138 ASSAYS SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL. 



object " l or the putting one's self forth in desire 

 for the realization of some object present to us 

 in idea. It is not merely selecting, but selecting 

 for a reason. 



Thus Will can be identified with neither reason 

 nor desire^ nor is it a third thing co-ordinate with 

 both (Plato) nor a fusion of the two (Aristotle), 

 yet it includes both. 



It includes (a) the instinctive craving for a good, 

 an ideal to be realized in Aristotelian language 

 /SovArjo-tCj which though a part of op&g is already, 

 as being |3ouAi?<ne ayaOov, \OJKJTIKOV rt. Q3) A 

 representation to ourselves of some good to be 

 realized j^avracna). (7) The rational deliberation as 

 to how it shall be realized (flovXtvaig). (S) The 

 identification of self with the best means for the 

 end 



1 Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 151, 152. 



2 Cf. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 158. "Will, then, is 

 equally and indistinguishably desire and thought not however mere 

 desire or mere thought, if by that is meant desire or thought as they 

 might exist in a being that was not self-distinguishing and self- 

 seeking, or as they may occur to a man independently of any action 

 of himself; but desire and thought as they are involved in the 

 direction of a self-distinguishing and self-seeking subject to the 

 realization of an idea. . . . The will is simply the man. Any 

 act of will is the expression of the man as he at the time is. 

 The motive issuing in his act, the object of his will, the idea which 

 for the time he sets himself to realize, are but the same things in 

 different words. ... In willing he carries with him, so to speak, 

 his whole self to the realization of the given idea. All the time 

 that he so wills, he may feel the pangs of conscience, or, on the 

 other hand, the annoyance, the sacrifice, implied in acting conscien- 



