MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN. 53 



of Mr. Galton ; the " generic " images of Professor 

 Huxley, who however does not clearly distinguish 

 between them and the " concepts ; " they are 

 "sensations with a fringe," as Professor James calls 

 them, on which Professor Maguire, of Dublin, re- 

 marks, "A sensation with a fringe is more mis- 

 leading than a sensation on a bicycle." They are 

 not yet truly universal, but are on their way to 

 become so. For, following Locke again, Mr. 

 Romanes tells us that the mind is as yet passive, 

 whereas in " conceptual thought " it is active. But 

 a blurred picture is as much particular as a picture 

 with a sharp outline ; if it is really " generic " in 

 the sense of being representative, it is already 

 " general." It becomes a mere T/CHTOC avOpoj-rros, 

 doubling the difficulty it was to help to solve. It 

 is Mill's old fallacy of arguing from particulars to 

 particulars. So far as they are particular we cannot 

 argue from them, and so far as we argue from them 

 they are not particular, but typical, and therefore 

 universal. The "recept" of a triangle is like 

 Locke's abstract idea of a triangle, which 



"Must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equila- 

 teral, equicrural, nor scalenon ; but all and none of these at 

 once. In effect it is something imperfect that cannot exist ; 

 an idea wherein some parts of several different and incon- 

 sistent ideas are put together." 



Yet the whole object of the present volume, we 

 are told, is to discover whether there is a difference 



