A SUMMARY OF ARISTOTLE S ETHICS. 149 



beauty. There are endless views as to what our 

 duty is, and why it is our duty ; but few would 

 accept Bentham's paradox that the word " ought " 

 ought to be banished from morals. This sterner 

 view is due to two causes, the Stoic necessitarian- 

 ism, and the religious sanction. Whether we talk of 

 a perfect life as " following nature " or as conformity 

 to the will of God, it has a character of necessity 

 and universality which the Greek wSai/uLovia certainly 

 had not ; and in both cases it subordinates man to 

 what is conceived of as greater than himself. The 

 Kantian conception of " Duty " lies between the 

 Stoic and the religious view ; it has the sternness 

 and inflexibility of the one, and the moral authority 

 of the other. 



The method of realizing TO ayaObv. EuSmjuoWa 

 as equivalent to rajaOov is the well-being of the 

 whole man, therefore it is an activity or perfect 

 realization of his being (tvepyt'ia). But his nature 

 is not like God's, aTrAfj. He has body as well as 

 soul, and the soul is not a simple whole : that which 

 is an irrational principle of life in the plant, and of 

 life and movement in the animal, is capable in man 

 of transfusion by the rational. Yet the irrational 

 rationalized is distinguished from that which is 

 reason in itself. Man's nature, though not like 

 God's, jLtta KCU airXri, is yet a unity, a o-uorrjjua, in 

 which there is a naturally higher and a naturally 

 lower. And, just as in the world of nature, ro 



