50 COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART i 



egoistic and altruistic actions or motives is vicious 

 psychology ; and while we have agreed with Comte 

 against Stephen that the forces of human nature are 

 capable of being profoundly modified, we were sceptical 

 as to the possibility of harmonising this fact with the 

 principles of determinism. It remains to discuss the 

 ethical significance and trustworthiness of the altruistic 

 ideal. 



Its significance in Comte's system is plain enough. 

 It furnishes him with a fresh definition of virtue, as the 

 appeal to biology furnished him with a fresh definition 

 of duty. Less authoritative than the doctrine of the 

 social organism, the doctrine of altruism appeals to 

 man's moral nature from a different side. To live 

 for self is al<rxp6v ; to live for others is KO\OV 

 tcar/adov. Thus there is a special appeal to motive in 

 this new definition. Perhaps, however, it is best 

 understood as a deliberate rejection of duty to God or 

 to any transcendent standard of worth. Virtue shall 

 be only barely mutual help between man and man. 

 Altruism accordingly is the religion of humanity itself, 

 considered as a law of conduct between individual and 

 individual. The state is not mentioned ; society is not 

 formally invoked ; but we are bidden live for others. It 

 is easy to see that this doctrine corresponds to a part, an 

 element, an aspect of human goodness. With Comte, 

 however, it stands for the whole. 



The doctrine finds a response in human nature and 

 the human heart. For, whether recognised or ignored, 

 the moral nature of man is a constant factor in the 

 promulgation and the acceptance of ethical doctrines, 

 healthy or morbid. Conscience is always with us ; it is 

 always more or less active, more or less influential ; and 

 it sees something in " altruism." But, as a formal and 



