KKKK WILL. 



r'UEE WILL. 



I of the body and mind, in the nine manner, and with 

 the mine certainty, M other aflwta do from their mechanical causes ; 

 ao that a person cannot do indifferently either of the action. A and iU 

 contrary a, while the previous circuuwtances are the aune ; but is 

 under an absolute noeity of doing one of them and that only. 

 Agreeably to this, I auppoee that by free-will is meant a power of 

 doing either th action A or iU contrary, while the preriou* circum- 

 stance* remain the aune. If by free-will be meant a power of be- 

 ginning motion, thin will come to the same thing ; since according to 

 the opinion of mechanism, as here explained, man has no such power ; 

 but every action or bodily motion arise* from previous oircumstanoes, 

 or bodily motion*, already existing in the brain ; that is, from vibra- 

 tions, which are either the immediate effect of impineninna then made, 

 or tie remote compound effect of former impressions, or both. But if 

 by free-will be meant anything different from these two definitions of 

 it, it may not perhaps be inconsistent with the mechanism of the mind 

 here hud down. Thus, if free-will be defined the power of doing what 

 a penon desires or wills to do, of deliberating, suspending, choosing, 

 Ac., or of resisting the motives of sensuality, ambition, resentment, 

 ftc., free-will, under certain limitations, is not only consistent with 

 the doctrine of mechanism, but even flows from it ; since it appears, 

 from the foregoing theory, that voluntary and semi-voluntary powers 

 of calling up ideas, of exciting and restraining affections, and of per- 

 forming and suspending actions, arise from the mechanism of our 

 natures. This may be called free-will in the popular and practical 

 sense, in contradistinction to that which is opposed to mechanism, and 

 which may be called free-will in the philosophical sense." This paaiage 

 is not selected as being a peculiarly successful statement of the ques- 

 tion, but simply because it shows with sufficient accuracy what the 

 matter under consideration is, and that independently of the author's 

 theory of vibrations. 



Ntettrity, according to the common definition is that quality of a 

 thing by which it cannot but be, or whereby it cannot be otherwise. 

 When, in a proposition which affirms any thing to be true, there is a 

 fixed invariable connection between the subject and the predicate, then 

 that thing is understood to be necessary. Necessity is opposed to 

 chance, accident, contingency, and to whatever involves the idea of 

 uncertainty and of possible variation. It is usually distinguished into 

 logical, physical, and moral necessity. Logical necessity consists in 

 the circumstance that the conception of something being <i< 

 from what it is, implies a contradiction or absurdity. In this sense 

 it is necessary that two and two should be four, that converging lines, 

 if produced far enough, should meet : thus also the eternal existence 

 of being generally is necessary, as are innumerable other truths. 

 Physical necessity has its origin in the established order and laws of 

 the material universe. The necessity, in this case, differs from that 

 formerly specified, in that it is only conditional, is a necessity of con- 

 sequence. Everything that takes place in the natural wurlil hap|us 

 by virtue of certain laws : these laws are known by experience to 

 operate regularly and uniformly ; and the results of their operation 

 are hence, with reference to them, said to be necessary. When we 

 ascribe anything to chance, we merely state our ignorance of the law 

 or lawn to which its existence is to be referred. Physical necessity is 

 founded on the relation of cause and effect. By tracing back this 

 connection, we arrive at the knowledge of a great first cause, that is 

 Ood, who is the only Being cxixting independently and by an absolute 

 necessity. His infinity and other attributes are necessary ; and it i- 

 cvident that the purposes and acts of such a Being must also be neoes- 

 ary, being determined by that necessity by which he is what he in. 

 Ho must always resolve and act with the most perfect wisdom, justice, 

 and goodness. To affirm the contrary would be to affirm that he is 

 different from what he is. Moral necessity has reference to the 

 volitions and actions of rational agents, and is intended to express the 

 connection between these volitions and actions, and certain moral 

 catties, as inclinations, desires, or motives generally. Whether there 

 be any connection which, strictly speaking, may be termed necessary, 

 between such motives, and the resolutions of the human will, ami the 

 consequent actions, or whether, independent of them, the will has a 

 elf-determining power, is an inquiry which has largely engaged the 

 attention of both philosophers and theologians. It is one of great 

 interest, and which haa an important hearing, on whatever relates to 

 man as the subject of a moral government. [ WILL.] 



Tho doctrine of a universal necessity, or fatalism, was maintained by 

 many of the ancient philosophers ; and formed the characteristic tenet 

 of the Stoical school. According to it, necessity was to be con- 

 sidered as nn inevitable and all comprehending principle, to which 

 gods as well as men were subject. (Everything was conceived to exist 

 in a necessary aeries of causes and effects the whole constitution of 

 nature the modes and circumstances of all things without exception 

 being irresistibly and unchangeably determined. Hence the 

 language of Seneca, the elegant expounder of the opinions of this Met, 

 in his treatise On Providence : ' " The same necessity binds both 

 gods and men Divine as well as human affairs proceed onward in an 

 irreaistible stream one cause depends upon another effects ore pro- 

 duced in an endless series nothing lis the offspring of chance." 

 Democritus held opinions closely resembling the Stoical docl i 

 fate ; as also Heraclitun, the founder (of the sect that went by his 

 name. In modern times, the doctrine of necessity, especially in regard 



to the human will, ha* been defended by Hobbes, LeibniU, Priestley, 

 Hume, Kaiuies, Hartley, and many others. 



The universal language and practice of mankind imply a belief in a 

 UM !' free-will. To deliberate, to choose, to determine, aud to act 

 iu pursuance of such determination, are expressions in every man's 

 mouth, and things within every man's ordin 



himself and others. Every man also suppose* that another will choose 

 and determine pretty much in the same way that be himself would 

 under the aune external circumstances; that is, each man i 

 that every other man will be governed by motives, or will act according 

 to motives, in the main pretty much as he would himself. When men 

 act differently under the same external circumstance*, the cause of th 

 difference in conduct is not referred to the circumstances, in which it 

 is here supposed that there u no difference, but to some difference in 

 the persons. We believe, therefore, that circumstances move i. 

 art, l.nt that we have at least a certain i*>. liing these \ 



motives and giving the preponderance to one or another, and that 

 different men pompon and exercise, this power in different degrees. 

 This may be called, in a sense, a free exercise of the will, and every 

 man, at least who is of sound mind, believes that he has this power, 

 and ia supposed by other* to have it. 



The belief that man possesses this power is the foundation of laws 

 whk-U forbid acts under certain penalties. All legislators have believed 

 that the knowledge that a certain punishment will follow a certain act 

 if detected, operates in some degree on those who are disposed to do 

 the forbidden act ; that the persons who are by any motives led 

 towards such act may, and as a general rule will, delil>erate on the 

 penalty attached to the act before they do it, and will often I* pre- 

 vented from doing it by a comparison of the advantage which they 

 expect to derive from the act, with the certain penalty attached to it. 

 Many persons do not violate the law because they have been brought 

 up in habits of uniform obedience to it, and therefore the penalties of 

 the law have little or no effect upon their conduct : but it will hardly 

 be disputed that the fear of punishment has some effect on many im -n, 

 and is a motive which, operating on the mind and operated \i\ 

 the mind, produces self-restraint. The enactment of penal laws sup- 

 poses a power in men to determine how they will act ; or, in other 

 words, it supposes at least that motives can be present*-.! i 

 which shall in some way and in some degree determine their conduct. 



That men, then, do act under the influence of motives, ami thai they 

 have also the power of weighing motives, is universally admits 

 for all practical purposes it is immaterial to inquire any further. A 

 man subjects himself to a certain discipline, he educates his children 

 in a certain method, aud legislators forbid men to do a variety of acts, 

 all acting under the belief that the discipline, the education, ami the 

 rules of law are so many motives, which, by constantly perating on the 

 mind, will produce on the whole a certain line of conduct in those who 

 are the objects of them. 



But it has been already said, that the external circumstances or tin- 

 motives being the same, two persons will often act diili 1. 1.:)-. i.n.li : 

 them. As the external motives ore by the supposition the same, tin if 

 is some difference in the persons which causes the ditlcreiicu of 

 Under the same external circumstances, oue man will vi..i,it< the law, 

 and another will not ; one will steal and rob, and commit uiurder, and 

 another will not. It is generally said that the transgressor of the law 

 is punished on the supposition that his act is voluntary ; that he 

 if he chitte, haw acted differently. Practically, ho wh.. ixi.n: 

 law will not trouble lu'in.- it with the question whether a | ui titular 

 individual could have acted differently under the circumstances : if it 

 is thown that such a person possessed the ordinary understanding of 

 mankind, he will see no reason for remitting the punishment ; because 

 he believes that in most cases, if not in all, the penalty attached to a 

 particular act will operate to deter people from doing it. The question 

 of an absolute free-will, then, does not concern a legislator. . It is 

 enough for him to present the proper motives for acting or not acting 

 in certain ways, if he believes that such motives will on the \\h..le 

 produce the conduct which he require*. Nor does the question ,.f 

 absolute free-will concern any other person who has to direct or ope- 

 rate upon others. If he believes that he can place such circumstances 

 around persons, or present to them such motives, as will cause a deter- 

 minate course of action, it is unimportant whether he believes that the 

 course of action is necessarily determined by these circumstances, or 

 by these concurring with other circumstances, or that the person 

 ore tinder their influence do in some way or other choose and deter- 

 mine to act as he wishes them to act. 



But if wo examine more closely any particular act of a man's life, 

 suppose it to be an act which has about it all the marks of slow delibe- 

 ration, in what sense can we say that this is an act of absolute free ill ' 

 Tin ordinary language of mankind assumes the existence of choice, 

 deliberation, and yet it does not permit us to maintain that every act 

 is an act of absolute free-will. If it is a virtuous act, we do not 

 barely ascribe it to a man's careful consideration of all the motives 

 which at the time operated on him ; we speak of his habits, his edu- 

 cation, his character, as the things which would ensure his acting on a 

 given occasion in a determinate way, or, if we so choose to express it, 

 as securing that exercise of the will which is called a proper exercise. 

 And we make the like remarks of a man who has deliberately done a 

 bad act. In both cases we do not attribute the whole conduct of the 



