CHAP, iv THE APPEAL TO HISTORY 35 



history of doctrine, the history of theological beliefs. 

 If we treat these in the light of the comparative method 

 they will no longer be meaningless, but meaningful ; we 

 may even discover that " God is not only revealing 

 Himself to His creatures, but also realising Himself to 

 Himself" in history. 



There is a great deal that is Comtist in this pro- 

 gramme. To " abandon the search for essences and 

 look only to Jhe operation of forces" is thoroughly 

 Comtist in spirit, though even "forces" is too meta- 

 physical a term for Comte's taste ; he would write 

 " sequences^" The result contemplated, nt> doubt, is 

 anything but Comtist ; but how immense the gulf be- 

 tween the method recommended and the results desired ! 

 Either our Theistic beliefs are valid and defensible ; 

 but, if so, there are other fields of knowledge besides 

 that cultivated by phenomenal science, and other 

 methods of study for metempirical and metaphysical 

 subjects. Or else Theism is merely a human delusion ; 

 but, if so, historical science can do nothing to galvanise 

 it into fresh life. The sum of the longest series of 

 cyphers is still zero. In one thing Dr. Hatch is right. 

 Our age is pre-eminently an age of historical study. 

 Very likely our age does better work in dealing with 

 the history of beliefs, theological or other, than in 

 dealing directly with the problem of their justification. 

 Nay, our age may even make its best contributions to 

 metaphysics or theology at second hand in the regions 

 of history. But, if so, that is the weakness of our 

 age, not its strength. And, in any case, profitable 

 treatment of the history of such opinions implies a 

 belief that they deal with facts, not hallucinations. 

 Few of us, indeed, may be so metaphysical as Dr. 

 Hatch. A strange way surely of banishing metaphysics, 



