14 COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART i 



natural, as when we contrast positive law with the 

 obligations of natural law. Perhaps a combination 

 of these two senses may suggest the Comtist view, 

 especially if we can light up the result with an 

 unspeakable glamour of love and complacency. Comte 

 prefers positive historical institutions to what he 

 regards as metaphysical dreams of natural law or 

 natural rights. He prefers real facts to fictitious or ideal 

 fancies. Yet the fictions had their use. They helped 

 to clear away the mediaeval system, in doctrine and 

 polity, when it had grown obsolete. More than that 

 the spirit of the Revolution or, as Comte would say, 

 the spirit of the Reformation and of the Revolution 

 could not possibly accomplish. But more is now 

 demanded. That negative service has been done. We 

 must be positive. Back then to the facts ; if we 

 appeal to the right facts, in the right spirit, we shall 

 positively save society ; positively, we shall ! 



The old authorities, whose defeat Comte usually 

 takes for granted, were at least three or four in number. 

 There was religion ; supernatural religion ; what students 

 call the positive religions of the world, claiming, many 

 or most of them, to come by revelation. These had 

 played their part in promoting human or social well- 

 being during the theological stage of history, but they 

 were long ago effete ; the metaphysical stage had super- 

 seded them, and it in turn was now yielding to the 

 final or positive stage of knowledge. The other three 

 authorities are all metaphysical, and on that ground are 

 disowned by Comte ; metaphysics proper, the intro- 

 spective method in psychology, and intuition. As 

 it happened, these various alleged authorities had 

 presented themselves in alliance to confront the assaults 

 of modern Agnosticism ; and, as Comte believes, they 



