48 COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART i 



action of a lunatic, not of a sane man. Old-fashioned 

 empiricism was right in looking for a personal motive 

 in each action, though gravely in the wrong when it 

 called that personal motive, uniformly and monotonously, 

 by the name of pleasure. But again, with scarcely less 

 confidence, one may assert that even the most egoistic 

 actions are, in a sense, altruistic. Man is so radically 

 social that his sins no less than his virtues are stamped 

 with the signet of his nature. He sins socially. If he 

 does not serve others he uses up others in his own 

 service. Nay, even the cynic is only a social being in a 

 pet. He retains the hope that some one is watching 

 him. Diogenes, basking in his tub, has an exquisite 

 pleasure in requesting the great Alexander to stand out 

 of the light. Outwardly withdrawn from society, he 

 is inwardly dependent on it; for admiration, or for 

 criticism, but at any rate for notice. Of course, Comtists 

 may rejoin that they mean to allow for all this. But 

 does their formulation of the case satisfy the demands 

 of science ? Surely Comte, of all men, will not maintain 

 that scientific accuracy is superfluous, or that conduct 

 can be safely guided in the light of slovenly and in- 

 accurate thinking ! 



A second criticism is offered by Sir J. Fitzjames 

 Stephen in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. 1 Justice 

 Stephen, like his brother Mr. Leslie Stephen, is a very 

 severe critic of the weakness of Comte. He protests especi- 

 ally against a further assumption which we noticed in pass- 

 ing, the assumption that it is possible, by careful effort, 

 to readjust the balance of egoism and altruism in human 

 nature. According to Stephen, such a change lies as 

 far beyond our power as a change in gravitation or 

 magnetism, or any of the forces of nature. Sir Fitzjames 



1 p. no. 



