RECOVERY OF STOLEN HORSES. 65 



was given of a compliance with the statutory regulations, 

 a bo)id fide purchaser of a horse from a person who had 

 bought it (as the second pm-chaser knew) at a fair, with- 

 out any evidence that he knew that it was obtained dis- 

 honestly, although it had been purchased on credit, and 

 not paid for, was held entitled to maintain trover against 

 the original owner for retaking it. 



The onus of showing that the formalities required by Proof of com- 

 the statute have been observed lies on the buyer. In pliance with 

 Moran v. Pitt {e) the defendant's Mare, which he had 

 turned out in a public park, was found out of the park 

 and was sold at public auction by the " pinner" ; and after 

 an intermediate sale she was sold in Market overt by the 

 plaintiff and subsequently taken possession of by the 

 defendant. No proof was given that the formalities re- 

 quii'ed by the statute had been complied with ; and the 

 Com-t of Queen's Bench, in the absence of such proof, 

 declined to infer that such formalities had been observed, 

 and held that the plaintiff could not maintain an action 

 for the Mare against the defendant, the true owner. 



It has been held, that where a party has good reason to Rule that 

 believe that his Horse has been stolen, he cannot maintain owner must 

 Trover against the person who bought it of the supposed your to brino- 

 thief, unless he has done everything in his power to bring the thief to 

 the thief to justice {/). But where the owner of the stolen J^^stice. 

 property had prosecuted the felon to conviction, and before 

 that time had given notice of the felony to the defendant, 

 who had purchased bond fide, but not in Market overt, and 

 the defendant after such notice had sold the property in 

 Market overt, it was held that the owner might recover 

 from the defendant the value of his property in Trover (g). 



Though the decisions themselves in the cases of Gimson To be taken 

 V. Wood fall and Peer v. Hmnphrey have not been ex- ^ithmodifi- 



CtltlOUS 



pressly overruled, yet the general rule upon which they 

 rest can now only be taken with some modifications. It 

 is a true principle, that where a criminal and consequently 

 an injurious act towards the public has been committed, 

 which is also a civil injury to a party, that party shall not 

 be permitted to seek redress for the civil injury to the 

 prejudice of public justice, and to waive the felony (Ji). 



[e) 42 L. J., Q. B. 47; 28 L. T., [h) Although this is the rule, it 



N. S. 554 ; 21 W. R. 554. becomes a different question when 



(/) Gimson v. Woodfall, 2 C. & we have to consider how it is to 



P. 41. be enforced; per Cockbum, C. J., 



[g) Peer v. Humphrey, 2 A. & E. Wells v. Ahrcihams, L. R., 7 Q. B. 



495. 557; 41 L. J., Q. B. 306. 



O. F 



