140 WARRANTY DISTINGUISHED FROM REPRESENTATION. 



and ended when he was knocked down to the highest 

 bidder (/). 



And in the case of Chalmers v. Harding (g) the plaintiff, 

 a farmer, having by letter inquired of the defendant, an 

 Agent for the sale of agricultural machines, the lowest 

 j^rice for which he could furnish a corn machine, the 

 defendant replied by letter as follows : — " I happen to 

 have a very good second-hand Wood's Eeaper, which I can 

 offer you at IG/. IGv. It belonged to a gentleman who 

 has retired from farming ; he paid me 35/. for it a little 

 time ago ; it has only cut fifty acres, and it is not one 

 penny the worse, — in fact, you would hardly know it 

 from a new one. I enclose drawings. I have shown more 

 than thirty of these machines in this part, all of which are 

 doing well, so that I can confidently recommend it. I do 

 not recommend it for cutting meadow grass, but it will 

 cut wheat, barley, oats, clover, French grass, &c., or any 

 grain crop efficiently." In an action to recover damages for 

 breach of Warranty, the machine having failed to perform 

 the desired work, it was held that the letter did not 

 amount to a Warranty on a contract tliat the particular 

 machine would do the specified work, but was a mere 

 representation and a description of Wood's Patent Reapers 

 generally. 

 Question to The proper question for the Jury in a case in which 



Jury' ° ^ ^^® effect of a statement made during the sale is the point 

 at issue, is whether it is or is not intended to form part of 

 the contract. In the case of Foster v. Smith (A), an agent 

 sold a Mare to C, and having no express authority from 

 the owner to warrant her, refused to do so, but at the time 

 of the sale told C. that " if the Mare was not all right she 

 was not his." C. thereujoon paid the price, which was 

 received by the owner. The Mare proving Unsound, 

 C. returned her to the agent, and sued the owner in the 

 County Court for a return of the money. Jervis, C. J., in 

 delivering the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, 

 said that the proper question to leave to the Jury in this 

 case was whether it was part of the contract that the Mare 

 should be returned, if she proved Unsound ; if so, and she 

 were returned, there would be a failure of consideration, 

 and the plaintiff would be entitled to recover back the 

 price. 



(/•) Hoijkins V. Tanqueray, 23 L. (r/) 17 L. T., N. S. 571. 



J.,"C. P. 162. (h) Foster v. Smith, 18 C. B. 156. 



