls up the idea of a 

 dwarf. One idea that is an element of the complex feeling called the 

 idea of a, yiaiit is the idea of talluess, which idea is made up of the idea 

 of height and that of greatness. The idea of tallness, and therefore 

 that of height, is a vivid idea, or (changing the phrase) it is an idea on 

 which the mind dwells, or which very frequently presents itself to the 

 mind when a giant is being thought of ; and so when a dwarf is being 

 thought of, is the idea of shortness, which again includes the idea of 

 height, a vivid idea. Now the idea of height being a vivid idea, or 

 one which very frequently presents itself to the mind when a dwarf is 

 thought of, is strongly (and strongly by reason of the frequent prox- 

 mate succession of the two ideas) associated with the idea of a dwarf, 

 as it is, for the same reason, strongly associated with the idea of a 

 giant. The idea of the giant then calls up the idea of height, which 

 has frequently before (as we may say for shortness) co-existed with the 

 idea of the giant ; and the idea of height thus called up, calls up, for 

 the same reason, the idea of the dwarf. 



We have dwelt thus at length on the psychological law of associa- 

 tion, and ita primary principle of previous proximate succession, 

 because it may be said to be the key to the whole psychological theory 

 of dreams. This law being fully comprehended at the outset, so much 

 of the remainder of our task as consists in the exemplification of its 

 mode of operation is made straightforward and easy. 



We arrive at the law of association, as determining waking trains of 

 ideas, by the processes of observation and of induction. We may either 

 extend the law, thus arrived at in the case of waking trains of ideas, to 

 the case of dreams, knowing independently that these are made up of 

 ideas and are therefore not different in kind from waking trains ; or 

 again we may arrive at the law, in the case of dreams separately, by the 

 same processes of observation and induction. The former mode is as 

 satisfactory as the latter ; and in the way of this latter there are many 

 difficulties, arising out of the nature of the case, which do not exist as 

 regards the former. By the former mode, therefore, which is the 

 easier, and which is at the same time logically correct, we come to the 

 conclusion that, in dreams, one idea is followed by another idea, when 

 either the sensation of which the first is the copy has, at a previous 

 time or tunes, been followed by the sensation of which the second is 

 the copy, or when one of the ideas has followed or been followed by (as 

 the case may be) the sensation of which the other is the copy, or 

 again when the ideas themselves have been, at a previous time or 

 times, present to the mind in proximate succession; and that this 

 happens the more surely, or (changing the phrase) the association 

 between the two ideas is the more strong, in proportion as the previous 

 proximate succession has been more recent, and in proportion as it has 

 been more frequent. Of the law thus modified by the circumstances 

 of recency and frequency, causation, resemblance, and contrast, are 

 names for classes of instances ; and in dreams, as in waking trains, the 

 idea of what is called a cause is generally followed by the idea of what 

 is called its effect; the idea of an object which resembles another 

 object ia generally followed by the idea of the object which it re- 

 sembles ; and the idea of an object which ia said to be contrasted 

 with another object is sometimes followed by the object with which it 

 is said to be contrasted. We will now exemplify, with somewhat 

 more particularity, the operation of this law of association in dreams. 



1. The classes of associations which make up the greater part of our 

 mental history when we are awake, those concerned in naming, in 

 classification and abstraction, in memory, in belief, in reasoning 

 (whether to ourselves or by word of mouth, or in writing), in imagina- 

 tion, in desires and aversions, in affections, occur likewise during sleep, 

 and make up a considerable part of our mental history in sleep, that 

 is, of our dreams. It will .not be necessary to give instances of the 

 occurrence of each of these classes of associations, as every one who is 

 conscious of having dreamed must be conscious of having had these 

 several states of mind during his dreams. And further, the giving of 

 the instances would be of little use, unless the instances given of the 

 several states of mind were analysed, and the associations forming 

 these several states of mind set forth hi the particular instances given ; 

 but this, even were it relevant to our present purpose, would carry us 

 to an unreasonable length. Referring the reader then to Mr. Mill's 

 masterly work, entitled the ' Analysis of the Human Mind,' in which 

 the working of the law of association is thoroughly developed, we shall 

 content ourselves with a couple of instances of reasoning and imagi- 

 nation, and with an exemplification of belief, of that kind which is 

 most important for the full comprehension of dreams. 



We not only converse, in dreams, with the persons whom we believe 

 to be present, speaking to them, and again attributing to them con- 

 nected words which we believe that they speak to us, but we frequently 

 o so far as to make a speech or written dissertation, which, as remem- 

 bered when we have awoke, is not only coherent, but often (owing to 

 psychological circumstances peculiar to the state of sleep) more clearly 

 and forcibly arranged than it would have been had we been awake, and 

 had we actually spoken the speech or written the dissertation. Condillac 

 is said to have often brought to a conclusion in his dreams reasonings 

 on which he had been employed during the day, and which he had not 

 completely worked out when he retired to bed. (Cabanis, ' Rapports 

 du Physique et du Moral de 1'Homme,' ii. p. 395.) Cabauis says, in the 

 same place, of Franklin : ",\ knew a very wise and enlightened man 

 who believed he had often been instructed in his dreams concerning 

 the issue of events which at the time occupied his mind. His strong 

 head, and his freedom, in every other respect, from prejudice, had not 

 been able to guard him against a superstition in respect of these inward 

 warnings. He observed not that his profound skill and rare sagacity 

 continued to direct the action of his brain during sleep." The circum- 

 stances under which Mr. Coleridge composed the fragment called 

 ' Kubla Khan,' have been described by himself as the following, and 

 we see no reason to discredit his statement. He had taken an anodyne 

 which had been prescribed to him in consequence of a slight indisposi- 

 tion, and fell asleep in his chair while he was reading in ' Purchas's 

 Pilgrimage,' of a palace built by Khan Kubla ; he remained asleep for 

 about three hours, during which, as he himself tells us, " he could not 

 have composed less than from two to three hundred lines; if that 

 indeed can be called composition in which all the images rose up before 

 him as things, with a parallel production of the correspondent expres- 

 sions, without any sensation or consciousness of effort." On awaking 

 he instantly sat down to commit his poem to paper. After having 

 written so many lines as were afterwards published, he was interrupted 

 by a person on business ; and when he returned to the task the poem 

 had vanished from his memory. 



Our belief in the presence of external objects not present is one of 

 the most curious and, from the frequency of its occurrence, together 

 with its curiousness, one of the most important of the phenomena of 

 dreams. This belief is a complicated case of association. When we 

 are awake, and, having sensations of sight from a present object, believe 

 that the object is present, we have, first, the sensations of sight which 

 the object excites, then the ideas of distance and extension and figure, 

 which are closely associated with these sensations : again, the ideas of 

 all the other sensations which the object has at other times and in other 

 circumstances excited (those of resistance, smell, sound, &c.), and of 

 ourselves as having these sensations : and, lastly, the idea of a cause of 

 all those sensations, whether present or past, whether those which are 

 themselves, or those of which only the ideas or copies are present to 

 the mind. All those ideas, inseparably associated with the sensations 

 of sight of which we are conscious, make up the complex state of mind 

 called belief in the presence of external objects, or belief in the existence of 

 external objects present. The same ideas, inseparably associated with 

 the ideas of the sensations of sight which were themselves present in 

 the former case, constitute another complex state, which is also a state 

 of belief in the existence of the external objects, but which, having 

 ideas of the sensations of sight instead of the sensations themselves, is 

 thus distinguished from the former state, and which may be called 

 belief in the existence of external objects not present. This last state of 

 mind is the one which occurs during sleep, appearing to be the former 

 one. Why it so appears we shall explain presently. At present we 

 have had to do only with what it actually is, and with the associations 

 which it comprehends. 



2. It is said that a man's character and pursuits influence his dreams. 

 Now we mean by the phrase, " a man's character," nothing more than 

 certain classes of association which occur to him most frequently ; and 

 his " pursuits " again, viewed subjectively or in respect of himself pur- 

 suing, may be paraphrased in the same way. When we say then that 

 a man's character and pursuits influence his dreams, it is only a way of 

 saying that those associations which most frequently occur when he is 

 awake will also occur most frequently, cteteris paribiix, when he is 

 asleep. This circumstance, therefore, observed in dreams, exemplifies 

 the manner in which frequency strengthens association. It would be 

 but a waste of words to bring particular instances in support of the 

 general remark ; and indeed it will be incidentally exemplified in some 

 of the illustrations which we shall presently adduce of the influence of 

 sensations on dreams. 



3. Dreams turn upon subjects which have been present to the mind 

 recently, rather than those which have been present to it at a greater 

 distance of time. In other words the most recent associations will recur, 

 cateris paribm, the most frequently in our dreams. As under the last 

 head, therefore, was exemplified the influence of frequency on asso- 

 ciation, so under the present is that of recency exemplified ; aud it 

 will not be necessary to dwell any longer upon this than upon the last 

 topic. 



4. We shall enter at rather greater length into the manner in which the 

 sensations occasionally felt in sleep modify dreams through association 

 We have already alluded to the occasional occurrence of these sensations 

 They are themselves very unimportant parts of dreams, even when 

 they occur; but they call up vivid and interesting trains of ideas, the 



