CREATION AND CREATIAN1SM. 69 



sense when the creative act turns that which is not 

 into that which is. He creates in the second sense 

 (mediante natnrd, as the Schoolman says) in all those 

 processes to which properly the name of evolution 

 or development is given. Such a distinction is 

 recognized by Haeckel, as creation of matter and 

 creation of form. 1 Of the first, Creation in its 

 narrow sense, science knows nothing; the second 

 properly falls under the cognizance of science. 2 



In order to bring this question to a point, I 

 will for the sake of argument assume, what I do 

 not believe, that, given a certain Trpwrrj vXrj, the pro- 

 cess known as evolution will cover everything. 

 Haeckel, of course, believes this, for he moves in 

 the region of matter, and spirit for him means 

 matter subtilized. The religious instinct, like the 

 gregarious instinct, is the result of organization. 



Now, with those evolutionists who, like Haeckel 

 and Darwin, start from the' material side, the 

 defenders of Creation have no real quarrel. Indeed, 

 though science can know nothing of it, a primary 

 creation of matter is even probable. For we must 



1 History of Creation, vol. i. pp. 8, 9. 



2 "It is plain that physical science and 'evolution' can have 

 nothing whatever to do with absolute or primary creation." Mivart, 

 Genesis of Species, p. 261. See too his quotation from Baden 

 Powell's Essay. Cf. also some useful quotations in Luthardt, 

 Fundamental Truths, pp. 360, 361, and Tyndall, Use and Limits 

 of Imagination in Science, p. 49. "Evolution does not solve 

 it does not profess to solve the ultimate mystery of this universe. 



t leaves, in fact, that mystery untouched." 



