IIO THE FOOD CRISIS AND AMERICANISM 



that the farmer withheld nearly a carload of wheat 

 for his neighbors, estimating that sufficient to sow 200 

 to 250 acres would be required. The price to be paid 

 was the Chicago price on date of delivery, less freight 

 and commission. Not long after that, the Govern- 

 ment fixed the price of such wheat at $2 per bushel, 

 Chicago (about $1.85 to $1.90 per bushel to the 

 farmer). When sowing time came, only two of all 

 the farmers who had applied for seed called for it 

 those two taking 14^/2 bushels, just enough to sow 

 <^/2 acres, instead of 200 to 250 acres. The only 

 reason offered for not sowing more wheat was that the 

 price fixed was too low to justify sowing, and taking 

 the hazard of crop loss or shortage. If the largest pos- 

 sible acreage is sown in the coming year in the strictly 

 wheat-growing sections, it will not be sufficient to sup- 

 ply our Allies, our armies and home consumption. If 

 this amount is secured, it must be by inducing a mul- 

 titude of farmers, in localities where wheat has not 

 been a profitable crop, to plant wheat. 



According to recent press reports, we, in 1917, 

 shipped to our Allies, 132,000,000 bushels of wheat. 

 During the years 1914, 1915 and 1916, after deduct- 

 ing seven bushels per capita to feed their own inhabit- 

 ants and re-seed their fields, Kansas and Nebraska 

 alone had an annual average surplus of 175,613,192 

 bushels of wheat. With unrestricted prices, these two 

 States can be safely counted upon for more than all 

 that was sent to the Allies last year. According to 

 reported yield for 1917 and estimated yield for 1918, 

 under restricted prices, the surplus will be little, if any 

 more, than one-half that amount. 



