142 JESS AYS SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL. 



willing the man is his own object. (In acts which 

 are done &' ayvoiav, " circumstances master a man," 

 says Hegel : the will does not will. In acts done 

 )3m, the will is free though the act is not.) 



(]3) The Will is always determined, it cannot act 

 without a motive, and the motive of the will is 

 always good, or conceived of sub specie boni. But 

 this is self-determination ; and SELF-DETERMINA- 

 TION is equivalent to FREEDOM. Necessitas natu- 

 ralis non aufert libertatem voluntatis. 1 



" To act by motives is to act freely, to act with- 

 out motive is to act under necessity, physical 

 necessity is the only necessity, and moral necessity 

 is freedom." 2 



(y) In the sense of real freedom, however, the 

 good will is free, not the bad one. 3 



Liberty, as actual freedom, is a thing to be 

 won, and it can be won only by realizing the law 

 of one's being. 



The man who, by his formal freedom of self- 

 determination, identifies himself with impulses not 

 for his true good is a slave ; he who seeks satisfac- 

 tion in what is for his true good is free. In the 

 former case, he uses his freedom to make himself 

 a slave ; in the latter, he wins freedom by self- 

 emancipation from nature. 



This (Hegelian) view of freedom which we find 



1 S. Thomas Aq., I a., 82, I ad. I. 2 Stirling, p. 19. 



3 Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, ii. 321. 



