344 



NEGLIGENCE IN THE USE OF HORSES, ETC, 



Damages. 



Responsi- 

 bility for ' ' all 

 possible con- 

 sequences." 



Damage too 

 remote. 



wliere lie did not lay the information, or, in tlie first 

 instance, request the magistrate to award compensation (/). 



Grenerally speaking, where an injury arises from the 

 misconduct of another, the party who is injured has a 

 right to recover from the injuring party for all the con- 

 sequences of that injury. And it is quite clear that every 

 person who does a wrong is at least responsible for all the 

 mischievous consequences that may reasonably be expected 

 to result, under ordinary circumstances, from such mis- 

 conduct {u). 



But it is doubtful whether a person guilty of negligence 

 is responsible for all possible consequences of it, although 

 they could not have been reasonably foreseen or expected. 

 For instance, if a person chooses to w^alk in a crowded 

 street with an open knife tmder his coat, and another 

 person negligently runs against him, is that other person 

 to be responsible for all the injury which the knife may 

 inflict on the person who carries it (.r) ? 



A servant, in breach of the Metropolitan Police Act 

 (2 & 3 Yict. c. 47, s. 54), washed a van in a public street, 

 and allowed the waste water to run down the gutter 

 towards a grating leading to the sewer, about twenty-five 

 yards off. In consequence of the extreme severity of the 

 weather, the grating was obstructed by ice, and the water 

 flowed over a portion of the causeway, which was ill-paved 

 and uneven, and there froze. There was no evidence that 

 the master knew of the grating being obstructed. A Horse, 

 while being led past the spot, slipped upon the ice and 

 broke its leg. It was held that this was a consequence 

 too remote to be attributed to the wrongful act of the 

 servant (//). And Bovill, C. J., said, "No doubt, one who 

 commits a wrongful act is responsible for the ordinary 

 consequences which are likely to result therefrom ; but, 

 generally speaking, he is not liable for damage which is 

 not the natm-al or ordinary consequence of such act, 

 unless it be shown that he knows, or has reasonable means 

 of knowing, that consequences not usually resulting from 

 the act are, by reason of some existing cause, likely to 

 intervene so as to occasion damage to a third person. 

 Where there is no reason to expect it, and no knowledge 



{() Wright V. London General 

 Omnibus Co., L. R., 2 Q. B. D. 271 ; 

 46 L. J., Q. B. 429 ; 36 L. T., N. 

 S. 590 ; 25 W. R. 647. 



{u) Rigby v. Heivitt, 5 Ex. 243. 



(.r) See quaere per Pollock, C. B., 

 Greenland^. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243, 246. 



(v) Sharp V. Foivell, L. R., 7 C. 

 P. 253; 41 L. J., G. P. 95; 26 L. 

 T., N. S. 436. 



