24 COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART i 



of lower and simpler branches. In spite of the pre- 

 judices of phenomenalism, a scale of values will assert 

 itself as we deal with the different branches of human 

 knowledge. Of course Comte had his own explanation 

 of the origin of this scale of values. It is purely 

 subjective, a matter of human convenience. To take 

 things in this order suits us, and therefore we rightly do 

 so ; for intellectual curiosity is always to be kept in 

 subordination to the claims of the affections. But how 

 does it happen that human knowledge, upon the whole, 

 lends obedience to the demands of the moral nature ? 

 How is it that knowledge comes to us, imperfectly but 

 really, in the form of a system, where the later parts 

 imply the previous parts and carry us further on ? In 

 other words, how comes it that our subjective synthesis 

 does not distort the knowledge which phenomena afford, 

 but rather brings out its inner meaning ? Comte is in 

 ^ a curious half-way position between phenomenalism, to 

 which one fact is as good as another, and idealism, to 

 which knowledge is a thing that objectively and really 

 grades itself. It is a thin disguise of intellectual helpless- 

 ness when Comte asserts that we have such a grouping 

 of phenomena in our knowledge, but that the grouping is 

 due merely to man's capricious regard for the interests of 

 his own species. "Facts are chiels that winna ding." 

 They are not so easily manipulated as Comte implies. 



Putting the matter in our own way, we may say 

 that Comte's positive and constructive teaching has 

 three sources of light and leading, in which it trusts 



(1) The appeal to Biology. 



(2) The appeal to History. 



(3) The doctrine of Altruism. 



We shall say a few words about each in turn. 



