82 COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART n 



Spencer has ceased to bear any resemblance to a truism. 

 Vague as are its terms, they are sufficiently startling. 

 Fichte seemed a bold man when he announced a test 

 for all possible revelations ; Spencer is not less bold 

 when he prints a programme for all possible universes ! 

 And all this is in the name of science the old and 

 sober science of mathematics. Spencer assumes a de- 

 finitely limited stock of matter, a definitely limited 

 stock of force, or, as he prefers to say, of motion ; and 

 he alleges that every universe, constituted of these 

 materials, must continuously become more and more 

 complex, until it reaches a balance and ultimately is 

 wrecked by an impulse from without. If this is a 

 scientific certainty, so be it. Yet, without attempting 

 to control Mr. Spencer's use of science, one may express 

 surprise at two or three features in the scheme. First, 

 there is the perplexing doctrine of the instability of the 

 homogeneous. It would have been so much simpler for 

 nature to remain what it was than to work out a position 

 of balance by more than aeonian evolution, only to 

 return once again to homogeneity and instability. So 

 far, the doctrine seems to be this : evolution is neces- 

 sarily originated because of the very nature of matter 

 and force. Secondly, one may express surprise that 

 the forces from without should be assumed to act only 

 at the very beginning of all things, or at the very end 

 of all things. If they can tear up a worn-out universe, 

 are they not likely to tear up the majority of universes 

 before they have so much as half run their course ? 

 Their interference may be orderly enough ; it may only 

 result in a richer capitalising of the business ; but 

 assuredly if such things happen, evolution will need to 

 start de novo. Thirdly, the grounds for the theory of 

 equilibrium are not manifest to the plain reader. If 



