CHAP, ii COMTE'S LIFE AND TEACHING 21 



Or we may propose another issue. Let us consider 

 Comte's appeal to science. If that works out so clearly 

 and satisfactorily as to carry us unhesitatingly with it, 

 then we may feel that Comte has justified his cavalier 

 attitude towards those mighty allies, faith and reason. 

 On the other hand, if Comte's positive construction fails 

 to commend itself, we shall be justified in " considering 

 yet again " the old-fashioned guides to truth and duty, 

 for which sociology was to be a substitute. 



Now, first, we must remark that Comte does not 

 absolutely shut the door against faith. While he re- 

 gards belief in a God as the second-last outworn raiment 

 of human thought, he declines with some indignation to 

 be called an atheist. God, say his disciples, may or \\ 

 may not exist ; the question lies beyond the competency 

 of human reason to settle. So, too, the doctrine of a 

 soul separate from the body is assigned by Comte to 

 the last outworn phase of thought the metaphysical. 

 Yet, if you call Comte a materialist, his facile indigna- 

 tion once more overflows. He belongs, therefore, to the 

 agnostic group. He will neither say "yes" nor "no." 

 But he is filled with scorn for those who say " yes," for 

 he is perfectly and dogmatically assured that we have 

 no right to dogmatise. Moreover, his attitude towards 

 the claims of his rivals looks very differently in different 

 sentences or paragraphs. When he denounces the dreams 

 of theories that transgress the limits of human reason, 

 he speaks in the tone of one who possesses real know- 

 ledge through the positive sciences. But, when he 

 explains that mankind is abandoning inquiry into 

 causes, it forces itself with a shock upon the reader's 

 mind that the opposite is the case. It is knowledge 

 that we are surrendering. It is reality that we are 

 forsaking. Our predecessors may have failed to attain 



