A SUMMARY OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 147 



j3Xaj3e/oov, SiKaiov and aStKov (Pol., 1253). He 

 not only instinctively satisfies wants, he seeks for 

 good ; he not only feels, he seeks to know. The 

 O/OE&C of man and of the brute is different In 

 the brute it is liriOvpia and OVJU.OG ; in man it is 

 these plus jSouArjdtc, which, being a wish for good, 

 is implicitly rational. It is XoytcrriKYi opt^e, as 

 opposed to the aXoyot opt'^e. 



Contrast ivith modern thought. It is clear that 

 for us this question is far more complicated. 

 Evolution has brought out the close affinity of 

 man with the brute, but (a) the breach between 

 a^v\ov and IE/UL^V\OV is more marked, and Q3) 

 though we trace the beginnings of conscious- 

 ness in the animal world, it still remains true, as 

 Tyndall puts it, 1 that the chasm between physical 

 processes and facts of consciousness remains "intel- 

 lectually impassable." Herbert Spencer admits the 

 same while asserting the origin of consciousness 

 out of unconsciousness, of the physical from the 

 physiological. 2 



The great metaphysical problem of the day is 

 personality implying (a) self-consciousness, ()3) 

 freedom. Can these be put on one side as illusory 

 or reduced to the unconscious and the necessary ? 

 Is man a thing of nature, or is he, as he thinks he 

 is, greater than nature ? If so, is not conscious 



1 Scientific Materialism, p. 420. 



2 See, too, Fiske, Destiny of Man, pp. 62-65. 



