96 COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART n 



view of evolutionism hailed it as a new stick for beating 

 the intuitionalist dog withal a new reason for rejecting 

 the conception of ready-made and all authoritative ideas 

 in the human mind. And when he conceived the 

 possibility and desirableness of a new system of morals, 

 he had not in view a worthier ethic than utilitarianism, 

 but rather one more fully in harmony with new scientific 

 truths. Science, not philosophy, demanded the change. 

 Evolutionism must be given effect to. If the change 

 results in a more adequate statement of moral ideas, 

 that is, for Mr. Stephen, a secondary matter. The great 

 thing with him, as on a broader canvas with Mr. 

 Spencer, is to unify thought. One fresh province is 

 to be gained for the master principle, evolution. As 

 Prussia Prussianises its Polish dominions, as Russia 

 desires to Russianise Finland, so Mr. Stephen evolu- 

 tionises his ethics. Of course in each case the conquered 

 is assured that ultimately his own interests will be 

 served through accepting the regime dictated by the 

 conqueror. 



When dealing with Comte, we suggested a difficulty 

 for thorough-going phenomenalism in the very concep- 

 tion of duty ; and we argued that Comte uses the 

 doctrine of the social organism as justifying the claim 

 for individual submission to the public weal. Mr. 

 Stephen also makes an appeal to biology, but he does 

 not directly employ that appeal as a basis of ethics. 

 He begins more simply, by accepting current moral 

 judgments. Science deals with facts ; well ! these are 

 facts. Ideal ethics, indeed, are no facts of everyday 

 experience ; but Mr. Stephen tells us that he has 

 nothing so he says ; nothing to do with ideal ethics. 

 It is the current rules, which have been historically 

 recognised and appealed to, for which he desires to find 



