CHAP, v THE DOCTRINE OF ALTRUISM 53 



It is strange to find this doctrine of balance, this 

 glorifying of compromise, renewed by Herbert Spencer 

 the second great name in the annals of sociology, the 

 inheritor of Comte's problems and Comte's vocabulary. 

 He also assumes the psychological legitimacy of the 

 contrast between " Egoism " and " Altruism " ; but 

 altruism does not rank with him as a compend of all the 

 virtues. It is only one half of virtue, though possibly, 

 in the language of children, " the biggest half." 



Here again, as formerly, we have to ask, Which is 

 the juster development of the view in question ? If we 

 accept altruism as a conception which is psychologically 

 valid and ethically important, ought we, like Comte, to 

 press it as hard as we can, or rather, like Spencer, to 

 urge that altruism is good only when balanced by a 

 judicious regard to our own egoistic rights? Perhaps 

 the latter view has more of the remnants of wisdom in 

 it. But the truth is, both views are impracticable ; 

 Spencer's no less than Comte's ; a doctrine of balance 

 no less than a doctrine which ignores self. The double- 

 minded man is, and remains, unstable. It is impossible 

 to serve two masters. A true moral analysis must 

 recognise something higher in the lowliest duty, and in 

 the commonest act of kindness, than private convenience, 

 whether that of ego or alter. " One person I have to 

 make good myself. My duty to my neighbour is 

 much more nearly expressed by saying that I have to 

 make him happy if I may." * Yes indeed ; but, in 

 making my neighbour happy, I make myself good ; or, 

 if I fail to make myself good, I shall not long make my 

 neighbour happy. Both are duties ; or rather both are 

 aspects of the good life, in whose unity they are merged. 

 And in both alike there is a reference to something 



1 R. L. Stevenson, A Christmas Sermon. 



