SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WILL. 13$ 



the universe and God ? Here " freedom " has to 

 run the gauntlet with 



(a) A metaphysical pantheism. 



(/3) A theological theory of omnipotence. 



(7) A physical doctrine of determinism. 



(a) THE STOICS. Here we get the first collision 

 between moral freedom and physical necessity : 

 E</uap/ulifh avajKri is supreme everywhere ; human 

 freedom is therefore only a mode of necessity. 

 Chrysippus struggles in vain with the difficulty, 

 but at last responsibility disappears in fate. 1 



Q3) JOHN CALVIN. Theological necessitarianism 

 dates from John Calvin, though the reaction from 

 Pelagianism in St. Augustine gave a colour of 

 necessitarianism to Augustinianism. The " Deus 

 ducit volentem duci " of St. Augustine reminds one 

 of Seneca's (Ep., 107. ii.) " Ducunt volentem fata, 

 nolentem trahunt." But Calvin, starting with the 

 omnipotence of God, made Him responsible for 

 all human actions, evil as well as good. He did 

 not allow, He willed evil. The "double predesti- 

 nation " was not more immoral than this, though 

 the injustice was more obvious. 



(7) Determinism. Hobbes, Hume, and Mill main- 

 tained mechanical Determinism. H. Spencer and 

 his followers maintain physiological Determinism. 

 Kant's answer to the difficulty consists in an 



1 See Zeller, Gesch. d. Griechischen Philosophic, III. Th. I 

 Abth. pp. 1 68, scqq. 



