THE FOOD CRISIS AND AMERICANISM 71 



States, the miller's remuneration was restricted to one- 

 tenth to one-eighth of the wheat ground, or its equiva- 

 lent in money. From almost any railway station in 

 Nebraska, the freight to Minneapolis on a bushel of 

 wheat is more than one-eighth of its value, to say 

 nothing of the freight for returning the flour and by- 

 products bran, middlings, etc. The average price 

 of wheat from 1893 to 1915 inclusive in the Chicago 

 market was 88.3 cents per bushel. The freight on a 

 bushel of wheat from central Nebraska to Minneapolis 

 on rates quoted just prior to advance under Govern- 

 ment control was 13.74 cents per bushel, or one-sixth, 

 instead of one-eighth, the value of the wheat. The 

 same applies to the by-products bran, shorts, mid- 

 dlings indispensable to successful dairying. The 

 high cost of these commodities has practically driven 

 the small farmer out of the dairy business, resulting 

 in an increased cost of milk, butter and cheese to the 

 consuming public. Thus it is seen that larger profits 

 to the farmer do not necessarily mean higher prices to 

 the consumer. In fact, with marketing conditions 

 such as obtained before the war in nearly all European 

 countries, the price of food stuffs to our consumers 

 could have been largely diminished during the last 

 twenty years, and at the same time profits to the farm- 

 ers enormously increased. 



As side-lights on the present agricultural situation 

 in general and evidences of the deplorable marketing 

 conditions, some contemporaneous facts should be con- 

 sidered. One of these is the dividend of $80,000,000 

 400 per cent. on the capital of $20,000,000 re- 

 ported declared in 1916 by one of the packing com- 



