NEGLIGENT DRIVING. 321 



So, also, if a person sees another Carriage coming furiously 

 on the wrong side of the road, and does not get out of the 

 way when he has the opportunity, he cannot recover for 

 any injury he may sustain (b). 



In an action brought by an infant plaintiff against a Identification 

 Eailway Company for an iniury from an accident, which of child with 

 was caused by the joint negligence of the defendants and change of it. 

 the grandmother of the child, who had charge of it, the 

 child being unable to take care of itself, it was held by 

 the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the 

 Court of Queen's Bench, that the child could not maintain 

 an action against the Company, as a comj^lete identification 

 was constituted between the plaintiff and the party whose 

 negligence contributed to the damage (c). 



In the case of Tliorogood v. Brijan [d), where a person Identification 

 was run over and killed by an Omnibus which was racing, of passenger 

 and the Negligence of the driver of the Omnibus, in which ^ ^ 

 the deceased was a passenger, was relied on as a defence 

 to the action brought by the widow of the deceased, it was 

 hold that the deceased having trusted the party by selecting 

 the particular conveyance, he had so far identified himself 

 with the Carriage in which he was travelling, that want of 

 care on the part of its driver was a defence for the driver 

 of the other Carriage, which clu'eetly caused the injury ; 

 and that this was in accordance with the opinion expressed 

 by the Court of Exchequer in Bridge v. TJie Grand Junction 

 llaihcay Company {e) . 



Upon this last case the following remarks are made Remarks in 

 in Smith's Leading Cases :— " If two drunken Stage f^J^'Sse^^^*^" 

 Coachmen were to drive their respective carriages against ° 

 each other and injure the passengers, each would have to 

 pay for his own carriage no doubt ; but it is inconceivable 

 that each set of passengers should, by a fiction, be identi- 

 fied with the Coachman who drove them, so as to be re- 

 stricted for remedy to actions against their own driver or 

 his employer {/). And "why in this particular case both 

 the wrongdoers should not be considered liable to a person 

 free from all blame, not answerable for the acts of either 

 of them, and whom they have both injured, is a question 



(i) See Seed v. Tate, post, p. 328. 130. 



(c) Waite v. North-Eastern Rail- {e) Bridge v. The Grand Junction 



way Co., E. B. & E. 719. Hailway Co., 3 M. & W. 244. 

 {d) Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. (/) 1 Sni. L. C, 8th ed. 315. 



O. Y 



