loo COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART n 



"benevolence," but which, in every case, takes as its 

 direct and supreme rule the highest interests of society, 

 or the welfare of other persons. 



Mr. Stephen explains this conception of morality by 

 the aid of the idea of type. A type in each class, apart 

 from extrinsic and accidental tests, is that which attains 

 maximum efficiency. The most moral human society is 

 the most efficient or most prosperous human society. 

 Here then Mr. Stephen has found a second answer to 

 the question, How can empiricism speak of morally 

 better and morally worse ? The first answer was pro- 

 visional ; the moral consciousness is a fact, and we 

 accept its utterances as approximately trustworthy. The 

 second answer goes deeper. Morality is not something 

 externally added to social life, as a necklace or a posy of 

 flowers may form a slight addition to the graceful 

 dress of a beautiful woman. Morality is simply the 

 perfect performance of social functions, like the glow of 

 health upon a beautiful countenance. Therefore human 

 life in society points to perfect morality as its own 

 typical perfection in the way of vitality or of health. 

 And here we see what biological evolutionism has done 

 for Mr. Stephen. It is not indeed strictly necessary for 

 his argument. There might be evolution in human 

 society, with the moral law as its ideal goal, even if 

 there were no evolution of species in the infra-human 

 world. The "typical bow" which is "felt out" might 

 point us to Mr. Stephen's conception of morality as the 

 true type of our own social being, even if there were no 

 evidence that " the animal . . . feels itself out." 1 But 

 there would not be the same trace or hint of authority in 

 Mr. Stephen's evolutionary interpretation of morals, did 

 we not believe in the origin of species by a process of 



1 p. 79. 



