NEGLIGENT DRIVING BY A SERVANT. 345 



in tlie person doing tlie wrongful act that such a state of 

 things exists as to render the damage probable if injury 

 does result to a third person, it is generally considered that 

 the wrongful act is not the proximate cause of the injury, 

 so as to render the wrongdoer liable to an action" (z). 



A Carriage was driven against the wheel of B.'s Chaise, Injury done 

 and the collision threw a person w^ho was in the Chaise *° ^ Carnage, 

 upon the dashing-board. The dashing-board fell on the 

 back of the Horse, and caused him to kick, and thereby 

 the Chaise was injured. It was held, that B. was entitled 

 to recover in Trespass against A. damages commensurate 

 with the whole of the injury sustained {a). 



Where a Horse has been injured by negligent driving, Measure of 

 the Jury must give as Damages the expenses of curing <iamages 

 the Horse and of his keep during that time, in addition jjorse has 

 to the difference between the value of the Horse before been injured, 

 he was injured, and his value after he had been cured. 

 Thus in an action for negligent driving, whereby the 

 plaintiff's Horse was injured, it appeared that the Horse 

 was sent to a Farrier's for six weeks for the purj)ose of 

 being cured. At the end of that time it was ascertained 

 that the Horse was permanently damaged to the extent of 

 20/. And it was held by Mr. Justice Coleridge, that 

 the proper measure of Damages was the Keep of the 

 Horse at the Fariier's, the amount of the Farrier's bill, 

 and the difference between the value of the Horse at 

 the time of the accident and at the end of six weeks; 

 but that the plaintiff ought not to be allowed also for 

 the hire of another Horse during the six weeks {h). 



In an action by the personal representatives of a de- Damages 

 ceased person, to recover Damages for his death under ^q^ {^^^16*611 

 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, the Jury, in assessing the Damages, killed, 

 are confined to injuries of which a pecuniary estimate 

 can be made, and cannot take into their consideration 

 the mental suffering or the loss of society occasioned to 

 the survivors by his death (c). 



Such an action cannot be maintained without some evi- How limited. 

 dence of actual pecuniary damage (<:/), or the loss of the 

 reasonable probability of pecuniary benefit from the con- 

 tinuance of the life of the deceased {e) . 



[z) See note {y), ante. 21 L. J., Q. B. 233 ; Pijm v. Great 



\a) Gilbcrtson v. Richardson, 5 C. Korthern Railway Co., 4 B. & S. 



B. 502. 396. 



{h) Hughes V. Quentin, 8 C. & P. (d) BucTcworth v. Johnson, 4 11. & 



703 ; and see Percival v. Dudgeon, N. 653. 

 Appendix. (e) Pym v. Great Northern Rall- 



(r) Blake v. Midland Railway Co., way Co., 4 B. & S. 396. 



