CHAP, v THE DOCTRINE OF ALTRUISM 49 



Stephen does not (here at least) pin his faith to the old 

 selfish psychology of hedonism. Allowing the assump- 

 tion to pass, that there are a certain number of unselfish 

 promptings in the nature of mankind, or of any given 

 individual, he assumes that (like the elect under the 

 scheme of Calvinism) they can neither be increased nor 

 diminished in number. The criticism, advanced as it is 

 by a determinist, is a very awkward criticism for his 

 fellow-determinists to meet. Speaking as an impenitent 

 freewiller, one admires this pretty quarrel between the 

 forces of the enemy. Stephen appears to be the more 

 logical or consistent determinist, while he is certainly 

 the more impracticable and the more hopeless guide of 

 human conduct. Put in so naked and outrageous a 

 shape, determinism must repel all who love goodness 

 better than they love paradox. Comte's determinism 

 is disguised or kept in the background. He points out 

 that human agency can do absolutely nothing to modify 

 astronomical laws, but that, as we ascend the scale of 

 the sciences, we see physical and chemical forces yielding 

 more and more to human manipulation, until finally, 

 arrived at sociology, we may well expect " the human 

 providence " to prove itself nearly omnipotent. Stripped 

 of its Comtist language, all this is true, but it is a truth 

 incompatible with thoroughgoing phenomenalism. Just 

 because man can modify nature, he can more profoundly 

 modify himself. Just because he is not a passive stage, 

 upon which the feelings fight out their battle and settle 

 his destiny for him; just because "man is man, and 

 master of his fate," he puts his mark upon the world in 

 which he lives, and makes it his world. 



We may now leave the psychological aspects of the 

 doctrine of altruism, and consider its ethical aspects. 

 It has been argued that the sharp contrast between 



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