46 COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART i 



The two classes in question nowhere overlap, and there 

 is no third class of motives. Every action must be done 

 with a view either to our own good or to the good of 

 another, or some others, or all others. A further 

 assumption is noteworthy, both psychologically and 

 ethically. It is assumed that we are able, if we like, to 

 encourage one class of motives and multiply the actions 

 which proceed from it, to discourage the other class of 

 motives, and to weed out or gradually exterminate the 

 actions to which it gives rise. And, finally, there is the 

 ethical assumption, that egoistic actions are bad en 

 masse, and altruistic actions ethically good, so that 

 plainly we ought to encourage altruism, and do our best 

 to put down egoism. 



Psychologically, this doctrine involves a notable 

 break with the phenomenalist ethics of the past. Those 

 systems had almost all been established upon psycho- 

 logical hedonism, on the assertion that man necessarily 

 seeks his own pleasure, and cannot possibly, in any 

 action, seek for any other end besides his own pleasure. 

 Man, it was conceived, may be misinformed as to the 

 best means of securing the given end, and therefore 

 there is still room for ethical science as a body of 

 prudential maxims ; it is still possible to say to man, 

 hopelessly and incurably selfish as he is, " you ought " 

 to do this or that ; although upon such a view " you 

 ought" simply means, This will give you the greatest 

 happiness in the long-run. Or hedonism might make 

 room for ethics (of a sort) in a different fashion. The 

 moral fellowship of human society might be regarded 

 as a mutual insurance office, in which every one sur- 

 rendered small fragments of present happiness in return 

 for a guarantee against great contingent unhappiness 

 in the future. Or by a sort of generous confusion the 



