TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY. 105 



smooth surface of a decent life," The fact, too, 

 that every moral judgment is a judgment of moral 

 worth enables us clearly to draw the line between 

 the judgments of conscience and of prudence. The 

 moral judgment is insight, prudence \s foresight : 

 conscience is given, prudence is found. 



This brings us to the most valuable part of 

 Dr. Martineau's constructive work, where we must 

 leave him, without following him into the detailed 

 classification of the springs of action. 



Conscience speaks with authority. This truth 

 has shown itself in our very conception of duty. 

 For 



" k Without objective conditions, the idea of duty involves a 

 contradiction, and its phraseology passes into an unmeaning 

 figure of speech. Nothing can be binding to us that is not 

 higher than we ; and to speak of one part of self imposing 

 obligation on another part of one impulse or affection play- 

 ing, as it were, the god to another is to trifle with the real 

 significance of the sentiments that speak within us. Con- 

 science does not frame the law, it simply reveals the law 

 that holds us ; and to make everything of the disclosure 

 and nothing of the thing disclosed is to affirm and to deny 

 the revelation in the same breath." 



But 



"The predicate 'higher than I' takes me yet a step 

 beyond ; for what am I ? A person, higher than whom no 

 ''thing' 1 assuredly, no mere phenomenon, can be; but only 

 another Person, greater and higher and of deeper insight. 

 . . . If it be true that over a free and living person nothing 

 short of a free and living person can have higher authority, 

 then is it certain that a ' subjective' conscience is impossible. 



