326 THE ADVENTURES OF A GENTLEMAN 



assuming that the doubt is not one of admissibility ; 

 and, therefore, if a jury decides that the fact of 

 unsoundness is established, inasmuch as they are the 

 judges of fact, I apprehend that the court would 

 not set aside their verdict merely because the evi- 

 dence Avas not necessarily decisive. The following 

 case, I think, bears me out in this position: 



Lewis V. Peake, 7 Taunton, 153. — " The soundness 

 or unsoundness of a horse, is a question peculiarly fit 

 for the consideration of a jury, and the court will not 

 set aside a verdict for a preponderance of contrary 

 evidence. If the buyer of a horse with warranty, 

 relying thereon, resells him with warranty, and being 

 sued thereon, by his vendee, offers the defence to his 

 vendor, who gives no directions as to the action, the 

 plaintiff* in defending that action, is entitled to re- 

 cover the costs thereof from his vendor, as part of 

 the damage occasioned by his breach of warranty." 



•" This is correctly quoted ; but to an unprofessional reader, it 

 would be more intelligible to substitute " defendant" for " plain- 

 tiff ;" the party would indeed, be " plaintiff" in the action against 

 his own vendor, but a plaintiff can scarcely be properly spoken of 

 as " defending" an action : still, for the sake of accuracy, I prefer 

 quoting the report as I find it. 



