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INTERCALARY. 



INTERDICT, ECCLESIASTICAL. 



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multitude without losing its own unity and permanence. On the other 

 hand it is the source of those primary principles on which all science 

 rests, as conversant about universal and demonstrable truth. 



For intellect Mr. 8tewart prefers the vernacular term understanding, 

 which he employs in the same extensive signification. But the critical 

 philosophy of Kant distinguishes the intellect into two faculties, under- 

 standing and reason. The understanding acting on experience merely 

 compares, judges, and measures its representations, and is conversant 

 solely with their mutual limits and relations, classifying them accord- 

 ing to certain schemes of its own which are called categories. While 

 however the understanding is thus limited, the activity of the reason 

 is unbounded, and, as the principle of principles, it is the base and the 

 verification of every special principle and reasoning. 



Intellectualism, or intellectual philosophy, as opposed to sensualism, 

 is a particular theory in philosophy, according to which the intellect 

 or thought is the only source of true knowledge, whereaa the evidence 

 of sense is but a cheat and delusion. The Eleatao were the most dis- 

 tinguished adherents of this doctrine. The phrase intellectual know- 

 ledge denotes whatever principle or proposition had its origin in the 

 Understanding or reason, as opposed to sensuous or empirical know- 

 ledge, whose source Is sensation. As contradistinguished from sen- 

 sibleg, the objects of this cognition are denominated intelligibles 

 (a.lffff-rj'rd, vorjrd). 



INTERCALARY. [KALKNDAR.] 



INTERDICT (hlerdictiim in the Roman law). The general dis- 

 tinction between the Roman Inturdictum and Actio seems clearly 

 pointed out by Savigny in a few remarks on the passage in Oaius 

 (iv. 139), where that writer treats of the interdict. The words of 

 Gains, which form the groundwork of the following remarks of Savigny, 

 are : " Certis ex caussis Praetor aut Proconsul principaliter auctoritatem 

 Buam finiendis controveraiis proponit " (or prtrprmit, as Haubold reads, 

 after Maffei) ; and his remarks have reference to the supposed difficulty 

 of the word principaliter, and to a certain proposed emendation 

 supported by very indifferent reasons. 



The general distinction between the actio and the interdictum is 

 this : in the actio the pnctor does nothing, but only allows a judex, 

 whose duty it is to inquire and decide. \Vh*en the judejc has decided, 

 the matter may in general be considered as at an end, and if the 

 praetor is again called on to act in the cause, such must be viewed as 

 an accidental thing. This appears from the terms of the praetor's 

 order in matters which belong to the actio : he does not command or 

 forbid a thing to be done, but he says " judicium dabo." With the 

 interdictum it is just the reverse. Here also judicei or recuperatores 

 may be required when the facts are in dispute ; but as a general rule 

 in matters to which the interdict applies, the case is such that the 

 prsetor's order can immediately terminate the question. The praetor 

 accordingly does not say " judicium dabo," but he uses the ordering 

 words " restitus, exhibeas, vim fieri veto," ftc ; and this could not be 

 better expressed, as Savigny remarks, than by the words " principaliter," 

 to. ; the meaning of which, as Haubold observes, can hardly be any- 

 thing else than thin : " the praetor or the proconsul at once gives a 

 definitive judgment, by which the dispute, at least for the present, is 

 terminated." 



According to Gains, the general description of the interdictum is 

 this It ordered something to be done, or forbade something being 

 done. The forms of the orders used on such occasions were called by 

 the general name of interdicta. When the order was to produce 

 something (exhibere), or restore a thing (restituere), the interdicta 

 were called Decreta. The term Interdictum was used when the order 

 forbade a certain thing being done as disturbing a man who was in 

 possession, sine vitio; preventing any trespass on sacred ground, SLC. 



The general process seems to have been l>y a kind of bill or petition 

 addressed to the pnctor, in which the plaintiff stated his grievance and 

 prayed for redress, that i, for the interdictum. The defendant also 

 stated his case, probably by way of reply to that of the plaintiff. If 

 the case was clear on the part of the plaintiff, he obtained the interdict. 

 Or if the defendant admitted the plaintiffs statement of his case, or 

 if after the interdict was obtained he submitted to its terms, the 

 matter was at an end. If the defendant denied the plaintiff's case, 

 that is, denied that there was any ground for the interdict, or main- 

 tained that he had given the plaintiff full satisfaction, and had 

 complied with the terms of the interdict, the plaintiff made his 

 application to the pnetor to refer the matter to judica or recuperatores, 

 or to an arbiter. The parties complainant and defendant went before 

 the judex or arJAter whom the pnctor named, and the process then 

 became the usual process of the actio. The parties produced their 

 witnesses and proofs, and the judex or arbiter decided upon them. 

 The terms of the interdict, in case it was prohibitory, were the formal 

 words of the edict which determined in what cases such relief could 

 be given (certis ex caussis), only so far varied as to apply to the parties 

 who were in dispute. In the restitutory and exhibitory interdict, the 

 term* of the order would necessarily vary according to circumstances. 

 If the matter came before a judex, the only question as to the pro- 

 hibitory interdict which he had to settle was, whether the defendant 

 had, by his act*, brought himself within the praetor's interdict. If he 

 had, the interdict must be enforced against him ; if not, it must be 

 dissolved. In the case of the restitutory and exhibitory interdict 

 coming before ttiejiulcj; or arbiter, the matters for inquiry would be 



whether the defendant had, by his acts, given good ground for the 

 interdict ; whether he had satisfied the terms of the interdict ; what 

 damages the defendant should pay to the plaintiff, in case he had not 

 satisfied the terms of the interdict, or had only satisfied them imper- 

 fectly. If no sponsio (deposit of money by the parties abiding by the 

 result of the inquiry) had been entered into, and consequently the 

 matter had come before an arbiter, all these three points had to be 

 determined, and the damages were at the discretion of the arbiter ; in 

 case there was a sponsio (which in the prohibitory interdict was 

 necessary, but in the other interdicts not absolutely necessary), the 

 judicei oi recuperatores had to determine only the first two pointa. 

 (Cicero, ' Pro Cseeina,' 8.) In fact, when the matter came before a 

 jude.c or arbiter the interdict process did not differ from that of the 

 i Tdinary actio, as appears from Cicero's oration ' Pro Caecina,' in which 

 the plaintiff Caecina had obtained the praetor's interdict ' Unde Tu,' &c., 

 against the defendant jEbutius, and the matter had been referred 

 to recuperatores. The defence of ^Ebutius before the recuperatores 

 was, that he had obeyed the interdict and had restored the plaintiff 

 to the same place from which he had ejected him. The defendant 

 had not in fact done this ; but it appears to have been sometimes the 

 formal way of raising the question, whether the act complained o 

 had been committed. If it was not committed, the defendant had in 

 substance obeyed the interdict, that is, had not acted contrary to it. 

 Mr. Spence, in his work on the ' Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of 

 Chancery,' has given a short account of this branch of the Roman law 

 of procedure ; and in that part of his book where the history of the rise 

 and progress of the English chancellor's jurisdiction by injunction 

 is discussed (vol. i., ch. xxii.), he maintains that the Roman juris- 

 prudence afforded a model from which a system might be constructed 

 that should supply the desired means for protecting property against 

 actual or prospective dangers. But as he shows, the application of the 

 principle thus introduced was extended much beyond the limits of the 

 Roman process, and the clerical chancellors and their lay successors 

 gradually made great improvements in the method of carrying out the 

 system they had thus introduced. 



The authorities for what is above stated are : Haubold, Ucler die 

 StelU vim den Interdicten in den Veronrsivhm llandnchriften ; and 

 Savigny, C., Nacktrdglicht Bemerkunf/en, in the Zeittchnfl fUr gesehickt- 

 liche RechtwiitcjUfkaft, 8er band. For the application of the interdict 

 to the case of possession, Savigny, Dai, Jlec/it dee Jiefitzes, translated 

 into English by Sir Erskine Perry (book iv.), should be consulted, 

 and his remarks on the case of Ccccina. And in Niebuhr's History of 

 Rome, English triin-lation, edit. 1851, vol. ii., p 130, the reader will 

 find a very able sketch of this intricate and obscure part of Roman 

 legal history. The valuable work of Brissonius, De t'ormulit, lib. v., 

 c. 154, contains a collection nf passages which refer to the functions of 

 the judex in the interdict process ; and for the actual text of the 

 Roman law on this subject the reader is referred to the Commentaries 

 i if iiaius, iv., 138 ; Justinian's Institutes, book iv., title 15, 170; 

 and Digest, book xliii. [INJUNCTION.] 



INTERDICT, in the law of Scotland, is a proceeding in the nature 

 of an injunction from a court of equity in England. It is a prohibitory 

 order, forbidding some act from being done, and it is obtained on the 

 application of the party who would be injured by the performance of 

 the act. It may be issued by the Court of Session, or by the Sheriff's 

 Court. Interdicts also occupy in the law of Scotland a place analogous 

 to the writ of prohibition in England. They are frequently obtained 

 for preventing inferior courts, or courts of limited operation, from 

 exceeding their jurisdiction. To this end the form has been frequently 

 adopted in the disputes between different parties in the Church of 

 Scotland. In pressing matters, interim interdict is awarded before the 

 parties are heard, but in the general case intimation is given to the 

 other party, who gives in answers, and the matter proceeds as an 

 ordinary litigation. 



INTERDICT, ECCLESIASTICAL, a mode of censure employed 

 at times by the Roman Catholic church, by which, in consequence of 

 some offence alleged to have been committed by the people or rulers 

 of a town or country, the pope forbade by a bull the performance of 

 any kind of church rites within the same; the church-service was 

 suspended, the sacraments were not administered, and the funeral 

 service was not read. The use of interdicts appears to have originated 

 with the bishops of the 9th century. Hincmar, bishop of Laon in 

 France, laid a parish of his diocese under an interdict in the year 870. 

 (Moreri's ' Dictionary,' art. ' Interdict.') In the middle ages this mea- 

 sure was often resorted to by the popes in consequence of some serious 

 dispute with the sovereigns of particular countries, and it had the 

 effect of throwing whole kingdoms into consternation, and even into a 

 state of rebellion, by which the refractory sovereigns were obliged to 

 sue for pardon from the pontiff. Gregory VII. and Innocent III. 

 made free use of the interdict. Adrian IV. laid Rome itself under an 

 interdict for the purpose of driving away Arnaldo <Ia Brescia and his 

 followers. Some popes mitigated the rigour of the interdict out of 

 regard to the spiritual wants of the people, who could not be justly 

 punished for the guilt of their rulers. Gregory IX., during the inter- 

 dict against Frederic II., allowed mass to be said on Sundays. On 

 some occasions the sacrament to the dying and baptism to infants 

 were allowed to be administered. (See Lyndwood.) 



The frequent abuse of the interdict has been censured oven by Roman 



