MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN. 



that those who do not agree with him are not 

 psychologists. He almost does go as far as this in 

 reference to another matter, which he says "is 

 admitted by all my opponents who understand the 

 psychology of the subject." Certainly no meta- 

 physician would agree with him, for, as every one 

 who has read Green's " Introduction to Hume " 

 knows, that which for Mr. Romanes is the founda- 

 tion of knowledge, the simple idea, or " perception," 

 or sensation, which is common to man and beast, 

 is the very negation of knowability, and many 

 nothings will not make a something. While if the 

 individual sensation is consciously representative, 

 it is already knowledge, and can as little be shown 

 to exist anywhere except in man as " concepts " 

 can. Curiously enough, almost simultaneously 

 with Mr. Romanes' volume, there have appeared 

 two repudiations of the psychology of " ideation " 

 from different points of view. Father Rickaby 

 repudiates it in the interests of modern scholastic 

 realism, and Mr. Case from the point of view of 

 healthy physical realism. 



We do not, however, propose to join issue with 

 Mr. Romanes on his avowed nominalism or his 

 unavowed sensationalism, either of which, to our 

 perverse metaphysical view, is destructive of know- 

 ledge altogether, still less to criticize Locke and 

 Hume through him. We propose rather to show 

 how Mr. Romanes builds upon this foundation. 



