72 COMTE TO BENJAMIN K1DD PART n 



of motion. In the invisible world of molecular change 

 it was assumed that these diverse branches combined in 

 one common trunk. The second discovery was Darwin's 

 account of the origin of species. Before this theory was 

 broached Spencer was already on the track of his own 

 thoughts. If it helped him it did so rather by confirm- 

 ing his original bias than by making him a convert to 

 the special peculiarities of Darwinism. In its simplest 

 shape Spencerian evolution is an assertion of the all- 

 sufficiency of natural law, a denial of intervention from 

 outside at any stage in the process by which the universe 

 has become what it is. Moreover, natural law means 

 here strictly physical law ; everything is to be explained 

 in terms of " matter and motion." This denial of all 

 miracle, and of everything analogous to miracle, gives 

 evolution its charm in the eyes of a fighting evolutionist 

 like Mr. Edward Clodd. On Spencer's premises " there 

 is nowhere else " outside the process whence interference 

 might come. Mr. Spencer is confident that he can 

 account for the beginning of the whole process. The 

 inorganic world has been unified by one discovery, the 

 organic by another. True, the transition from one to 

 the other had not yet been cleared up in terms of natural 

 law ; nor has that been done, one may add, until this 

 day ; but by an act of scientific faith Spencer affirms 

 that the last remaining gap must also be filled up, and 

 natural law remain as the power from which all things 

 have proceeded master of the whole situation. 



When we ask whether there is any close connection 

 between Spencer's philosophy and the doctrine of 

 struggle for existence, we feel at once that Darwinism 

 is almost impossible as a cosmic philosophy. Professor 

 Alexander seems, indeed, to contemplate giving a 

 position of universal importance to the Darwinian 



