MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN. 59 



Aristotle, and those who follow him, say Man 

 is different in kind from the brute because man has 

 reason, which brutes have not ; speech, which brutes 

 have not ; morality, which brutes have not. Mr. 

 Romanes has not yet dealt with the question of 

 morality, but on the other two points he endorses 

 the old distinction. The ideas are, indeed, more 

 precisely limited, which is a gain : and they are 

 expressed in terms borrowed from empiricism, 

 which is a loss. He has told us a great deal about 

 the psychical processes of brutes which Aristotle 

 did not know. But the main distinction is as clear 

 as ever. Ideation covers everything from sensation 

 to thought. Language covers all sorts of noises 

 and sign-making, as well as the language of man. 

 But only conceptual ideation, which is peculiar to 

 man, has a right to the name of reason, and only 

 the expression of it in language has a right to be 

 called speech. Homo alahis, if he ever existed, 

 was an impostor, or a contradiction in terms. For 

 " speech created reason : before its advent mankind 

 was reasonless " i.e. it was not mankind at all. 



Yet Mr. Romanes claims to have proved that 

 man and brute only differ in degree and not in 

 kind. Certainly he cannot complain if he is mis- 

 understood and misjudged. A more misleading 

 expression it is difficult to imagine, and even 

 when the sense in which " different in kind " is 

 used has been explained, the old and natural use 



